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Firewalls and Virtual Private Networks Abstract 
Abstract 
The Internet has become a global computing phenomenon, and during the 1990's has had more 
influence on the computer- communications industry than any other development in its history. There 
are two major issues(~fecting the development of the Internet for the 21 '1 century; performance and 
security. This thesis is concerned with the later; in particular the issues raised by the interconnection of 
TCP/IP based networks between trusted and untrusted network domains. 
Four main topics are addressed: the common threats and vulnerabilities that@ffectthe TCP/IP protocol 
suite at the Network, Transport, and Application layers; the application of firewall architectures to 
counter the risks posed by TCP/IP based connections between trusted and untrusted network domains; 
the issue of independent firewall architecture evaluation and certification; and the application of Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) technology to protect traffic over untrusted networks. 
This thesis examines the common threats and vulnerabilities which effect the current TCP/IP protocol 
suite, and hence the Internet. A firewall architecture can be a powerful tool for preventing attacks based 
on TCP/IP vulnerabilities, however, it is only as effective as the security policy that it implements. 
Although firewalls can benefit computer and network security, they suffer from several significant 
limitations, including; the inability to protect network traffic; defending against insider abuse; and 
controlling the content of end-user access (e.g. virus infected files, Java applets, etc.) 
Firewalls are generally considered impregnable, however they are certainly not immune to software and 
hardware vulnerabilities. Therefore, this thesis examines independent evaluation and certification of 
firewall architectures with particular focus on New Zealand and Australian efforts. 
The final section of this thesis examines the use of VPNs for securing network traffic. The 
amalgamation of VPN and firewall technologies allows the security policy to be extended onto the 
network in the form of services, such as, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and strong 
authentication. 
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Chapter 1. Internet Beginnings 
1.1 Introduction 
Today the term "Internet" suggests an image of a global network of computers that exists solely to 
market products and services, and generate profit for the organisations they represent. Fortunately, the 
Internet is far more interesting and varied than the image presented by increasing commercialisation. 
The Internet has grown from its small beginnings in the late 1960's into a truly global network, not just 
in terms of geography but also in respect to national boundaries. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to develop an image of the Internet in its early days before 
commercialisation, and introduce some important concepts which provide background, and help in the 
understanding of many of the topics throughout this thesis. 
1.2 The ARPANET 
The Internet has evolved into its present form from the work begun by the US Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the late 1960s. In 1969, DARPA sponsored a project that 
became known as ARPANET, whose rationale was to provide high-bandwidth connectivity between 
major government, education, and research computing establishments [Hare et al., 1996]. ARPANET 
was an experiment in packet-switched1 network communications, aimed at providing the US 
Department of Defense (DoD) with a command and control network capable of delivering data to its 
destination even if some of the intervening network segments were disabled through, for example, a 
nuclear attack. 
Throughout the 1970's DARPA continued to fund ARPANET, which was extended to include 
experimental satellite and radio communication links. From this came the development of a common 
framework of networking technologies, out of which emerged the Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and the Internet Protocol (IP). These three protocols provide 
the foundation for most of the applications which make use of the Internet today. 
The key protocol is IP, which provides a common ~ddress space that allows messages, known as 
datagrams2, to be delivered between the many separate networks that constitute the Internet. TCP allows 
extremely reliable data transmission over possibly unreliable networks. UDP, which is analogous to 
postal mail, transmits discrete collections of data without any guarantee of delivery. Both TCP and 
UDP require IP, and so do all other protocols that are part of the TCPIIP protocol suite. Note that the 
acronyms TCPIIP and IP are often used to refer to the whole protocol suite. 
It is important to mention here that the development of TCPIIP cannot be attributed entirely to the US 
research the community. In fact, Norway and England were involved from the beginning in the 
development of IP, while France and the United Kingdom (UK) provided considerable technical 
contributions to TCP and IP. For example, the original TCP retransmission algorithm was known as the 
RSRE (Royal Signals and Radar Establishment) algorithm in name of the UK organisation that 
developed it [Carl-Mitchell et al., 1993]. 
The initial protocols used on ARPANET were not TCPIIP, instead TCPIIP was invented using 
ARPANET. The basic protocol used on ARPANET was called Network Control Protocol (NCP) and 
the protocol for a host to communicate with a router was called BBN 1822, after the technical report 
1 Packet-switching involves breaking data into discrete units for transfer over a network, each packet is routed from one 
computer to the next until the destination is reached. In most cases a dedicated computer, known as a router, is used to relay 
packets between the network segments that it connects. 
2 A datagram is a discrete chunk of data that has sufficient addressing information for it to be routed independently in an 
internetwork. Note: the term "packet" is synonymous with the term "datagram". 
1 
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that specified it. Aside from research into packet-switching, the intended use for ARPANET was to 
provide users with the ability to remotely login to very expensive computer resources, and save ARPA 
from duplicating them at each research facility. To enable this, the Virtual Terminal Protocol (Telnet) 
and the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) were developed. The NCP versions of these protocols were 
modified for use with TCPIIP, and have proved so successful that they are still among the most popular 
Internet protocols today. 
By January 1983, all computers connected to ARPANET were using the TCPIIP protocols. In fact, 
ARPANET had become so successful that it was no longer considered an experimental network and 
operational control was passed over to the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), now known as the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). A non-experimental internet, known as ARPA Internet, 
was begun in January 1983 by DCA who required all connected nodes to use TCPIIP. At the same time, 
DCE divided ARPANET into two networks; the ARPANET for research, and MILNET for military 
operations. 
Today's popularity of the TCPIIP protocol suite can be traced back to its initial implementation in the 
University of California at Berkeley's 4.2BSD version of UNIX. The TCPIIP protocols were included 
because ARPA had partly funded the development of 4.2BSD to provide them with a research platform. 
As funding had come from public sources, including the State of California, 4.2BSD was made 
available for the cost of its distribution and therefore spread quickly. Ever since the development of 
UNIX and TCPIIP has been closely entwined. 
Although ARPANET provided the first backbone network of the early Internet (until retirement in 
1990) it was still predominantly a government network. Thus, in 1994 the National Science Foundation 
created a network backbone across the US known as NSFNET, which also used TCPIIP. NSF also 
provided initial funding for smaller regional networks, which are commonly referred to as "NSFNET 
regionals." These regional networks now provide extensive connectivity to universities, government 
agencies, and commercial businesses. 
ARPANET, MILNET formed the earliest US nation-wide network backbones, while others were added 
by US government agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA). In addition 
to US based agencies and educational institutions, 1973 saw the first European organisations connect to 
ARPANET. Over the next decade a number of Japanese and European networks developed and were 
connected, including the European EUNET, and the UK Joint Academic Network (JANET) [Sim et al, 
1997]. With the participation of other government agencies, the name given to this conglomeration of 
networks was changed, from ARPA Internet to Federal Research Internet to TCPIIP Internet and finally 
to just the Internet. 
1.3 New Zealand and the Internet 
New Zealand's history in relation to the Internet begins in 1985 with the establishment of a 2400-
bit.sec-1 dial-up connection from the University of Victoria in Wellington to the University of Calgary 
in Canada. This link was used to transfer electronic-mail (email) using UUCP (UNIX-to-UNIX Copy), 
a store and forward protocol for linking together UNIX systems over low-speed serial lines. Due to the 
low-speed and expense of such a connection, other resources such as USENET news archives continued 
to be delivered on magnetic storage tapes by airmail [Wiggin, 1996]. 
A similar link t() the University of Waterloo in Canada was established by the University of Canterbury. 
At this time no direct links existed between Universities within New Zealand, instead email between 
Victoria and Canterbury universities was delivered via Canada! However, in 1986 these links were 
replaced with packet-switched links to the University of Melbourne in Australia and a US site. 
Sufficient capacity was now available to carry both email and USENET news feeds to the Universities 
and other interested organisations within New Zealand. 
The University of Waikato established the first true IP-based Internet connection from New Zealand to 
the US in April 1989, with a 9600 bit.sec-1 analogue link to Hawaii. This was as a joint development 
2 
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project with NASA and formed part of the Pacific Communications program (PACCOM) [Neal, 1996]. 
The gateway itself was known as "the PACCOM gateway," but was soon renamed "NZGate." 
It is interesting to note that the New Zealand government at that time provided no subsidy whatsoever to 
establish the local end of the Waikato link. This was in stark contrast with NASA which provided a 
generous subsidy to establish and operate the US end in Hawaii. Instead, funding was provided by six 
of the New Zealand universities, with each agreeing to provide one-sixth of the start-up and on-going 
costs which where in-turn passed on to the users. Regardless of this "user-pays" approach, the first four 
years saw significant growth with the link speeds increasing from 9600 bit.sec-1 to 512 Kbit.sec-1• 
In addition to the Waikato Internet connection, the period from 1990 to 1992 saw the beginning of IP 
links between the New Zealand Universities. The Maori word "Kawaihiko"3 was chosen to name the 
network connecting all seven universities (i.e. Canterbury, Otago, Lincoln, Victoria, Massey, Waikato, 
and Auckland). 
The Kawaihiko network began operating in April 1990, and from the beginning greatly improved 
communications between the universities. Initially each site had a Cisco router, and was connected to 
the next node by a 9600 bit.sec-1 Digital Data Service (DDS) link. The original topology consisted of a 
central triangle joining Waikato, Victoria and Canterbury, with the others connected to these (see 
Figure 1-1). Thus, the first large scale IP network had arrived in New Zealand, and began introducing 
many users for the first time to the benefits of TCPIIP services, such as email, FTP, Telnet, and 
USENET news. 
During the early 1990's government research institutions, such as the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (DSIR), were also installing IP networks to connect their main sites. By April1991 
the DSIR had connected five of its sites, i.e. Gracefield, Wellington, Palmerston North, Christchurch 
and Hamilton, which was known as DSIRnet. At the same time the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (MAF) had installed their own IP network (using Telecom's X.25 packet-switched network, 
or PACNET), known as MAFnet. 
lntemet 
Auckland 
. 
~. Massey 
Waikato~ / 
I /Victoria 
Lincoln --- Canterbury 
/ 
Otago 
/) 
Figure 1-1 The location of each university in New Zealand, including the logical 
topology of the Kawaihoki network (see inset). 
3 
"Kawaihiko" is a Maori word, derived from kawai (a branching structure, like tree roots) and hiko (electricity). 
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Prior to 1992 there were three Research and Education networks in New Zealand; DSIRnet, MAFnet, 
and Kawaihiko. However, in 1992 the government restructured the DSIR and MAF creating eleven 
partly independent Crown Research Institutes (CRis), and a single co-ordinated network known as 
CRinet. 
By May 1992 it had been decided to combine the existing Research and Education networks into a 
single network providing a national backbone based on Frame Relay, but retaining DDS links where 
Frame Relay was too expensive. Thus between May and July of 1992, CRinet, Kawaihiko, the National 
Library network, and the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MoRST) network were 
combined into the New Zealand National Research and Educational Network (NREN) [Brownlee, 
1994]. 
Initially NREN was managed through an informal arrangement, which was eventually replaced by the 
Tuia4 Society that resulted in NREN being renamed to TuiaNet. Tuia is an incorporated society, 
providing its members (e.g. the CRis, Universities, etc.) with a legal entity and a formal structure within 
which to run the single national backbone network. Tuia retained the original network groupings as 
management groups, thus, Kawaihiko is the Tuia management group which co-ordinates inter-university 
networking, while Industrial Research Limited (IRL) and AgResearch co-ordinate groups of CRis 
which correspond to the old DSIR and MAF networks. The remaining sites (e.g. National Library, and 
MoRST) have remained as single-member management groups. 
Connections to the Internet have continued to grow dramatically since 1992, especially since the 
deregulation of the telecommunications market. Deregulation provided a competitive environment for 
independent Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and has helped bring Internet access to all parts of New 
Zealand. To help foster this competitive environment, and in response to the increasing pressures of 
maintaining an international link, early 1996 saw Waikato University turn management ofNZGate over 
to Netway (a subsidiary of Telecom) and Clear Communications. NZGate is now known as the New 
Zealand Internet Exchange (NZIX). In addition, NZIX is now no longer the sole Internet gateway, a 
number of other organisations, such as IBM, Voyager, and CompuServe, operate their own international 
links. 
1.4 Internet Growth 
There are a number of factors contributing to the phenomenal growth of the Internet in New Zealand 
and around the globe. One is an increasing recognition and acceptance of the Internet in home based 
computing. Another is the growing commercialisation of the Internet to support business initiatives, 
such as advertising, electronic commerce, and organisations basic day ·to day functioning. 
The reason for such growth during the 1990's can be attributed to the development, in 1989, of the 
World Wide Web (WWW) by Tim Burners-Lee of CERN. It was this single application that 
transformed the Internet into a global, multimedia information service, and helped attract a much 
broader spectrum of users. As of April 1998, a survey conducted by Nua Ltd.5 estimated that the 
number of Internet users was in excess of 115 million- representing 2.4% of the world's population. 
A 1998 survey conducted by Network Wizards6, shown Figure 1-2, page 5, depicts the explosive 
growth of the Internet since 1991. The survey measures the number of hosts, i.e. connected computers, 
on the Internet. ~owever, these numbers are generally considered to be an underestimate of the true size 
4 
"Tuia" is a Maori word which means "bound together." 
5 Nua Ltd. Internet Population survey results are available at http://www.nua.net/surveyslhow_many_online!world.html 
6 Network Wizards Internet Domain survey results are available from http://www.nw.com. It is important to note that the 
methodology used to conduct the January 1998 survey was changed in an effort to achieve more accurate results. The plot of 
"Adjusted Survey Results" is an attempt to adjust the survey results from January 1995 to July 1997 to reflect the new 
methodology and assume a previous history. However, no direct comparisons can be made between the old and new results. 
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due to the fact that firewalls prevent the accurate surveying of a considerable number of network 
domains. From a New Zealand perspective the survey found that 169,264 hosts were connected under 
the second level.nz domain, which represents 100% growth since the January, 1997, survey! 
Prior to 1990 the Internet was predominantly used for data exchange and communication between 
academics and government researchers. It is now used widely from the home and office to access the 
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vast repository of information published on the Internet. This expansion has been influenced by the 
increased power of home and office computers which has driven the development of on-line shopping, 
3-dimensional virtual reality worlds, and real-time audio and video applications including Internet 
telephony and video-conferencing. Figure 1-3 is based on results from the 8th GVU (Graphics, 
Visualization & Usability)7 Survey, and compares the WWW-browsing habits of users in the US and 
Europe. Another interesting finding from the GUY Survey is the types of Internet technology currently 
being used by users in the US and Europe (see Figure 1-4). 
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Figure 1-4 Comparison of Internet technologies used by US and European users. 
Although Figure 1-4 categorises a wide range oflnternet technologies, it is clear that WWW -browsing 
and Email are by far the most dominant. This trend is supported in Figure 1-5, page7, which presents 
results from the 1997 UK Internet Surve/, which focuses specifically on the services (or applications) 
used to access information on the Internet. 
The information resources contained on the Internet are immense, it is possible to search for 
information on the most obscure topic and yet receive thousands of "hits"9• The ease with which 
information can be found and retrieved is one of the main contributors to the Internet's growth. 
Obviously, the ability to search and retrieve results almost instantly is a great advantage for researchers 
and academics. However, businesses have also found it very. valuable as a marketing tool, which 
enables them to provide up-to-date information to new and existing customers without the delays and 
costs associated with traditional paper based resources such as product catalogues. The ability of the 
WWW to support dynamic content is especially valuable for organisations (e.g. share-brokers, travel 
7 GVU surveys are conducted by the Georgia Tech Research Corporation, the results are provided online at 
http://www.gvu.gatech.edu/user_surveys. The glh survey was conducted from October 10, 1997 through to November 16, 
1997, and represents responses from 7200 respondents. ' 
8 The UK Internet Survey was conducted by the Red Square Group Ltd., the results were released on December 1, 1997, and 
represents the response of768 respondents. The results are freely available athttp://www.redsquare.co.uk/index.htm 
9 A "hit" is Internet jargon used to describe the successful outcome of a search. Information repositories, such as WWW-pages, 
are continually indexed and categorised by powerful search engines which can then be queried with a set of key words entered 
by the user. Results are usually returned to the user in the form of hyper-links on a dynamically generated WWW-page. 
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agents, real-estate agents, etc.) that deal with continually changing, or real-time, information that must 
be constantly updated for customers. 
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In addition to providing information, many businesses are using the Internet to provide better customer 
service. For example, most software and hardware manufacturers maintain WWW -pages which allow 
their customers to download the latest patches, service releases, or device drivers. Selling and 
distributing intangible products (e.g. software, electronic books and reports, etc.) on the Internet can 
help manufacturers/suppliers reduce the cost of distributing their products. For example, instead of 
buying a software product from the local computer store, a customer can go directly to the supplier's 
WWW-site and download it. The customer then, pays for the majority of the distribution costs (i.e. 
download and storage), and the manufacturer no longer has to ship the product tore-sellers, nor provide 
physical packaging and distributable media (e.g. floppy-disk, compact-disk). 
The Internet has in essence become the next business frontier, reaching every continent and permeating 
all manner of organisations. However, the use of the Internet for commerce, such as banking and 
shopping, is hindered by the lack of security mechanisms to protect the transactions. Many people do 
not use their credit-card on the Internet because of their fear of becoming a victim of fraud. To placate 
such concerns Visa and MasterCard are jointly developing the Secure Electronic Transaction10 (SET) 
protocol to secure credit-card transactions over open networks (e.g. the Internet). On December 19, 
1997 a new corporate entity called SET Secure Electronic Transaction LLC (or SETCo), was formed by 
Visa and MasterCard to provide the structure that will govern and direct the future development of the 
SET protocol, as well as other key functions that are required to support its implementation. However, 
in the interim many Internet businesses are securing customer transactions with the Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) protocol developed by Netscape Communications (see Chapter 7 for a discussion of SSL). SSL 
provides a private connection between the customer and the supplier, over which sensitive transactions 
such as customer details and credit-card information can be sent. 
Due to the Internet's growth and increasing commercialisation, the Internet now consists of many 
interconnected networks which belong to a myriad of public, private, and government organisations. 
10 Information on SET and its implementation is available at http://www.visa.com/cgi-bin/vee/nt/ecomm/set/main.html 
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Unfortunately not all are friendly, some may harbor attackers while some may practice traffic 
monitoring. It is not possible to send information over a "safe" path because of the very reasons which 
make the Internet so resilient - paths change constantly to deal with network outages or other 
problems, so even after a connection is established between two points the information transmitted may 
not follow the same path. Finally, a problem which stems directly from the Internet's explosive growth, 
is that the number of attackers is potentially growing at an equivalent rate! 
1.5 Summary 
The Internet has grown from connecting a mere 200 or so hosts in 1981, to nearly 30 million at the start 
of 1998. New Zealand has also seen startling growth and had nearly 170,000 Internet connections at the 
beginning of 1998. Since 1981 the Internet has changed from a network serving only academic and 
research interests, to a truly global network supporting the interests of individuals to multinational 
organisations. 
In fact, increasing numbers of businesses and institutions are using the Internet to conduct their day-to-
day business. It is becoming increasingly difficult for organisations to remain isolated and yet continue 
to do business with their Internet connected partners. As the Internet continues to grow, so will the role 
it plays in peoples everyday lives. 
Unfortunately, the growth of the Internet and the increasing dependence on it, have presented many new 
threats and security challenges. The remainder of this thesis deals with specific technologies that can be 
used to address these security threats- in particular firewalls and virtual private networks (VPNs). 
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Chapter 2. Overview of TCP/IP 
2.1 Introduction 
As previously mentioned the term TCP/IP is used to refer to the collection of communications protocols 
that have evolved out of the initial DARPA project. The 1990's have seen the TCP/IP suite become the 
most widely accepted networking architecture. 
Although many protocols contribute to the TCP/IP suite this Chapter only discusses those whose 
understanding is necessary for the remainder of this thesis. For a detailed discussion of these and other 
protocols in the TCP/IP suite the reader should consult [Carl-Mitchell et al., 1993] [Stevens, 1994] and 
the relevant Requests for Comments 11 (RFCs). 
2.2 The TCP/IP Protocol Suite 
The TCP/IP suite recognises that communication between heterogeneous computer systems is a 
complex and diverse problem. One which cannot be accomplished by a single all-encompassing 
protocol [Stallings, 1991]. Therefore the task of communicating is divided between a series of modules, 
which are layered on top of each other in a hierarchical manner (see Figure 2-1 ). 
Application 
Transport 
Network 
Link 
Figure 2-1 The four layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack. 
Each layer provides a different functional requirement [Stallings, 1991] [Stevens, 1994]: 
• Link-Layer- contains the protocols which provide access to a communication network. This 
usually consists of the host operating system's device driver, and the network inteiface card 
(NIC). The Link-layer handles all aspects of physical interfacing with the communications 
medium. Protocols at this level route data between hosts attached to the same network 
segment, and may provide additional services, such as, flow and error control. 
• Network-Layer - provides the functionality which allows data to traverse separate logical 
networks between hosts. Therefore, the Network-layer provides the internetwork routing 
function. At this layer there are three different protocols; IP, Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMP), and the Internet Group Message Protocol (IGMP). Protocols at this layer 
can be implemented in either host or network devices (e.g. routers). 
11 The Requests for Comments (RFCs) are a series of notes, started in 1969, about the Internet (originally the ARPANET). The 
notes discuss many aspects of computing and computer communication focusing on networking protocols, procedures, 
programs, and concepts, but also including meeting notes, opinion, and sometimes humour. However, RFCs are also used to 
publish specification documents relating to the Internet protocol suite, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(ffiTF) and its steering group (the ffiSG). The official RFC Editor WWW-page which provides links for searching repositories 
ofRFCs is available at http://www.isi.edu/rfc-editor/ 
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• Transport-Layer- provides functionality which enables data to be delivered between two 
applications on different host computers. There are two important protocols at the 
Transport-layer; the TCP, and the UDP. 
• Application-Layer- handles the details of the applications. 
The relationships between the common protocols at each layer of the TCPIIP suite are shown in Figure 
2-2 (adapted from [Stevens, 1994]). Unfortunately, the term "TCPIIP" promotes a misconception that 
TCP is solely dependant on IP, and further suggests that all applications rely on TCP. In reality, TCP 
can exist quite happily over any other internetworking protocol and was in fact designed with this 
objective in mind [Postel, 1981d]. Figure 2-2 clearly dispels any illusion that applications depend solely 
on TCP, in fact, many applications are more efficient using connectionless UDP than they would be 
using TCP, while some would not even be possible. The term "TCPIIP" is used throughout this thesis to 
infer the dependence of TCP on IP, and to refer to the TCPIIP suite in general. (Note, in most cases the 
surrounding context will clarify the meaning, however, where ambiguity could have arisen additional 
clarification was included.) 
Application Layer 
Transport Layer 
Network Layer 
Link Layer 
Media 
Figure 2·2 Relationship of protocols in the TCP/IP protocol suite. 
Although TCP and IP are the dominant internetworking protocols on the Internet, other protocols have 
and are being developed. One in particular, the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model, 
was adopted in 1983 by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). Essentially it 
provides a framework for defining standards for connecting heterogeneous computers, and like the 
TCPIIP suite12 the OSI protocol stack is layered. However, the OSI layering is far more abstract and 
consists of seven layers. This has proved, in practice, to be restrictive and complicated to implement. 
Therefore, the majority of interconnected networks have continued to implement the TCPIIP suite. This 
trend is now being extended to Local Area Networks (LANs) in an effort to reduce the number of 
12 The tenn "suite" refers to a layered architecture in which a layer can be implemented without all of the underlying layers. For 
example the trace route application is implemented directly on top of the IP layer- the Transport-layer does not have to be 
present. On the other hand, the term "stack" refers to a layered system in which each layer (except the lowest) requires the one 
directly below it to be present. For example, an OSI X.400 electronic mail application requires the presence of a full OSI 
protocol stack. 
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protocol conversions that data must be put through, especially when connecting heterogeneous LANs 
over the Internet. In fact, the OSI standard did not originally address the issue of internetworking13, and 
was only added as a sub-layer to the OSI Network-layer (layer 3) [Stallings, 1991]. 
Even though the OSI protocol stack has been criticised for its complexity, it still remains a valuable 
descriptive tool. It is used later in Chapter 5 to describe the various firewall components and how they 
relate to each other. 
2.3 Internet Protocol (IP) 
The IP is an unreliable, connectionless datagram service. There are no guarantees that a given IP 
datagram will reach its destination. In fact, there is no guarantee that the datagram received is the same 
as was sent. The official IP specification can be found in RFC 791 [Postel, 1981b]. The basic format of 
an IP datagram is shown in Figure 2-3. 
An IP datagram can be a maximum of 65535 (216-1) bytes long it is limited by the two-byte 
datagram length field in the IP header. In practice, few datagrams of this size are sent because most 
Link-layer protocols support physical frame lengths of a few thousand bytes only. An IP datagram is 
split into a number of smaller datagrams if it is too large for the underlying Link-layer, this process is 
known as fragmentation. The reconstruction of fragments at the destination host is known as re-
assembly. The largest amount of encapsulated data a network interface can transmit is called the 
maximum transmission unit (MTU). For example, Ethernet supports an MTU of 1500 bytes. 
For IP datagrams with a destination that is located on the same network as the sender the MTU will 
already be known. This is due to the fact that the MTU is a parameter that is a part of every NIC 
specification. The Transport-layer protocol can use the default MTU parameter to limit the size of the 
message it passes to the Network-layer, therefore, under such circumstances an IP datagram will never 
be fragmented. However, when a Transport-layer protocol builds a message destined for a host on a 
different network, it has no way of knowing the route, nor the MTU of each physical network the 
datagram will traverse before reaching its destination. In this case a default MTU of 576 bytes is used 
which supports a 512 byte message, a 20 byte TCP header, and a 20 byte IP header. Most Link-layer 
protocols support an MTU of at least 576 bytes. 
0 15 16 31 
4-bit versionl 4-b1~~;t~derl 8-bit type of service 16-bit total length (in bytes) (TOS) 
16-bit identification 3-bit I 13-bit fragment offset flags 
8-bit time to live I 8-bit protocol 16-bit header checksum (TTL) 
32-bit source IP address 
32-bit destination address 
I 
20 bytes 
1 
7 options (if any) { 
data 
Figure 2-3 IP datagram fonnat. 
13 Internetworking is defined as two communicating end systems not connected to the same network. Therefore data rnust 
traverse at least two networks in which the protocol stacks rnay be quite different. 
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The following is a brief description, adapted from [Carl-Mitchell et al., 1993], for each of the IP 
datagram fields shown in Figure 2-3. 
• Version (4-bits)- the version number ofiP; currently version 4 (IPv4) is deployed. 
• Header Length (4-bits) - the length of the IP header in 32-bit words. The header is always 
padded out to a multiple of 32-bit words. 
• Type Of Service (TOS) (8-bits) - the type of service or priority for this datagram. Type of 
service processing is not frequently used, therefore the default value of 0 is generally used. 
• Total Length ( 16-bits)- the length of the IP datagram (including the header) in bytes. 
• Identification (16-bits), Flags (3-bits), and Fragment Offset (13-bits)- used for fragmentation 
and re-assembly control. 
• Time To Live (TTL) (8-bits)- the maximum time in seconds, time-to-live, that the datagram 
may exist. This field is decremented by at least 1 each time the IP header is processed by a 
router or host. Unless the datagram is queued in a buffer for a long period of time, this· field 
actually indicates the maximum number of intermediate routers a datagram may cross before it 
is dropped. When this field reaches 0, it must be dropped unconditionally by the IP. This 
feature prevents a datagram from looping around the network forever because of a routing 
error. 
• Protocol (8-bits) - indicates the type of protocol message encapsulated within the IP header. 
For example, the protocol field value is 6 for TCP and 17 for UDP. 
• Header Checksum (16-bits)- provides a checksum for the IP header only. The checksum is 
constructed by taking the 16-bit 1 's complement of all the 16-bit words in the header. This 
field allows the header to be checked for errors which may have occurred in transmission. This 
is the only error checking that IP does; other than routing errors. 
• Source JP Address (32-bits) - the IP address of the interface from which the datagram 
originated. 
• Destination JP Address (32-bits) - the IP address of the datagram's final network interface 
destination. As each IP datagram contains its source and destination address it can be routed 
independently to its destination. 
• Options (variable bit length)- can contain various IP options, although most IP datagrams do 
not. Options include the following: 
0 source routing- enables an IP datagram's route to be specifically controlled. Is used 
in source-routing attacks. 
0 route recording - records the route the datagram takes in the options field. 
0 time-stamping -adds a time-stamp by each intermediate router. 
0 security- can contain seldom used security options (see Section 2.3.2). 
• Padding (variable bit length) - pads the IP header to an even 4-byte boundary. This is 
occasionally needed because not all IP options are even multiples of 32-bits. 
An IP datagram can travel through many routers or hosts before it reaches its destination. On receipt of 
a datagram the router looks at its destination address and compares this with its routing table; returning 
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a result which decides which port the datagram will be sent out on. Routing tables are constantly 
updated to reflect the status of the various interconnected networks. It is not uncommon for IP 
datagrams which are part of the same connection to take different paths before arriving at their 
destination. It is the job of higher layers of the protocol suite, e.g. TCP, to reassemble and re-sequence 
application data. 
Unfortunately, the use of dynamic paths between source and destination points, and the ease at which 
they can be manipulated, means that any plain text sent across the Internet is, in essence, available for 
anyone to see. 
2.3.1 IP Addresses 
As shown in Figure 2-3, IP addresses are 32-bits long and divided into two parts; the network and the 
host address. The boundary is dependant on the first one to four high-order bits, and indicates which 
network addressing scheme is being used, as shown in Table 2-1. 
Table 2·1 IP Address Formats. 
B 14 65,534 
c 110 21 254 
D 1110 Multicast group 268,435,456 
E 1111 (Experimental use) n/a 
The host part of the IP address is usually broken into a subnet and host address. Subnets are used to 
route IP datagrams within an organisation's network domain. It is up to the organisation to determine 
the number of bits used for the subnet. For example it is common to divide a Class B network into 254 
sub-networks. 
IP addresses are not usually used in their numeric formats, instead they are translated into a more 
human readable form; for example 132.181.10.25 is translated to www.cosc.canterbury .ac.nz. This 
translation is accomplished by the Domain Name System (DNS) (see Section 2.8) which is essentially a 
distributed database. 
There has been a lot of concern recently on the consumption of IP addresses, mainly due to the wastage 
caused by subnet partitioning. For example, if an organisation has a single class C network address, 
they have a possible 255 host addresses. However they may only have 50 hosts on their network, thus 
205 host addresses have been wasted. If it were not for subnets, the current 32-bit IP addressing scheme 
could accommodate a possible 232 host addresses. This problem has been addressed in the IP version 6 
(IPv6) standard, by using 128-bit addresses. 
It should be noted that IP source addresses do not provide a reliable indication as to the originator of 
the datagram. In fact, this is another weakness of 1Pv4 and forms the basis for spoofing attacks 
discussed in Section 3.2.2. 
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2.3.2 IP Security Labels 
The IP header provides space for a number of optional fields that are not commonly used. The 
important ones from the perspective of security are the security label and strict and loose source routing 
(see page 30) 
The IP security option [Housley, 1993] [Kent, 1991] is seldom (if ever) used within commercial 
organisations, but has found significantly more success within military environments. Each datagram is 
labelled in accordance with the sensitivity of the information that it contains. The labels are designed 
for compartmentalised multi-level secure (MLS) operating systems, th~refore they include both a 
hierarchical component (e.g. SECRET, TOP SECRET, etc.) and an optional category (e.g. nuclear 
weapons, cryptography, NATO, etc.) 
Essentially, the labels are used to indicate the security level of the ultimate sending and receiving 
processes. A process may not write to a medium with a lower security level, because that would allow 
the disclosure of confidential information. For obvious reasons, it may not read from a medium 
containing information more highly classified. Under normal situations, the combination of these two 
restrictions will usually dictate that the processes at either end of a connection be at the same level. 
Additional information can be found in [Amoroso, 1994] 
Some operating systems, such as UNIX SCO CompartMented Workstation (CMW) I MLS, maintain 
security labels for each process. This allows them to attach the appropriate option field to each 
datagram. For conventional computers, a router can attach the option to all packets received on a given 
connection. 
Within the network the primary purpose of security labels is to constrain routing decisions. A datagram 
marked "TOP SECRET" may not be transmitted over a connection with a lower security level (e.g. 
CLASSIFIED). An additional use of security labels is to control encryption equipment, for instance the 
previous described "TOP SECRET" datagram may be routed over an insecure connection provided it 
has been suitably encrypted with a cryptographic algorithm (see Section 7.3) rated for protection of 
TOP SECRET messages. 
2.4 Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), RFC 792 [Postel, 1981a], is an integral part of the IP 
suite. It is used to communicate information and control messages between IP hosts. ICMP messages 
are sent in several situations; for example, when a datagram cannot reach its destination, when a router 
does not have the buffering capacity to forward a datagram, and when a router can direct the host to 
send traffic on a shorter route. ICMP messages are sent like other transport protocol messag~s, that is, 
they are encapsulated in an IP datagram. The structure of an ICMP message is shown below in Figure 
2-4. There are 15 different values for the type field, which are used to identify the type of ICMP 
IP datagram 
14 20 bytes II> I 
IP header ICMP Message 
\ 
---
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
0 7 8 15 16 31 
8- bit type I 8- bit code I 16 - bit checksum 
7 (content depends upon combination of type and code fields) 
Figure 2-4 ICMP message structure in relation to IP datagram encapsulation. 
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message (see Table 2-2). Some ICMP messages make use of the code field, which provides more 
specific information on the connections status. 
:~!~&~~'# 
0 
3 
4 
5 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Table 2-2 ICMP message types. 
echo reply (used by Ping) 
destination unreachable 
source quench 
redirect (alter route) 
echo request (used by Ping) 
router advertisement 
router solicitation 
time exceeded for a datagram 
parameter problem with datagram 
timestamp request 
timestamp reply 
information request (obsolete) 
information reply (obsolete) 
address mask request 
address mask re 1 
The ICMP protocol also forms the basis of a useful program called "Ping", which stands for Packet 
InterNet Groper [Stevens, 1994]. Ping issues an ICMP echo request message to a host, and expects an 
ICMP echo reply in return. The lack of a reply indicates that there could be a problem with the 
destination host or the intervening network. However, many firewalls are configured to block ICMP 
messages, therefore Pings to these hosts will not receive replies. 
The most obvious exploitation of ICMP is through the redirect message [Bellovin, 1989] which is a 
control message used by gateways to advise of better routes. Fortunately, the possible impact from this 
threat is limited by the constraints placed on the ICMP redirect message; 
• must be related to a specific, existing connection, 
• cannot be used to make unsolicited changes to a hosts routing table, and 
• are only applicable to a limited topology; i.e. they may only be sent from the first gateway 
along the path to the originating host. A later gateway may not advise that host, nor may it use 
ICMP redirect messages to control other gateways. 
However, if a secondary gateway can be penetrated on a target host's local network (although it may be 
sufficient to compromise an ordinary host and have it act as a gateway), then it is possible to attack the 
target host's routing table- redirecting all traffic to the compromised host or secondary gateway. The 
attack is simplified if hosts do not perform sufficient validation checks on the redirect messages. 
Another popular abuse of ICMP is the generation of denial-of-service attacks. It is possible to use 
several types of ICMP messages, such as Destination Unreachable and Time to Live Exceeded, to reset 
existing connections. Some older implementations of ICMP do no limit their action to a specific 
connection, but will tear down all connections between the host and gateway on receipt of these 
messages. Some operating systems are vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack because their 
implementation of Ping cannot deal with oversized ICMP echo request messages (details about this 
vulnerability can be found in Section 3.2.4). 
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2.5 Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) 
In most cases IP datagrams are sent over data links such as Ethernet or Token Ring. However, these 
devices have their own addressing schemes, e.g. 48-bits in the case of Ethernet. When Ethernet frames 
are sent between hosts on a LAN, it is the 48-bit Ethernet address that determines which interface (i.e. 
NIC) will receive it. 
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), RFC 826 [Plummer, 1982], is used to provide dynamic 
mapping between the 32-bit IP addresses and the 48-bit Ethernet addresses. Mappings are stored in the 
hosts ARP cache which is essentially a table where each entry associates an IP address to an Ethernet 
address. Mappings in the ARP cache are expired after twenty 20 minutes. 
If a mapping in the host's ARP cache has expired, or the required one is not found, the host sends an 
ARP request (contained in an Ethernet broadcast frame) which contains the desired IP address. The 
destination host (if it exists) sends an ARP reply containing the IP and Ethernet address pair, which is 
placed by the sending host into its ARP cache. The ARP cache is necessary to reduce the amount of 
Ethernet broadcast traffic that would be required if IP to Ethernet mappings were resolved through ARP 
requests only. 
It should be noted that an untrusted host which has access to the LAN could broadcast phoney ARP 
messages to redirect all traffic to itself. The attacker could then impersonate another host and modify its 
data streams. 
2.6 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
The TCP, RFC 793 [Postel, 1981d], is a connection oriented protocol that provides end-to-end 
reliability and in-order sequencing of a byte stream, and attempts to optimise network bandwidth by 
managing the data flow between the sender and receiver. The TCP protocol processes a stream of data 
from an application and splits it into a series of segments (or messages) that are passed to the Network-
layer for delivery to an application at the other end of the connection. The remote TCP receives the 
segments from the Network-layer and orders them to recreate the original byte stream, which is passed 
to the Application-layer. Figure 2-5 shows the TCP segment format. 
0 8 16 24 31 
source port destination port 
sequence number 
acknowledgment number 
data I reserved l;··;t;;·4!~;~\··T··· offset ur ps rst syn lil window 
checksum urgent pointer 
options I padding 
data 
Figure 2-5 TCP segment format. 
The following points provide brief descriptions, adapted from [Postel, 1981d], of each TCP segment 
field shown in Figure 2-5: 
• Source Port (32-bits) -The source port number. 
• Destination Port ( 16-bits)- The destination port number. 
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• Sequence Number (32-bits) The sequence number field (SNF) contains the position of the 
first data octet in the segment. If SYN is present the sequence number is the initial sequence 
number (ISN) and the first data octet is ISN+ 1. 
• Acknowledgement Number (32-bits) - If the ACK control flag is set the acknowledgement 
number field (ANF) contains the value of the next sequence number the sender of the segment 
is expecting to receive. Once a connection is established this is always sent. 
• Data Offset (4-bits) The number of 32-bit words in the TCP header. This indicates where the 
data begins. The TCP header (even one including options) is an integral number of 32-bits 
long. 
• Reserved (6-bits)- Reserved for future use. Must be zero. 
• Control Bits (6-bits)- From left to right (see Table 2-3 for a description of each flag); 
1. URG Urgent 
2. ACK- Acknowledgement 
3. PSH-Push 
4. RST- Reset 
5. SYN Synchronise 
6. FIN- Finish 
• Window (16-bits) -· The number of data octets beginning with the one indicated in the 
acknowledgement field which the sender of this segment is willing to accept. 
Table 2·3 TCP control flags. 
Synchronise Sequence Numbers - Indicates that the sequence number field contains the 
connection-initiator's initial sequence number, and is only valid during the 3-way handshake 
used to initialise a TCP connection. TCP sequence numbers can be thought of as 32-bit 
counters. They range from 0 to 232-1. Every byte of data exchanged across a TCP connection 
(along with certain flags) is sequenced. 
ACK Acknowledgement- The acknowledgement number field is almost always set. It indicates that 
the acknowledgement field of this segment specifies the next sequence number the sender of 
this segment is expecting to receive, hence acknowledging receipt of all previous .sequence 
numbers. 
RST Reset - Indicates that the receiver should delete the connection without further interaction. 
The receiver can determine, based on the sequence number and acknowledgement fields of 
the incoming segment, whether it should honour the reset command or ignore it - unless the 
segment has been spoofed (see Section 3.2). In no case does receipt of a segment containing 
RST give rise to a RST in response. 
URG Urgent- Provides TCP with a way of implementing out of band (OOB) data. For instance, in 
a Telriet connection a 'ctrl-c' on the client side is considered urgent and will cause this flag to 
be set. 
PSH Push - The receiving TCP should not queue this data, but rather pass it to the application as 
soon as possible. This flag is most often set in interactive connections, such as Telnet and 
rlogin. 
FIN Finish - Indicates that the sending TCP has finished transmitting data, but will still accept 
data. 
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• Checksum (16-bits) - The checksum field is the 16-bit one's complement of the one's 
complement sum of alll6-bit words in the header and data fields. If a segment contains an odd 
number of header and data octets, the last octet is padded on the right with zeros to form a 16-
bit word for checksum purposes. The pad is not transmitted as part of the segment. While 
computing the checksum, the checksum field itself is replaced with zeros. The checksum also 
covers a 96-bit pseudo header conceptually prefixed to the TCP header. This pseudo header 
contains the source IP address, the destination IP address, the protocol, and TCP length. This 
gives the TCP protection against misrouted segments 
• Urgent Pointer ( 16-bits)- This field communicates the current value of the urgent pointer as a 
positive offset from the sequence number in this segment. The urgent pointer points to the 
sequence number of the octet following the urgent data. This field is only interpreted in 
segments with the URG control bit set. 
• Options (variable bit length)- Options may occupy space at the end of the TCP header and 
are a multiple of 8-bits in length. All options are included in the checksum. An option may 
begin on any octet boundary. 
• Maximum Segment Size Option Data (16-bits)- If this option is present, then it communicates 
the maximum receive segment size at the TCP which sends the segment. This field must only 
be sent in the initial connection request (i.e. in segments with the SYN control bit set). If this 
option is not used, any segment size is allowed. 
• Padding (variable bit length)- The TCP header padding is used to ensure that the TCP header 
ends and data begins on a 32-bit boundary. The padding is composed of zeros. 
TCP supports the multiplexing of multiple circuits over a single channel. Every TCP segment includes 
the originating. host address ( orig.host) and port number ( orig.port), as well as the destination host 
address (dest.host) and port number (dest.port). This vector (or 4-tuple), <orig.host, orig.port, dest.host, 
dest.port>, uniquely identifies the circuit being used for the communication. 
Communication over the Internet usually conforms to the Client/Server model. Servers generally listen 
to ports numbered below 1024, which are referred to as "well known ports" (see Appendix C). These 
ports offer standard TCP/IP services such as, Telnet, FTP, SMTP, etc. A Server continually listens to 
its associated port waiting for a client process to initiate a connection. Port numbers for client processes 
are generally allocated "high", i.e. above 1023. However, it is unwise to trust services based on port 
number alone, as the allocation of port numbers is a convention only! 
When two applications wish to communicate, their TCP's must first establish a connection across 
potentially unreliable networks. To provide reliable and error free communication the TCP protocol 
retransmits lost or damaged segments. This is possible because each segment contains a unique 
sequence number to identify its position within the original transmission sequence, and a 16-bit 
checksum to ensure the contents have not changed in transit. All segments contain a sequence number, 
and (except for the first segment used to initiate the connection) an acknowledgement number that 
corresponds to the sequence number of the last successfully received segment (i.e. segment number + 
1). Sequence numbers also prevent segments that get delayed in the network from being delivered late 
and being misinterpreted as part of the existing connection. Figure 2-6, page 19, depicts the 3-way 
handshake between a client (host A) and a server (host B). 
The 3 step process shown in Figure 2-6 can be summarised as follows; 
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• Step I- The client (host A) sends a TCP segment, with the SYN flag set, to the server (host B) . 
to indicate the clients intention to establish a connection (this is the only time it is valid to set 
the SYN flag). At this point the SNF, SNFA, contains the ISN, ISNA, which is usually generated 
as a function of the time-of-day clock. 
• Step 2 - On receipt of the clients TCP segment the server responds with its own segment. The 
server's ISN, ISNn, is assigned to the SNF, SNFn, and the SYN flag is set. The server must also 
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acknowledge the clients segment, so the ACK flag is set and the ANF, ANF8 , is assigned the 
value of SNFA + 1. 
• Step 3 -On receipt of the server's SYN/ACK segment the client must respond with an ACK 
segment to complete the handshake. The client's ACK segment is created by setting the ACK 
flag, and assigning ANFA the value of SNF8 + 1. From this point forward the client can start 
sending TCP segments containing application data. The server can do likewise once it has 
received the client's ACK segment. 
host TCP host 
(client) flags (server) 
step 1 A ---- SYN -- _..,.. 8 
SN~ = ISNA= 1001 
step 2 A + - SYN I ACK • - - 8 
SNF[J = /SN8 = 3058 
ANFa = SN!f + 1 = 1002 
step 3 A - - - - ACK · - - _..,.. 8 
SNFj. = 1002 
AN!J,. =SN~+ 1 =3059 
Figure 2-6 TCP 3-way handshake. 
Although simple and effective, the three-way handshake presents a vulnerability if an attacker can 
predict the target's ISN [Morris, 1985] [Bellovin, 1989]. An attacker can then fool the target into 
thinking that it is communicating with a trusted host. A full description of this and related attacks can be 
found in Section 3.2. 
2.7 User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
The UDP, RFC 768 [Postel, 1980], provides a datagram mode of packet-switched computer 
communication and assumes that IP is used as the underlying protocol. 
UDP provides a procedure for application programs to send messages to other programs with a 
minimum of protocol overhead. The protocol is connectionless, so delivery and duplication protection 
is not guaranteed. It is well suited for transaction based processes, such as Sun's Remote {'rocedure 
Calls [Sun Microsystems, 1988]. 
UDP tends to behave badly when used to transmit streams of data because it lacks flow control. Thus, 
UDP messages can swamp hosts and routers causing extensive datagram loss. This characteristic can be 
exploited by attackers to launch denial-of-service attacks. 
It is also far easier to spoof the UDP than the TCP because there are no handshaking protocols, and the 
datagrams are unique (i.e. there is no notion of sequence number). Thus, it is not recommended that the 
source address 15e used for authentication. 
2.8 Domain Name Service 
The DNS is a distributed database used by TCP/IP applications to map between hostnames and IP 
addresses, and is also used to determine the destination of email. All hosts connected to the Internet 
have unique IP addresses, which are used to communicate with one another. However, IP addresses are 
not easily remembered by humans, so the DNS provides a way of associating an ASCII based identifier 
to an IP address and mapping between them. No single site on the Internet contains all mapping 
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information. Instead every Internet site (e.g. University, company, etc.) maintains its own database and 
runs a server program that other systems (i.e. clients) across the Internet can query. DNS provides the 
protocol which enables clients and servers to communicate with each other. 
Applications access the DNS through resolvers which on UNIX hosts are typically the gethostbyname() 
and gethostbyaddr() library functions. The first resolver, gethostbyname, takes a host name and returns 
its IP address. The IP address returned by querying a DNS is not related to the choice of name for a 
host. The second resolver, gethostbyaddr, takes an IP address and returns the corresponding host name. 
The resolver may have to contact more than one DNS to complete the mapping. 
Each DNS entry has associated with it a number of records which store the information required to 
respond to resolver queries. The supported DNS record types are shown in Table 2-4. 
A 
AAAA 
NS 
CNAME 
PTR 
HINFO 
MX 
AXFR 
ANY 
Table 2-4 DNS record types. 
Authoritative address for IP version 4 
Authoritative address for IP version 6 
Name Server 
Canonical name for an alias for a hostname 
Pointer record- maps IP address to a hostname 
Provides host information 
Mail exchange record - specifies an alternate 
computer to receive mail for a particular host 
Request for zone transfer 
Request for all records 
Normally a resolver will generate a UDP based query to the DNS, which replies with the correct 
mapping, or returns information on an alternative DNS which can be queried further. TCP can also be 
used for queries, however, this is normally reserved for zone transfers. A zone transfer allows backup 
servers to obtain a full copy of their portion of the DNS name space. This can also be used by attackers 
to obtain a list of potential targets. 
The DNS name space is similar to a hierarchical file system, which is depicted below in Figure 2-7, 
page 21. Each node (i.e. circle) has a maximum 63 character label, with the exception of the root node 
which has a null label. Lower and upper case characters are considered equivalent. 
At the top are the root name servers, which contain information about the contents of the top level 
domains (TLD), i.e., .net, .com, .edu, .org, .int, .gov, .mil, and the two-letter country codes from IS0-
3166 (.nz, .us, .uk, .fi, .jp, etc.) [Barkow, 1996]. Under the top-level domains are the second level 
domains, such as nsa.gov. Further levels can be defined, but are the responsibility of the second level 
DNSs maintained by the organisation, in this case the nsa. Each name reflects its position within the 
DNS tree, for example, www.nsa.gov represents a host computer (www) in the nsa domain which is 
under the .gov top level domain. The domain name for a node is constructed by starting at that node and 
working up the tree to the root, separating each label with a period. 
A query about www.nsa.gov sent to a primary domain server will be answered (as long as the primary 
domain server knows about the domain nsa.gov) with a pointer (IP address) to the nsa.gov name server 
which holds the information about the host www.nsa.gov. The nsa.gov DNS will then return the IP 
address for the host www.nsa.gov. At this point a direct connection can be made to www.nsa.gov by the 
querying host. 
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domains l_ 
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domains l_ 
unnamed root 
33.13.252.140.in-addr.arpa 
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lei--------generic domains-------11'1 
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canterbury 
kaka.cosc.canterbury.ac.nz 
1-e--country domains---..j 
Figure 2·7 Hierarchical organisation of the DNS. 
With the emergence of the Internet as a marketing and commercial tool, the TLDs .com, .org, and .net 
are becoming unwieldy. For this reason the Internet Assigning Numbers Authority (lANA), responsible 
for managing DNS, has been moving new domain registries toward the less used country-code domains. 
An attacker who gains control of a DNS is in a very advantageous position because the attacker can 
send fraudulent information to any host which queries them. For this reason the DNS is generally 
considered an untrusted service. Hosts which place undue trust in the information returned by a DNS 
may provide an avenue for an attacker to gain control of their hosts and networks. Threats to the DNS 
are discussed in Section 2.8. · 
2.9 Summary 
The TCP/IP suite has been evolving since the late 1970s, and has become the world's most predominant 
WAN protocol. It is even gaining acceptance over traditional LAN protocols, such as Novell's 
IPX/SPX and ?v:!icrosoft's NetBEIU, as organisations implement Intranets and Extranets. 
The purpose of this Chapter was to introduce the most fundamental protocols of the TCP/IP suite. This 
is necessary for understanding Internet technologies such as firewalls and VPNs, as well as the threats 
and vulnerabilities they protect against. 
Although the TCP/IP suite has proven to be exceptionally adaptable and resilient, it provides only the 
most rudimentary support for network security. In particular, IPv4 does not protect the confidentiality 
of the higher layer data that it transports across the many interconnected networks that comprise the 
Internet. Throughout this Chapter numerous references have been made to the security problems that 
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plague the TCPIIP suite at the Network, Transport, and Application-layers. A detailed discussion of the 
common threats and vulnerabilities which effect the TCPIIP suite is given in Chapter 3. 
However, action is underway to provide security mechanisms for IPv4, and its proposed replacement 
IPv6, in the form of IP layer security, or IPSec. At the Transport and Application-layers similar efforts, 
including SSL and PPTP, are also underway to provide the necessary security mechanisms. Chapter 7, 
discusses these protocols in detail, and looks at how the TCPIIP suite can be made secure through their 
use. 
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Chapter 3. Threats from the Internet 
3.1 Introduction 
With such a large number of users, inherently there are those whose motives for using the Internet are 
not benign. These people are generally referred to as "hackers" or "crackers", terms which tend to 
glorify and contribute a sense of mystique to their exploits. To avoid such connotations, the remainder 
of this thesis will use the term "attacker" to emphasise the fact that these people are intentionally 
launching attacks and invading networks. 
Even though there are growing pressures on organisations to connect to the Internet they need to be 
aware of the risks as well as the benefits. A survey of organisations in the UK [CFS, 1996b] indicated 
that 65% of respondents with access to the Internet are not even aware of what connections their 
employees can make. This same survey also revealed that 75% of the organisations did not have a 
designated security officer, 77% had no formal procedures for reporting security incidents, and 67% did 
not have a business continuity plan. 
The 1998 Computer Crime and Security Survey [CSI, 1998] conducted by the Computer Security 
Institute (CSI) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports a continuing growth in US computer 
crime. The survey received responses from 520 security practitioners covering a cross-section of US 
corporations, government agencies, financial institutions and universities. The following points 
summarise a number of the most interesting results: 
• 64% of respondents reported computer security breaches in the twelve months prior to March 
1998. This figure represents an increases of 16% over the "1997 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and 
Security Survey" results, in which 48% of respondents reported unauthorised use. The 1998 
survey represents a 22% increase over the initial 1996 survey, in which 42% acknowledged 
unauthorised use. 
• Although 72% of respondents acknowledge suffering financial losses from such security 
breaches, only 46% were able to quantify their losses. The total financial loss for the 241 
organisations that could quantify a dollar figure was US$136,822,000. This figure represents a 
36% increase in reported losses over the 1997 figure of US$100,115,555. 
• Security breaches detected by respondents include a diverse array of attacks. For example, 
44% reported unauthorised access by employees, 25% reported denial-of-service attacks, 24% 
reported system penetration from the outside, 18% reported theft of proprietary in~ormation, 
15% reported incidents of financial fraud, and 14% reported sabotage of data or networks. 
• The most serious financial losses occurred through unauthorised access by insiders (18 
respondents reported a total of US$50,565,000 in losses), theft of proprietary information (20 
respondents reported a total of US$33,545,000 in losses), telecommunications fraud (32 
respondents reported a total of US$17,256,000 in losses) and financial fraud (29 respondents 
reported a total ofUS$11,239,000 in losses). 
• The nu-mber of organisations that cited their Internet connection as a frequent point of attack 
rose from 47% in 1997 to 54% in 1998. This represents a 17% increase over the initial 1996 
figure of 37%. Significantly, the number of respondents citing their Internet connection as a 
frequent point of attack is now equal to the number of respondents citing internal systems as a 
frequent point of attack. In the past, internal systems have been considered the greatest threat, 
however, it is not the internal threat that has diminished, but simply that the external threat 
(e.g. Internet connections) has increased. This conclusion is reinforced by another piece of 
data; of those acknowledging unauthorised use, 74% reported from one to five incidents 
originating outside the organisation, while 70% reported from one to five incidents originating 
inside the organisation. 
23 
Threats from the Internet Firewalls and Virtual Private Networks 
Table 3-2 reproduced from the 1998 CSI survey classifies the financial losses caused by computer 
crime into a number of generalised categories (Note: monetary figures are in US dollars). 
Table 3-2 The aggregate cost of computer crime and security breaches over a 24-month period 
(1997 - 1998). (Note: 72% of respondents reported suffering financial losses, however only 42% 
could quantify the losses.) 
Incidents w/ Lowost 
Quantlflecl Losses Reported 
Highest Roported 
. . . 
Average Loss Total Loaa 
1997 1998 97-98 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 97-98 
Theft of proprietary Info. 21 20 41 $1,000 $300 $10,000,000 $25,000,000 $954,666 $1,677,000 $20,047,986 $33,540,000 $53,687,986 
Sabotage of data or networks 14 25 39 $150 $400 $1,000,000 $500,000 $164,840 $86,000 $2,307,760 $2,150,000 $4,457,760 
Telecom eavesdropping 10 18 $1,000 $1,000 $100,000 $200,000 $45,423 $56,000 $363,384 $560,000 $923,384 
Systemspenetratlonbyoutslder 22 19 41 $200 $500 $1,500,000 $500,000 $132,250 $86,000 $2,909,500 $1,634,000 $4,543,500 
lnslder abuse of Net access 65 67 122 $100 $500 $100,000 $1,000,000 $18,304 $56,000 $1,006,720 $3,752,000 $4,768,720 
Ananclal fraud 26 29 55 $5,000 $1,000 $2,000,000 $2,000,000 $957,384 $388,000 $24,891,984 $11,252,000 $36,143,984 
Denial-of-service nla 36 36 nla $200 nla $1,000,000 $77,000 nla $2,772,000 $2,772,000 
Spooling 4 nla $1,000 nla $500,000 nla $128,000 nla $512,000 nla $512,000 
VIrus 165 143 308 $100 $50 $500,000 $2,000,000 $75,746 $55,000 $12,498,090 $7,865,000 $20,363,090 
Unauthorised insider acce~ 22 18· 40 $100 $1,000 $1,200,000 $50,000,000 $181,437 $2,809,000 $3,991,614 $50,562,000 $54,653,614 
Telecom fraud 35 32 67 $300 $500 $12,000,000 $15,000,000 $647,437 $539,000 $22,660,295 $17,248,000 $39,908,295 
Activo wiretapping nla nla $30,000 nla $100,000 $49,000 nla $245,000 $245,000 
Laptop theft 160 162 322 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000,000 $500,000 $38,326 $32,000 $6,132,160 $5,184,000 $11,316,160 
Total $97,321,493 $136,764,000 $234,085,493 
Source: CSI/FB/1998 Computer Crime Survey 
The participants of this survey were also asked to indicate the types of security technology that they 
were using, the results are shown in Table 3-1. Of the 512 respondents it is interesting to note that 81% 
have invested in firewall technology, unfortunately it is not clear whether the remaining 19% use 
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Table 3-1 Types of security technology in use 
by respondents to the 1998 CSI!FBI Computer 
Crime and Security survey. 
secufity Technology 
:· .... · ' . -' 
Implemented by 
Access control 89% 
Biometrics 6% 
Encrypted Files 49% 
Anti-virus software 96% 
Reusable passwords 53% 
Firewalls 81% 
Encrypted login 36% 
Physical security 89% 
PCMCIA 34% 
Intrusion detection 35% 
Digital IDs 20% 
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alternative methods to protect their Internet connections, are not connected to the Internet, or simply 
take no precautions. It is also interesting that cryptography is being used to protect files, and logins, but 
there is no indication that VPNs are becoming a core security technology. 
Although the statistics presented above are helpful when analysing attack trends and for determining 
where threats lie, they do not provide an understanding of the attacks themselves. It is essential that 
attack methods are understood, especially when developing security policies and procedures to address 
the right problems in the most effective and efficient way. 
The following points introduce a few of the most common attacks [DeMaio, 1995] used by both internal 
and external attackers: 
• Password Guessing - It is relatively easy to obtain a password cracking program such as 
"Crack"14• These programs use standard and non standard dictionaries, and simply try to guess 
an account's password. Usually, such programs find at least 10 percent of the passwords 
chosen by users [DeMaio, 1995]. Educating users as to the correct selection and use of 
passwords is the most effective solution. 
• Password Sniffing- The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Co-ordination Centre 
estimates that in 1994 more than 100,000 systems were the victim of password sniffers. Once a 
hacker gains entry to a system they will usually install sniffer programs to automatically 
capture passwords and account information. The programs typically monitor TCP sessions, 
such as Telnet or FTP, and record the first 128 or so bytes that contain the identification and 
authentication information. The best defence is to employ one-time password schemes. 
• IP Spoofing - There are a number of spoofing attacks which take advantage of the information 
contained within the IP datagram header. For example the Christmas Day attack on Tsutomu 
Shimomura15 involved forging the source address of the IP datagrams so they looked as if they 
were generated from within Shimomura's network. Another IP attack involves loose source 
routing of IP datagrams (see Section 3.2.2). The attacker manipulates the IP header's source 
routing option to change the path that datagrams should take. Properly configured firewalls 
capable of packet filtering provide the best means of defence against these types of attack. 
Some attacks such as password sniffing and spoofing are much easier to conduct for an attacker who is 
internal to the organisation. This is because some attacks require access to the network traffic, it is 
difficult (even impossible) to do this on the Internet unless the attacker controls a routing node. 
Although these attacks are only practical due to the presence of a vulnerability, it is important to 
consider the reasons behind their launch so the risks can be fully understood. The following points 
describe a few of the reasons an attack may be launched: 
• Information Theft - Using knowledge of certain Internet services, such as NFS (see Section 
3.3.5), attackers can spoof the host authentication mechanism to gain access to sensitive 
information. If an attacker has access to a ·valid password, then depending on the level of 
access it provides, sensitive organisational information and data may be at risk. Computer 
Weekly reported findings by the CSI which indicated that information theft rose 260% from 
1985 to 1993. Of 8,932 attacks, 7,860 were successful, but only 19 were reported [Computer 
Weekly, 1995]. A properly configured firewall can help prevent unauthorised access by 
providing countermeasures such as strong authentication or network encryption. 
14 
"Crack" is available at ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/tools/crack 
15 On Christmas Day, 1994, a hacker launched a sophisticated "IP spoofing" attack against the home computer of a computer 
security expert, Tsutomu Shimomura, a researcher at the federally financed San Diego Supercomputer Center in California. 
Over a two week period Shimomura pursued and eventually tracked the hacker to computers on which Shimomura's stolen 
files were found. The hacker was finally identified as Federal fugitive Kevin Mitnick, and subsequently arrested at 1:30 a.m. 
on February 15, 1995 by FBI agents. The following WWW-addresses provide links to a great deal of interesting information 
regarding the Christmas Day attack and Kevin Mitnick; http://www.gulker.com/ralhack/ and http://www.mitnick.com/ 
25 
Threats from the Internet Firewalls and Virtual Private Networks 
• Denial-of-service - This is a class of attack designed to prevent the use of computers and 
networks by legitimate users. Some attacks, such as "Ping 0' Death" (see Section 3.2.4), can 
completely shut down or disable equipment and services. For example, it is possible to send 
ICMP redirect messages to a host or router telling it to stop sending IP datagrams to all or part 
of a network. More common are flooding attacks, e.g. SYN flooding (see Section 3.2.1), which 
overload a computer or network so that it spends all of its time responding to illegitimate 
messages and requests. Solutions include placing services on separate hosts so if one is flooded 
the others will continue to function, or using a properly configured firewall to filter out 
dangerous protocols, such as ICMP redirect messages. 
• Information Destruction- In some cases an attacker's intentions may be purely malicious, the 
aim of their attack being the destruction of an organisations information. Related to this is 
unauthorised data modification, for example an attacker may wish to confuse experimental 
results, or alter the number of units sent to a customer. Obviously, the reasons behind such 
attacks are complex, they may be driven by revenge, corporate rivalry, or just plain 
delinquency. It is easy to think of many situations in which an organisation could suffer such 
attacks. 
The remainder of this Chapter looks at the vulnerabilities exploited by attackers, and focuses on the 
TCPIIP suite, and on the applications that overlay it. 
3.2 Threats to the TCP/IP Protocol 
This Section describes a number of common attacks which exploit the limitations and inherent 
vulnerabilities in the TCP and the IP. The following attacks are discussed in detail: 
• SYN flooding 
• IP Spoofing 
• Sequence number attack 
• TCP session hijacking 
• RST and FIN denial-of-service attack 
• Ping of Death 
These attacks were chosen because software to launch them (including source code) is freely available 
on the Internet. They are also the most common, and practical attacks used by attackers on the inside 
and outside of organisations networks. 
3.2.1 SYN Flooding 
Description -
SYN flooding occurs when a server receives more incomplete connection requests than it can handle 
[Stewart et al., 1997]. In 1996 both 260016 and Phrack17 , two of the largest and most well-known of the 
underground hacker magazines, released source code that automated this attack. 
16 The 2600 WWW-site is available at http://www.2600.com/ 
17 The Phrack WWW-site is available at http://www.phrack.com/ 
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Under normal conditions hosts that wish to exchange data over a TCP connection must initiate the 
session using a 3 step process known as the 3-way handshake (see Section 2.6, page 16). The SYN 
flood attack is based on preventing the completion of the 3-way handshake- in particular the server's 
reception of the TCP ACK flag (see Table 2-3, page 17). 
Unlike a normal TCP connection request, the SYN flood attack withholds the final ACK segment which 
leaves a server's port in a half-open state. The attack succeeds because the number of half-open 
connections that can be supported per TCP port is limited. When the number of half-open connections 
is exceeded the server rejects all subsequent incoming connection requests until the existing requests 
time out, usually after 75 seconds- creating a denial-of-service condition. 
To initiate the SYN flood attack, the attacking host sends a number of SYN requests to the target TCP 
port (e.g. the Telnet daemon) to fill up its concurrent connection request (or backlog) queue - the 
exact number depends upon the operating system [Phrack, 1996a]. The backlog queue allows a server 
(i.e. listening port) to queue concurrent connection requests for later processing. To achieve this the 
details of each pending connection request are stored in a memory structure. Obviously, this queue must 
be bounded otherwise an attacker could make unlimited connection requests to a TCP port and consume 
all of the server's memory resources - which in itself would constitute a denial-of-service attack! 
The attacking host must ensure that the source IP-address is spoofed to be that of a routable but 
unreachable host, as the target host will be sending its response to this address. IP (by way of ICMP) 
will inform TCP that the host is unreachable, however, TCP considers these errors to be transient and 
leaves their resolution up to IP (reroute the datagrams, etc.) - in effect ignoring them. The IP 
destination address must be unreachable because the attacker does not want any host to receive the 
SYN/ ACKs sent by the target host, as this would elicit a RST from that host and defeat the attack. 
Figure 3-1 shows the steps involved in launching a TCP SYN flood attack. To begin (step 1) the 
attacking host sends a multitude of SYN requests to the target to fill its backlog queue with pending 
connections. Once the target receives this request it responds with SYN/ACKs (step 2) to what it 
believes is the source of the incoming SYNs. Once the backlog queue is full all further requests to the 
TCP port will be ignored until the original requests begin to time out and reset- normally after 75 
seconds. After each time out (step 3) the server port sends a RST to the unreachable client. At this point 
the attacker must repeat the process again (from step 1) to continue the denial-of-service attack. 
host TCP host 
(client) flags (server) 
step 1 A ---- SYN -- _..,. 8 
A ---- SYN -- _..,. 8 
A ---- SYN -- _..,. 8 e.g. Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 
A ---- SYN -- -!Jio- 8 backlog, b = 6 
A ---- SYN -- _..,.. 8 
A ---- SYN -- _..,. 8 
step2 c + - SYN I ACK- - - 8 
c + - SYN I ACK- - - 8 Key 
b A attacker 
8 target 
step3 c +-- RST---- 8 c unreachable 
b 
Figure 3-1 TCP SYN flood attack. 
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To make this attack more difficult to detect and respond to, the software randomises the source address 
of the IP datagrams sent by the attacking host. Thus, the target host receives datagrams that appear to be 
from all over the Internet, assuring the attackers anonymity. 
Countermeasure 
There are several ways of reducing the effectiveness of the SYN flood attack. The first relies on ISPs 
being responsible enough to block IP datagrams with non-internal addresses from leaving their network 
and reaching the Internet. Therefore, an attacker would have to send datagrams with an official IP 
source address which in most cases would lead back (through audit logs) to the owner of the account the 
attack was being launched from. This lack of anonymity would deter most attackers, although skilled 
and determined attackers would use accounts that had been compromised or launch attacks through sites 
that do not regulate Internet traffic. 
Other preventative measures require changes to the network aspects of the operating system, or the 
addition of intrusion detection tools. For example a list of connection requests could be kept with 
details of the source address, TTL, sequence numbers, windows size etc. These variables could then be 
analysed for suspicious activity, which if detected, would result in a RST being sent to the half open 
connection to allow new connections to be made. Other solutions rely on increasing the size of the 
backlog queue (not particularly effective as the attacker can simply send more SYN segments), and 
randomly dropping half-open connection requests when the queue is full. 
3.2.2 IP Spoofing, TCP Sequence Number Prediction, and TCP Session Hijack 
Description 
IP spoofing is an attack in which the attacker impersonates a host (or a legitimate user) at the IP layer. 
In most cases the objective is to attack the trust-relationship between two hosts, which relies upon the 
source IP address to authenticate hosts. The attack is only possible if the target host has a trust-
relationship with at least one other host. The most popular trust-relationship is provided by the .rhosts 
file found on UNIX operating systems, although many others exist, e.g. the UNIX files hosts.allow, 
hosts.equiv, etc. The rhosts file allows a user to build a set of trusted hosts applicable only to 
themselves. For example, suppose that the -ray!.rhosts file on the host huia.canterbury.ac.nz contained 
the lines: 
kaka.canterbury .ac.nz 
matata.canterbury .ac.nz 
This rhosts file would allow an account named ray on kaka or on matata to rlogin into ray's account on 
huia without typing a password! 
In itself IP spoofing is quite simple, all the attacker has to do is generate an IP datagram with a forged 
source address. This is usually done by creating an IP datagram from scratch using RAW-Sockets18• 
The target host has no way of determining that an IP datagram has been spoofed, as all it has to rely on 
is the IP source address. On its own IP spoofing is limited to providing anonymity for an attacker 
launching attaclcs against the IP layer, e.g. SYN flooding, ICMP redirects, Ping flooding, etc. 
Therefore, to complete the attack against trust-relationships as described above, the attacker must 
combine IP spoofing with TCP sequence number prediction - providing the attacker with a delivery 
mechanism for sending application data to the target host. 
18 The term "Raw-Sockets" refers to the ability in 4.2BSD derived socket implementations to access the Network-layer instead 
of the Transport-layer. For example, the programmer could directly format the fields within the IP datagram to generate ICMP 
echo requests (i.e. Ping). 
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TCP sequence number prediction is used by attackers to attack TCP sessions, and takes advantage of 
the fact that TCP is a sequenced data delivery protocol (see Section 2.6, page 16). TCP segments are 
encapsulated within IP datagrams, because of this there is no guarantee that the datagrams will follow 
the same route and therefore arrive in the order they were sent, in addition network errors may require 
datagrams to be resent. The TCP protocol uses sequence numbers to ensure that the Application-layer 
receives data in the same order that it was sent. Although this is a simple and effective method of 
ensuring a sequenced data stream, it unfortunately introduces a vulnerability. If an attacker can guess 
the correct sequence number they can then generate their own TCP segments that will be accepted by 
the target host's TCP layer. 
There are really two variations on this attack depending on how early the TCP session is attacked. The 
first three steps in Figure 3-2 shows the normal TCP 3-way handshake, if successful both the client and 
server proceed to step 4 and may begin exchanging data. The attacker can choose to attack the TCP 
handshake to take advantage of a trust relationship - often referred to as IP spoofing but to avoid 
ambiguity will be known here as TCP spoofing; or can wait until step 4 to take over a legitimate TCP 
session referred to as TCP session hijacking. Full technical discussions regarding TCP sequence 
number prediction and TCP session hijacking19 can be found in [Bellovin, 1989] [Morris, 1985] 
[Joncheray, 1995], and [Phrack, 1996b]. 
host TCP host 
(client) flags (server) 
step 1 A ---- SYN -- _.,. 8 
step2 A + - SYN I ACK- - - 8 
step3 A - - - - ACK - - _.,. B 
step4 A - - - - Data - - _.,_ B o~affid and/or during data 
transfer 
A + - - · Data - - - - B 
Figure 3-2 TCP 3-way handshake and data transfer. 
There are two ways to carry out TCP spoofing attacks; 
• Non-Blind Spoofing- In this case the attacker is on the same network path as the spoofed host 
or the target host (e.g. Ethernet 10Base2 LAN) and has direct access to the IP datagrams which 
contain the TCP segments. Therefore, sequence number prediction is trivial because the 
attacker simply uses a protocol analyser to capture the TCP segments and obtain the required 
sequence number. 
• Blind Spoofing - Is more difficult because the attacker is not on the same network path as the 
spoofed host or the target host, therefore direct access to the IP datagrams and TCP segments 
is not possible. Instead the attacker must attempt to guess the correct initial TCP sequence 
number, the success of which depends upon the mechanism being used to generate it. There 
are three mechanisms in common use: 
0 64K rule - this is the simplest mechanism and surprisingly is still used, or can be 
found on hosts running older operating systems (e.g. OSF, SunOS). Most 
19 Example code, known as Spoofit, for hijacking Telnet sessions is available from http://snifflt.rug.ae.be/. This site also 
contains a great deal of information about IP spoofing and sequence number prediction. 
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spoofing programs still provide support to take advantage of this rule. The rule is 
implemented as follows: 
increase the initial sequence counter every second with a constant 
(normally 128,000). 
If there is a connection initiated, increase the sequence counter with 
another constant (normally 64,000). 
Obviously, such a mechanism is very easy to predict, especially as the sequence 
counter is only altered once per second- a very large period in network time! 
0 time related generation - is a very popular and simple mechanism which allows 
the sequence number generator to generate time dependant values. The number 
generator is seeded at boot time, and is increased on a regular basis (e.g. psec) by 
an x number of time-units. Note that time-units on computers are not necessarily 
perfect, nor are all time-units of equal length, depending on how they are 
measured and on the load of the computer, etc. This variability increases the 
difficulty of predicting a correct sequence number. 
0 pseudo-random generation - in an effort to foil the prediction of initial sequence 
numbers newer operating systems are using pseudo-random number generators to 
generate the values- which makes prediction nearly impossible. 
In both cases the attacker must ensure that the spoofed host is unreachable, otherwise it will receive a 
SYN/ACK (see step 2 of Figure 3-2, page 29) from the target host in response to the attackers spoofed 
connection request. However, the spoofed host has no knowledge of initiating a connection request and 
will send a RST to the target host which will cause it to abort the connection and defeat the attack. The 
attacker normally has two options to deal with this problem, either to wait until the spoofed host is 
unreachable because of maintenance, or taking it off-line with a denial-of-service attack such as a SYN 
flood (see Section 3.2.1). An example of a blind spoofing attack is shown in Figure 3-3, page 31. 
From the attackers perspective blind spoofing is difficult because all replies from the target host are sent 
to the spoofed host. Therefore, the attacker cannot determine directly the success or failure of their 
attack. However, there are ways for attackers to turn a blind spoof into a non-blind spoof. This is 
achieved by using source routed IP datagrams [Stevens, 1994], Or by directly effecting the routing 
tables of intermediary gateways and routers. Source routing20 is a feature (an option) of the IP protocol 
which allows the sender to specify a route for an IP datagram to follow. The route is recorded in the IP 
header and the receiver uses the reverse of this to send replies. Therefore, an attacker could send source 
routed IP datagrams appearing to come from the spoofed host and including a route that sends replies 
back past the attacker. This is one reason why it is important to drop source routed IP datagrams, 
especially those originating from untrusted networks. 
In addition to source routing it is also possible to change the routing tables of gateways and routers by 
sending spoofed routing datagrams using protocols, such as, RIP, EGP, BGP, etc. As with source routed 
IP datagrams it is important to ensure that gateways and routers ignore or respond sensibly to the 
routing information they receive. In most cases though the Internet routes are stable enough so that all 
routing datagrams can be ignored. 
20 Source routing allows the sender to specify the route of an IP datagram. Two forms are provided; strict and loose source 
routing. Strict source routing allows the sender to specify the exact path that the IP datagram must follow. Loose source 
routing allows the sender to specify a list of IP addresses that the datagram must traverse, but the datagram can also pass 
through other routers between any two addresses in the list. 
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Target host 
IP: 192.10.10.2 
Attack host 
(IP: 192.10.1 0.2) 
Target host 
(IP: 210.101.82.1) 
Spoofed host 
(IP: 200.17.12.3) 
start of 3-way handshake SYN: 2000, nla 
--. 
The target host sends a 
SYNIACK response to the initial 
SYN segment, but this Is never 
received by the attacking host. 
Therefore, the attacker may 
have to send multiple ACKs to 
cover a range of possible 
sequence numbers depending 
on the accuracy of their 
prediction. 
At this point the attacker does r 
not know H a successful 
handshake has been 
completed, nor which (H any) 
sequence number was correct. 
Therefore, all TCP data 
segments must be resent based 
on the sequence number used ' 
for each of the previous ACKs. , 
ACK: 2001, 6586 
...... ACK: 2001, 6587 
...__ ACK: 2001, 6588 
ACK: 2001, 6589 
DATA! ACK: 2002, 6589 
~ 
lime, I 
ACK· Acknowledgment flag 
SYN Synchronise Sequence Numbers flag 
~ SYN I ACK: 6587, 2001 
.... ignored RST 
~ 
Ignored 
...,. accepted 
ACK: 6588, 2002 
-
ignored 
~ 
ACK: 6589, 2003 
. 
. 
. 
H' 
DATA Indicates that the transmission contains data (Informative only) 
n/a Indicates lhallhe field Is not valid 
-to 
-
1 
Allhls point foiWard the spoofed 
host must be unreachably. If the 
spoofed host receives TCP 
segments thalli does not 
expect, such as SYNIACK, it will 
reply with a RST. On receipt of 
the RST the target host will 
terminate the connection· 
defeating the attack. 
end of 3-way handshake 
l Any TCP segments that are received with the wrong 
• sequence number are simply 
ignored. 
[ 1 content of brackets Is optional; Its presence depends on the state of the TCP connection 
Label Constructjon: 
[ DATA I I [ SYN I 1 [ ACK 1 : value of sequence number field , value of acknowledgment number 
Figure 3-3 Example of a blind spoofing attack. 
The final attack, based on IP spoofing and TCP sequence number prediction, is TCP session hijacking 
which can be carried out against any TCP based application, e.g. Telnet, rlogin, FfP, etc. The only 
requirement is that the attacker has access to the IP datagrams sent between the target and spoofed host, 
this is necessary to obtaining the correct sequence number. Once the attacker has the correct sequence 
number a TCP segment can be sent, effectively hijacking the connection - all further datagrams sent 
by the spoofed host will be ignored by the target host because the sequence numbers will be incorrect. 
An example of TCP session hijacking is shown in Figure 3-4, page 32. 
Generally, TCP hijacking is used to take over a Telnet session. Telnet is a particularly easy protocol to 
hijack because it simply passes a stream of bytes between the client and server. All the attacker has to 
do is insert their commands (as a sequence of bytes) into the spoofed TCP data segments. The server 
will reassemble the TCP segments into command strings which will then be executed as though the 
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legitimate user had typed them. The only evidence of this attack is that the legitimate user's Telnet 
session hangs because it never receives conformation of the segments it sends, and will simply continue 
to resend them. After a few seconds the user will probably attribute the inactivity to "Murphy's Law" 
and begin a new session. 
TCP session hijacking has a number of benefits over other attacks, such as sniffing IP datagrams for 
passwords, especially when advanced identification and authentication techniques are in use. For 
example it is pointless to sniff one-time passwords, or responses to challenges issued by cryptographic 
authentication mechanisms, e.g. S/Key, SecureiD, Lockout, etc. However, because all of these 
advanced authentication techniques happen at connection time, no protection is afforded by them after 
this point. Therefore, the attacker simply hijacks a legitimate connection to gain entry to a system, and 
has the added advantage of appearing to the operating system's security mechanisms as the legitimate 
user! 
Spoofed host 
Target host 
IP: 210.101.82.1 
IP: 192.10.10.2 
Spoofed host 
IP: 200.17.12.3 
Target host 
IP: 210.101.82.1 
Attack host 
IP: 192.10.10.2 
start of 3-way handshake 
The attacking host wilt normally [ 
walt until any Identification and 
authentication takes place 
before hijacking the session. . 
Any further TCP segments sent ~ 
by the hijacked host will be 
Ignored by the target host 
because they have Incorrect 
sequence numbers. Tha , 
hijacked host will assume they , 
have been lost and will continue ' 
re-sending them. Ignored 
~ 
~ 
time, I 
SYN: 2000, nfa 
SYN I ACK: 6587' 2001 
ACK: 2001, 6588 
DATA/ACK: 2002,6588 
. 
. 
DATA/ AcK: 2007, 6588 
ACK: 6588, 2008 
DATA/ACK: 2008,6589 
. 
. 
. 
ACK: 6589,2015 
ACK Acknowledgment flag 
SYN Synchronise Sequence Numbers flag 
..... l The attacker uses a protocol 
analyser to capture IP traffic, 
, and can therefore determine 
, the TCP connection's state and 
• Its sequence numbers. 
end of 3-way handshake 
..... 
-... 
Data I ACK: 2008, 6589 
~ 
. 
. 
...... Ignored 
Data/ ACK: 2014,6589 
t-
, 
DATA Indicates that the transmission contains data (Informative only) 
n/a Indicates that the field Is not valid 
l The TCP session has been .. successfully hijacked once the attacker's TCP data segments 
: are received by the target host 
, and It sends an ACK. 
[ I content of brackets Is optional; Its presence depends on the state of the TCP connection 
Label Construction: 
[ DATA/ 1 [ SYN I 1 [ ACK 1 : value of sequence number field , value of acknowledgment number 
Figure 3-4 Example of a TCP session hijack. 
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Countermeasure 
Again, the simplest and most effective defence against IP spoofing, TCP spoofing, and TCP session 
hijacking lies with those organisations providing access to the Internet. If all of these organisations were 
responsible enough to prevent IP datagrams with source addresses originating from outside their 
networks from reaching the Internet, the attacks described above could not be carried out. 
Unfortunately, there are many organisations that provide unregulated Internet access. Therefore other 
means for protecting against spoofing and hijacking attacks must be used. The simplest and most 
effective is for an organisation to block all IP datagrams from the Internet that are source routed, or that 
have source addresses originating from the internal network. A properly configured firewall can be used 
to enforce such a policy. 
Also, trust relationships (e.g. rhosts) between hosts communicating across the Internet should never be 
permitted, unless they are used in conjunction with strong authentication and cryptographl1 they are 
simply too vulnerable! In fact, strong authentication and cryptography should be used with all TCP 
services (e.g. such as Telnet, FTP, etc.) where it is possible that an untrusted user could gain more than 
a very basic control over the operating system hosting the service. For example, an anonymous FTP 
server that provides read-only access to files can be adequately protected by the security mechanisms in 
existing operating systems, such as UNIX, and Windows NT. It is also important to assess the threat, 
for instance, it is unlikely that an attacker would go to the trouble of hijacking an anonymous FTP 
session! However, providing remote FTP access across the Internet to the superuser for uncontrolled 
read and write access has far greater implications. In such a case both strong authentication and 
cryptography are required, because the risk to the operating system by allowing such a connection 
would be too high. 
It is essential to understand the possible threats and vulnerabilities introduced by connecting to 
untrusted networks so that the risks can be accurately assessed. It is not enough to consider the risks 
posed by applications (e.g. FTP, Telnet, WWW, etc.) alone, it is equally important to understand the 
risks posed by the network protocols themselves, such as the TCP, the IP, and the many others outside 
the scope of this thesis (e.g. IPX/SPX, NETBUEI, SNA, etc.) 
3.2.3 RST and FIN Attack 
Description 
As mentioned previously TCP segments have control flags which indicate the status of a segment (see 
Table 2-3, page 17). There are two flags in particular, RST and FIN, which can be used for denial-of-
service attacks. Under normal circumstances the RST flag is used to reset a connection, while the FIN 
flag indicates that no more data will be sent. As with TCP session hijacking, the only requirement for 
this attack to be practical is that the attacker must have access to the IP datagrams sent between the 
target and spoofed host. This is necessary so that a protocol analyser can be used to collect the IP 
datagrams and obtain the correct sequence number. 
For a RST or FIN to be accepted, the TCP segment need only have the correct sequence number as the 
ANF is not used (i.e. there is no ACK in a RST segment). Therefore, the attacker simply analyses the IP 
datagrams in the connection between the target and spoofed host, and calculates (from the target host's 
ACKs) the sequence number that the target host would expect the next TCP segment from the spoofed 
host to contain. The attacker then generates a TCP segment with the RST flag set and sends it, in a 
spoofed IP datagram (i.e. containing the spoofed host's IP address in the source address field), to the 
target host. On receipt, the target host will close the connection with the spoofed host. 
A very similar attack can be launched with the FIN flag, which is the normal way that a TCP connection 
is closed. The attacker uses a protocol analyser to predict the correct sequence number, using it to 
21 It is important to note that strong authentication and cryptography are not mutually exclusive. For example SSL can provide 
session encryption and strongly authenticate both the client and server (see Section 7.7). 
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constmct a TCP segment with the FIN flag set. This is then sent to the target host which assumes that 
the spoofed host has no more data to send. Any further TCP segments sent by the spoofed host are 
ignored because the target host assumes they are network errors. The advantage of a FIN based attack is 
that the TCP mandates that on receiving a segment with the FIN flag set, the host must reply with one of 
its own. The beauty of this attack, from the attacker's perspective, is that they can be 100% guaranteed 
that their attack was successful! 
Countermeasures 
Normally, RST and FIN attacks are only applicable to the internal networks of an organisation. The 
reason for this is that an attacker needs to analyse the IP datagrams sent by either the target or spoofed 
host to determine the correct sequence number. For the attacks to be carried out on the Internet the 
attacker would have to have access to an Internet routing node at some point between the hosts being 
attacked- for most attackers access to such resources is impossible. 
Denial-of-service attacks can prove to be particularly malicious. Take for example a critical online 
database that has an HTML interface which allows users to enter data. A malicious attacker _could 
continually interrupt the commit phase (i.e. where the data is sent from the WWW-browser io the 
WWW-server) to prevent users from completing their work, or to corrupt the database. As a further 
example consider a WWW-server that provides information to users, an attacker could indiscriminately 
close connections during downloads causing many browsers to hang. These attacks would cause a great 
deal of confusion and be particularly difficult to resolve, i.e. is it a software, network, or hardware 
fault? Assuming the attacker does not wish to be caught they would stop their attack once an 
investigating was initiated and resume it once the investigation had finished - the infuriating, 
unpredictable, intermittent fault! 
Unfortunately, configuring routers and gateways on the internal network to block such attacks is 
difficult, and often impracticable because of the distributed nature of user groups and information 
resources. In such environments there is little that can be done to protect against such denial-of-service 
attacks. 
3.2.4 Ping 0' Death 
Description 
The Ping program tests whether a host is reachable by sending it an ICMP echo request message and 
receiving an ICMP echo in reply. Ping also measures the round-trip time to the host, which provides an 
indication as to how distant the host is, and is helpful for determining whether the intervening network 
is congested. 
IP datagrams (see Section 2.3) can be a maximum size of 65,535 (216-1) octets, which includes the 
header length (typically 20 octets if no IP options are specified). Datagrams that are larger than the 
maximum size that the underlying Link-layer can handle, known as the Maximum Transmission Unit 
(MTU), are fragmented into smaller datagrams which are then reassembled by the receiver. For 
Ethernet based networks the MTU is typically 1500 octets, while on the Internet the MTU is usually 
576 octets. 
The ICMP echo request resides within the IP datagram, and consists of eight octets of ICMP header 
information (RFC-792 [Postel, 1981c]) followed by the number of data octets in the "Ping" request. 
Hence the maximum allowable size of the data area is 65,535 - 20 - 8 = 65507 octets. 
What makes the "Ping 0' Death" attack possible is the ability to send an echo request datagram with 
more than 65507 octets of data, and because of the way IP fragmentation is performed. IP 
fragmentation relies on an offset value in each fragment to determine the order in which the individual 
fragments should be reassembled. Thus on the last fragment, it is possible to combine a valid offset with 
a suitable fragment size such that (offset + size) > 65535. Since operating systems typically do not 
process the datagram until they have reassembled all the fragments, there exists the possibility of 
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overflowing internal variables, and buffers which can lead to system crashes, reboots, kernel dumps, 
etc. 
Unfortunately, "Ping 0' Death" is easy to exploit, especially for those that have operating systems that 
allow users to send Pings of illegal size, such as Windows 95, Windows NT, and Linux. The following 
command is all that is needed to launch the attack from Windows 95: 
>ping -1 65510 your.host.ip.address 
Windows 95 will reply with "Request Timed Out", which means that the Ping was not answered, either 
because the remote host has correctly ignored the illegal Ping; or because it is now "dead" - it is that 
simple! 
Countermeasure 
Once it has been determined that hosts are at risk, the best solution is to obtain patches for the operating 
systems involved. Fortunately, the "Ping 0' Death" attack is now mainly of historical interest as most 
operating systems released since early 1996 are immune22, or have patches freely available. The attack 
is only possible because of insufficient error handling within the effected operating systems, not 
because of vulnerabilities inherent in the IP protocol itself. 
However, if patches are not available a quick solution is to block Ping at the firewall. Unfortunately, 
blocking Ping messages also prevents legitimate use and may prevent certain applications from 
functioning properly. A better solution than blocking all Pings is to block only fragmented Pings. This 
allows common and legitimate 64-byte Pings through on most systems, while blocking those that are 
larger than the MTU. 
Although the focus here is on Ping, it is important to consider that this attack is in theory applicable to 
any protocol that relies on IPv4 datagrams but cannot deal with those larger than 216-1 octets. Thus, it is 
possible that protocols such as TCP, UDP, and even IPX could be effected. The only completely 
effective solution is to secure the operating system against buffer overflows, and variables containing 
illegal values, when reconstructing IP fragments. 
3.3 Threats to Standard TCP/IP Services 
TCPIIP supports the operation of a number of well known services (i.e. applications). Traditionally 
each of these services have been associated with one or more vulnerabilities. Only applications that are 
commonly available on a number of operating systems, including UNIX, and Windows NT, are 
described here. 
The intention is not to provide a detailed discussion about all applications that exist and have 
potentially exploitable- vulnerabilities. Instead the following Sections are intended to provide an 
overview of the types of problems that are common to applications not included here, and to provide 
examples of the threats and vulnerabilities that those implementing Internet, Intranet, and Extranet 
networks should be aware of. For complete and detailed information about many other applications and 
their vulnerabilities the reader should consult [Cheswick et al., 1994] [Garfinkel et al., 1996] and [Hare 
et al., 1996]. 
22 An unofficial WWW-site providing information, and a list of affected (including available patches) and unaffected operating 
systems is available at http://www.sophist.demon.co.uk/ping/index.html 
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3.3.1 Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) 
Description 
The Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP), RFC 821 [Postel, 1982], is used as the basis for most 
email. Email is the most popular Internet service [Caceres et a!., 1991], allowing people to 
communicate by exchanging electronic messages globally. These messages take anywhere from a few 
seconds to a couple of hours to be delivered. An added attraction is the relatively low cost of sending 
large messages. Combined, these benefits give users a convincing argument for access to email, and 
thus the connection of their systems to the Internet. 
For a full and easy to read description of SMTP the reader is urged to consult [Stevens, 1994]. It must 
be noted that SMTP is a developing protocol, and as such, new threats could evolve. RFC 1425 
[Klensin, 1993] defines the framework for adding extensions to SMTP. 
Threats 
SMTP used by itself is a fairly benign protocol, containing only eight basic commands. These are 
HELO, MAIL, RCPT, DATA, QUIT, VRFY, NOOP, and TURN. There are two security tll.reats 
associated with these commands; 
• Denial-of-Service 
• Information gathering 
Denial-of-service attacks based on SMTP are aimed at flooding a network or computer with large email 
messages to prevent legitimate use. In most cases a computer is affected because it cannot handle large 
messages e.g. > 1 Megabyte, or cannot handle the load created by receiving large numbers of messages 
at the same time, or running out of storage space. 
For example the Computer Fraud and Security journal [CFS, 1996a] reported that a disgruntled 
university student was arrested for "mail bombing" the Monmouth University computer system in New 
Jersey. The attack caused massive disruption to the system for two days by generating 24,000 email 
messages, inundating the computers and paralysing the network. To get the systems functioning again 
required 44 hours of work, at an approximate cost of (US)$4,400. 
The second more subtle attack involves information gathering designed to provide the hacker with 
useful information about a computer system and its users. For instance the VRFY command sometimes 
translates a user's mail alias into their login name. This can be used to identify the more promising 
accounts to attack, with tools such as Crack. · 
Most problems arise when SMTP is implemented as a large application, such as sendmail [Costales et 
a!., 1993]. The threat comes from bugs, which inherently manifest themselves within large programs, 
and configuration problems such as giving the application higher privilege. These problems enabled one 
of the most famous Internet security incidents- the Internet Worm [Spafford, 1989] to take place. 
Other problems also exist with email attachments, and automated execution of encoded messages such 
as Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME). MIME allows specific actions to be encoded in 
email messages. These actions can request files to be automatically retrieved and returned to the 
message initiator. 
MIME can also be used to transfer executable programs and Postscript files, which can themselves 
perform dangerous actions. These existing security threats are very applicable to new, network oriented, 
programming paradigms such as Java and ActiveX (see Section 3.3.7). 
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3.3.2 Telnet 
Description 
Telnet, RFC 854 [Postel, 1983], is designed to enable communication between any host, regardless of 
the operating system. Telnet provides simple character based terminal access, and usually requires the 
user to login with an account name and password. 
Threats 
The biggest threat comes during login when initiating the Telnet session, as standard Telnet does not 
protect the transmission of the user's account name or password. Anyone monitoring the Telnet login IP 
datagrams over the network can capture this information. 
As with any protocol each step is predictable, therefore a packet sniffer can be configured to simply 
detect any Telnet session and record the IP datagrams containing the account name and password. 
Other threats exist, for example the Telnet program itself could have been compromised to record 
passwords and account names. A description of such a case is available in [Safford et al., 1993a]. 
To protect against sniffing attacks a number of secure versions of Telnet have been implemented 
[Borman, 1993) [Safford et al., 1993b]. These versions ofTelnet usually encrypt both the password and 
session contents which prevents an attacker from obtaining any useful information. 
3.3.3 Network Time Protocol (NTP) 
Description 
The Network Time Protocol (NTP), RFC 1305 [Mills, 1992], is used to synchronise the clocks of hosts 
connected to the Internet. The correct time is generated by extremely accurate atomic clocks which 
provide national time synchronisation. Time updates are propagated through a directed hierarchy of 
Internet hosts. The propagation path must not contain any loops as this would cause erroneous time 
transfers. 
NTP provides accuracy of 1 Oms or better; with such accuracy comes the ability to match log files from 
different systems. This has proved beneficial when matching audit logs from different systems and 
allows an attacker's actions to be replayed. It also provides a mechanism for cryptographic protocols to 
generate timestamps for authentication purposes. -
Threats 
Attacks on NTP focus on altering a target's sense of time. If this succeeds, a time based authentication 
protocol can be subverted by replaying a previous successful authentication sequence. Protection 
against these attacks is provided in newer versions of NTP which provide cryptographic message 
authentication. NTP specifies that authentication be carried out on a hop-by-hop basis. It is therefore 
possible for an attacker to subvert a system on which the target's NTP daemon relies, and thus subvert 
the target system as previously described. To ensure protection against this type of attack all sources of 
NTP information authenticate their sources, and so on back to the root NTP server. 
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3.3.4 Finger and Whois 
Description 
The Finger protocol, RFC 742 [Harrenstien, 1977], provides information on users of a specific host. 
Generally it is used to find out the account name of a user and/or whether they are logged on. In most 
cases the person using this command has no more sinister motives than sending mail. 
The Whois protocol, RFC 812 [Harrenstien, 1982], provides contact information such as account name, 
telephone number and address. It is useful for looking up people on systems when you do not have there 
full name. For example typing "who is smith" will return a list of people with "smith" in there name. 
Threats 
Finger can be used by hackers to collect useful information, such as account names, and compile login 
profiles i.e. the best time to attack the system is when the system administrator has finished for the day, 
or better still, on vacation. Other useful information supplied can be the date a user last logged in,_ and a 
user's ".plan" file which often contains useful personal information. This information can be used to 
identify promising targets, and provide contextual information to attackers for use with tools such as 
Crack. The following extract is from RFC 742 and expresses the philosophical nature of Finger. It 
reflects well the openness of early networks and contrasts starkly with the more security conscious 
1990's. 
"To fulfil the basic intent of the Name/Finger programs, the returned list should 
include at least the full names of each user and the physical locations of their 
terminals insofar as they can be determined. Including the job name and idle time 
(number of minutes since last typein, or since last job activity) is also reasonable and 
useful." 
The "Finger Bomb" is an interesting use of Finger to launch denial-of-service attacks against systems 
(Note: this attack has been patched on newer Finger services). Some Finger services allow the 
redirection of Finger to remote sites. To Finger through several sites, an intruder could use: 
>finger username@hostA@hostB 
The Finger will go through host B then to host A. This helps attackers to remain anonymous because 
host A will see a Finger coming from host B instead of the original host. This technique has also been 
used to go through fiiewalls that have not been properly configured. This can happen by using the 
command: 
>finger user@host@firewall 
On vulnerable hosts a denial-of-service attack can be launched by typing: 
>finger username@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @hostA 
The repeated @ causes the Finger to recursively Finger the same machine repeatedly till the memory 
and hard drive s~ap space fill up. This causes the machine to crash or slow to an unusable speed. 
The best countermeasure available to address the threat from Finger is to disable it entirely. If this is not 
possible then Finger should only be allowed to retrieve user information from a sanitised database. 
The Whois protocol is susceptible to the same types of abuse as the Finger protocol, however it does 
not reveal detailed information about users access habits. 
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3.3.5 Network File System (NFS) 
Description 
The Network File System (NFS), RFC 1094 [Sun Microsystems, 1989], protocol provides transparent 
remote access to shared files across networks, and is designed to be portable across different machines, 
operating systems, network architectures, and transport protocols. This portability is achieved through 
the use of Remote Procedure Call's (RPC) [Sun Microsystems, 1988]. 
To ensure robust NFS access in the event of system reboots and device failures (e.g. bridges and 
routers) the NFS server is stateless, unlike the clients which retain state. When an NFS server becomes 
unreachable its clients continue to send requests until they receive a reply. Thus, the client's functioning 
is not adversely. effected by the loss of an NFS server. 
Threats 
All files and directories on an NFS server are identified by unique strings known as file handles. A 
threat is introduced if a client program obtains and retains a root file handle at mount time, which is 
usually when the NFS server is re-booted. This is possible due to the inadequacies NFS access controls. 
Once access to the file system has been achieved it is possible to change file access controls, and create 
subversive programs and place them in search paths so that the real ones are not used e.g. trapdoor or 
password gathering programs. 
3.3.6 File Transfer Protocol (FTP) 
Description 
The FTP, RFC 959 [Postel, 1985], enables the transfer of character and binary files across a network. 
The design philosophy does not dictate a specific host, operating system or file structure - it is 
completely independent. 
An FTP server uses two TCP ports to transfer a file. Control Connection is established on Port 21, and 
Data Connection on Port 20. The FTP client is free to choose any available port. 
FTP has become the standard for publishing software, data, and documents on the Internet. However 
newer protocols such as Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) using the Hyper Text Markup Language 
(HTML) are becoming popular for documents. -
Threats 
The major threat to FTP comes from improperly managed FTP services. For example if an organisation 
runs a public FTP service but does not separate its sensitive organisational data, then with today's 
network speeds it may be possible to download all the sensitive data in a matter of minutes. FTP 
services should be restricted to certain, well managed, file areas. 
FTP has been used to gain access to password and remote host· files by exploiting deficiencies in 
management of the service. For example, if file areas are not controlled then the user is able to change 
access controls to files. It may be possible to insert false password or remote host files, which can then 
be used to gain access to other hosts. 
Like Telnet, the standard FTP protocol does not encrypt passwords that are required for the user to 
login to a system, so there is a high risk that the password can be compromised by anyone listening into 
the network. FTP sites are also used as promulgation points for pirated software. 
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3.3.7 World Wide Web (WWW) 
Description 
The WWW is made up of a collection of protocols specifically designed for exchanging information 
over the Internet. The original WWW protocols included Gopher, Wide Area Information Servers 
(W AIS), and Archie, however, the past four years have seen the introduction of the HTTP that has 
revolutionised the Internet. In fact, most laypersons associate the term WWW exclusively with HTIP. 
These protocols are generally used by clients to query servers for specific files. HTTP also implements 
the client/server model of document retrieval, in this case the client, called a "browser", is usually 
capable of multimedia support. The server, referred to as a WWW -server, functions in a similar manner 
to a standard file server, simply sending the requested documents to the browser. However, WWW-
servers are also capable of running programs to create HTML documents dynamically as they are 
requested, this makes them very useful for maintaining documents in dynamic environments. In fact 
HTTP was originally developed by physicists at CERN laboratories as a means of exchanging papers 
pertaining to their research. These documents where constructed using HTML which is based on the 
Standard Generalised Markup Language (SGML). --
What makes HTML so attractive is that a document can incorporate small programs that allow the 
content to become dynamic. These programs, referred to as executable content, can either be included 
as scripts within the document (e.g. Java Script), or as compiled programs which are loaded separately 
when the document is accessed (e.g. Java and ActiveX). 
Threats 
Sometimes files are returned which contain format tags, these are used to identify the program 
necessary to view, or execute the files. This problem is similar to trusting MIME encoded email 
messages. In fact, this is a major problem with HTML documents containing executable content. 
Most organisations that are connected to the Internet provide their employees with browsers so they can 
access WWW-servers. Unfortunately, to achieve this, firewalls and network guards must be configured 
to permit outgoing HTTP connections. This means that unknown programs contained in HTML pages 
can be downloaded onto a user's computer and executed, effectively bypassing the firewall and any 
security policy that attempts to control the unauthorised use of untrusted software! 
Fortunately, several solutions have emerged to deal with this problem. The first limits the access that 
the software has to system resources. For example, Java Script runs within the environment created by 
the browser and does not have direct access to system resources (e.g. hard disk, device drivers, 
memory, etc). Similar constraints are also applied to Java applets, although these can be relaxed to 
some extent by the user. The most dangerous executable content is Microsoft's ActiveX, these 
programs, known as "controls", are in fact executable binaries (i.e. compiled Microsoft Windows C++ 
programs). They are executed by the browser in the same manner that a user runs a program, because of 
this the ActiveX control has the same access rights to system resources as the user running the browser. 
For example, an ActiveX control downloaded by a user with administrator privileges would have full 
control of the computer, and possibly other machines if connected to a network. 
To address the problem users have in deciding whether executable content can be "trusted", Netscape 
and Microsoft have developed technologies based on public-key cryptography allow Java applet and 
ActiveX control code to be digitally signed. A browser that downloads a signed ActiveX control or Java 
applet can check the signature against a list of trusted certificates, if signed correctly the user can 
choose to execute the program with confidence that it came from a trusted source. Browsers from 
Netscape and Microsoft are pre-loaded with certificates from a number of well respected organisations. 
The benefit of this technique is that an organisation can remove all default certificates and install their 
own, effectively restricting executable content to that developed by the organisation. This can be 
enforced because the above browsers can be configured to enforce particular security policies. 
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Another solution provided by many of the newer firewalls allows HTML tags (i.e. hyper-links) that load 
the executable content to be disabled. Some firewalls can also be configured to check the signatures of 
Java applets and ActiveX controls, and allow through only those signed by trusted certificates. This has 
the added benefit of enforcing the security policy at a central point, other than delegating it to the 
browser where it may be possible for a user to alter the security policy locally. 
In most cases the solution to the problem of executable content is similar to FfP and other services. 
That is, services should be run in an enclosed environment with only enough privilege to perform their 
task. 
3.3.8 X·Window System 
Description 
The X-Window system [Scheifler et aL, 1992] is a client/server application which enables multiple 
clients to use the bit-mapped display managed by a server, which also manages the keyboard, and 
mouse. The client is an application program which runs on a host with the server or on a different host. 
X-Windows requires a reliable, bi-directional stream protocol such as TCP. Communication between 
client and server consist of 8-bit bytes. On UNIX systems where the server and client are on the same 
host, UNIX domain protocols are used to reduce the overhead of the TCP protocol. 
Threats 
An application which connects to an X server is able to do a multitude of things, e.g. read the keyboard, 
print the screen, read mouse movements/button presses, simulate key-presses, resize windows etc. If an 
attacker can connect to a server and read the keyboard, the user will be compromised. It is possible for 
an attacker on the Internet to probe for X servers, as X server ports are assigned as 6000 + n, where n is 
some small integer, usually 0. 
The X-Windows system uses host based authentication. The server takes the network source address of 
the connecting application and compares it with a list of allowable sources. However, there is no 
protection from an attacker connecting from a trusted host. 
Another protection mechanism makes use of a magic cookie; this is a secret byte string which the server 
and application share. Processes cannot connect to a server unless they contain this string. The problem 
is communicating the secret string between application and server over a generally unsecured network. 
A similar cryptographic challenge/response protection mechanism exists, but suffers from the same key 
distribution problems as the magic cookie. 
3.4 Summary 
The Internet can be a dangerous place for those who are not prepared. This warning is supported by the 
1998 joint CSI and FBI survey of computer crime. Although the Internet is perceived by many to pose 
the greatest threat to an organisations networks, the threat from dial-in connections and especially 
employees is just as great. Reality is that computer crime is costing organisations a great deal of money, 
though figures for New Zealand organisations are not available 241 organisations in the US reported a 
combined financial loss during 1997/98 of nearly US$235 billion dollars! 
Much of this figure can be attributed to the attacks discussed here. Although it is possible that having 
appropriate countermeasures in place would have reduced this figure. Unfortunately, computer systems 
are only as secure as those that use them can be trusted. This is borne out by the figures from Table 3-2 
in categories such as, unauthorised insider access, insider abuse of network, sabotage of data or 
networks, etc. 
41 
Threats from the Internet Firewalls and Virtual Private Networks 
The TCP/IP suite was never intended to offer comprehensive, scaleable security mechanisms, and it is 
the lack of such mechanisms that underlie most of the problems with IPv4 and TCP. However, many 
solutions have been presented here and most are readily available without great expense. For example, 
there is little expense in ensuring that trust relationships (e.g. rlogin) do not exist, or in applying patches 
(e.g. Ping) and keeping them up-to-date. 
Perhaps the most important point is that all organisations should act responsibly to prevent malicious 
traffic from reaching the Internet. As discussed in Section 3.2, most attacks to the IP and TCP (e.g. 
SYN flooding, IP spoofing, etc.) could be averted by preventing IP datagrams leaving an organisation's 
network if its source address did not originate from within. Unfortunately, not all organisations are so 
responsible, thus attacks which could be easily prevented are still possible. 
It has also been shown that many applications pose significant risks to organisations. Most problems are 
caused through deficiencies in the implementation (e.g. buffer overflows, unhandled exceptions, etc.) 
Therefore, it is essential that applications are kept up-to-date by applying patches or service packs that 
address new exploitable vulnerabilities. Other problems are caused by uneducated users or 
shortcomings in the organisations security policy. For example, Table 3-2 estimates that for the 1997/98 
period US$20 million dollars was lost to virus incidents. Also, it remains to be seen what problems, and 
financial losses, new WWW technologies (e.g. ActiveX controls, Java applets) will inflict. 
It is expected that IPSec (see Section 7 .6) will solve many of the problems associated with existing TCP 
and IP implementations. However, deficiencies and errors in the implementation of applications, along 
with corrupt employees, will continue to introduce new generations of threats and vulnerabilities. 
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Chapter 4. Firewall Technology 
4.1 Introduction 
A firewall is a combination of components, or a system that functions to enforce an access policy 
between two networks. The combination of components are known as a firewall architecture, which is 
directly responsible for protecting a single connection route between internal networks, or between 
internal and external networks. An internal network is defined as one that the organisation has control 
over, and is therefore considered a trusted network. In contrast, an external network is defined as one 
that the organisation has no control over, and is therefore considered an untrusted network. This thesis 
considers firewalls in the context of connecting internal networks to external networks (e.g. the 
Internet). 
However, firewall architectures are equally applicable to any two (or more) networks that have different 
security policies, or do not share common level of trust. For example, if an organisation has a LAN used 
by the Accounts Department and wishes to protect it from other departmental LAN's. A firewall can be 
placed between them to control the types of access permitted to employees in the different departments. 
Thus, all aspects of this thesis are equally applicable to the protection of internal networks from one 
another. 
A firewall architecture possesses the following properties [NCSA, 1996]: 
• all traffic from the internal to external, and vice-versa, must pass through it, 
• only authorised traffic, as defined in relevant security policy, is allowed to pass through it, 
and 
• the firewall architecture itself is immune from penetration 
Implementing a secure firewall architecture is dependant on the amount of resources the organisation is 
willing to expend, and the level of risk the organisation is willing to accept. 
4.2 Firewall Terminology 
To provide a common basis for the discussion of firewall architectures, the following terminology is 
introduced: 
Screening-Router - A basic component of most firewall architectures. A screening-router is 
usually a commercial router, although it can be a host with packet filtering capabilities. 
Typically screening-routers have the ability to control the flow of traffic between specific 
networks or hosts, at the IP layer. A screening-router can be the sole component of a firewall 
architecture. 
Bastiol)-Host - A bastion-host is analogous to a highly fortified castle; providing a central 
point for the protection of the surrounding countryside. Therefore the bastion-host is identified 
as a critical point in the security of a network. Bastion-hosts have extra attention paid to them 
which may be in the form of regular audits, have less or altered software/hardware, etc., to 
improve security. Bastion-hosts are commonly used to implement Application-level gateways 
(see below). 
Gateway - The terms "gateway" and "security gateway" are used in firewall literature to 
promote the idea of firewall as a single point which controls all communication between two or 
more networks. These terms are not preferred because they suggest that the firewall exists as a 
single component in the network, and possibly performs processing at all seven layers of the 
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OSI model - which is generally not the case. The preferred term is "architecture" or "firewall 
architecture", which promotes the idea of various components acting synergistically to protect 
a network from external threats. However, the term "gateway" is retained to provide 
consistency with existing literature. 
Dual-Homed Gateway -A dual-homed gateway (see Section 5.3) is implemented without a 
screening-router. The dual-homed gateway consists of two network interfaces, one connected 
to the external network and the other to the internal network. An important requirement is that 
TCPIIP forwarding is disabled to ensure that all traffic between the external and internal 
networks is inspected by the bastion-host. Thus, direct communication between networks is 
prohibited. By definition a dual-homed gateway is a bastion-host. 
Screened-Host Gateway -The screened-host gateway (see Section 5.4) is possibly the most 
common firewall architecture. It is implemented using a screening-router and a bastion-host. In 
most cases the bastion-host is located on the internal network. However, the screening-router is 
configured so only the bastion-host is visible from the external network. The screening-router 
can be used to limit the number of reachable services by blocking traffic based on port 
number. 
Screened-Subnet - A screened-subnet is a firewall architecture in which an isolated network 
segment is created between two screening-routers. The bastion-host and other sacrificial hosts, 
such as WWW -servers, are placed on the isolated network segment. The screening-routers are 
configured to permit traffic from the external network to reach hosts on the subnet only, 
external traffic attempting to connect directly to the internal network is blocked. The bastion-
host is only required if Application-level firewall architectures are to be supported. 
Pro>.y - A proxy is an application program which acts on behalf of another application, such as 
a WWW-server. For example a WWW-proxy passes Uniform Resource Locatol-3 (URL) 
requests/responses between browsers on the external network and the WWW-server on the 
internal network, or vice-versa. The same principles apply to other types of proxy. Importantly 
a proxy understands the protocol it is representing which enables the proxy to alter and 
monitor (meaningfully) the traffic it exchanges. The benefit of this is that the proxy can alter 
the protocol, for example, to support advanced authentication, or to provide improved auditing 
and logging capabilities. 
Proxies are not always security related. For example, proxies have been developed to provide a 
caching service for URLs. When the proxy receives a request for a URL, it looks to see 
whether it is already located in its local cache. If found, it returns the document immediately, 
otherwise it is fetched from the remote server with a copy being saved in the local cache. Such 
a proxy is often termed a "proxy-server". The proxy-server usually incorporates a mechanism 
to expire cached documents according to their age, size, and access history. 
In most cases proxies are transparent to the connecting hosts which simply appear to coi:mect 
to the expected service unimpeded. The most significant problem with proxies is that they have 
to be written specifically to mimic the application they represent (i.e. essentially they must 
implement any communication protocols provided by the original application). Proxies form 
the basis of Application-layer firewalls. 
IP masquerading - IP masquerading, or address translation, is a technique used by firewalls 
and security gateways to hide the use of unofficially registered IP addresses, and the topology 
of internal networks. Address translation can be achieved at the Network-layer by the 
operating system, or at the Application-layer using a proxy. Essentially, in both cases the IP 
source address of each datagram is replaced with an official address (usually that of the 
firewall's external NIC) before being sent on to the external network. 
23 A Unifonn Resource Locator (URL) is used to specify the location of an object on the Internet, such as a file or a newsgroup. 
URLs are used extensively on the WWW, and within HTML documents to specify the target of a hyperlink which is often 
another HTML document (possibly stored on another computer). For example, the Internet-Draft for the URL specification 
can be obtained by following the URL; http://www.w3.org/hypertext/WWW/Addressing/Addressing.html 
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Wrapper- Wrappers are a recent addition to UNIX security. They literally wrap around a 
program to enforce a higher degree of security than the wrapped program could achieve on its 
own. A common use for wrappers is to control the amount of information reaching the 
wrapped program, e.g. potentially dangerous commands can be filtered out. They can also 
provide extra security functionality, such as authentication, auditing and logging. Wrappers 
have a number of benefits, for instance, they are generally small programs which are easier to 
validate. In addition, wrapped programs can be upgraded without the need to rewrite the 
wrapper. Of course, any bugs that exist in the wrapped program are still potential 
vulnerabilities. 
Application-Server- An application-server provide a specific service, such as SMTP, FfP, 
WWW, or DNS. Application-servers usually operate at the Session, Presentation and 
Application-level of the OSI model. Application-servers are prone to security vulnerabilities, 
most often because of their size and complexity. Perhaps the most famous example is the 
sendmail hole that was exploited by the Internet worm (see Section 3.3.1 ). 
If application-servers are run on a firewall then any exploitable vulnerabilities could be used to 
directly compromise the firewall. It is commonly accepted that application-servers should not 
be run on a firewall, rather proxies or at least wrappers should be used. 
Circuit-Level Gateway- Circuit-level gateways are similar to application-level gateways with 
a single distinction. Instead of connections being mediated by the firewall, a virtual circuit is 
created between the external and internal hosts. This results in creating a hole in the firewall. 
Generally, circuit-level gateways are used to relay TCP connections from internal to external 
hosts. A certain amount of trust must be placed in the host opening the circuit, as the level of 
control the firewall has over the connection once it is established is less than that of the 
application-level gateway. 
Hybrid Gateways - Usually the term "hybrid" is used with firewalls or gateways that are 
composed of non-standard network components. Hybrid gateways may also use protocols 
other than TCP/IP, such as Novell's IPX/SPX network protocol. Protection of Hybrid 
gateways may rely on routers, or proprietary mechanisms specifically designed for the 
hardware or software being used. In general the concepts discussed in this thesis are equally 
applicable to hybrid firewalls or gateways. 
4.3 The 051 mo.del 
The OSI model (see Table 4-1, page 46, for an overview) is used to relate the various firewall 
components to their functionality. The OSI model provides a clearer reference than the TCPIIP model. 
Figure 4-1, page 46, presents a comparison between the OSI an TCPIIP communication architectures. A 
detailed description of the OSI model can be found in [Stallings, 1991]. 
Firewall architectures consist of components at two levels; the packet-level, and application-level. The 
packet-level components perform their actions based on information contained within the IP and TCP 
headers. In relation to the OSI model, the IP and TCP layers correspond to the network and transport 
levels respectively. The firewall architecture commonly used at this level is the screening-router. 
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Table 4-1 An overview of each layers of the OSI model. 
1 
2 
Physical 
Data link 
Concerned with the transmission of an unstructured bit stream over a physical 
medium; deals with the mechanical, electrical, functional, and procedural 
characteristics to access the physical medium. 
Provides for the reliable transfer of information across the physical link; sends 
frames of data with the necessary synchronisation, error control, and flow 
control. 
3 Network Provides upper layers with independence from the data transmission and 
switching technologies used to connect systems; responsible for establishing, 
maintaining, and terminating connections. 
4 Transport Provides reliable transparent transfer of data between end points; provides 
end-to-end recovery and flow control. 
5 Session Provides the control structure for communication between applications; 
establishes, manages, and terminates connections (sessions) between 
communicating applications. 
6 Presentation Provides independence to the application process from differences in data 
representation (syntax). 
7 Application Provides a means for application processes to access the OSI environment, and 
provides distributed information services. 
Application-level components generally perform their actions based on the protocols of the services 
being used. With respect to the OSI model, application-level firewalls relate to the application, 
presentation, and session levels of the OSI model. A bastion-host is generally used to implement the 
application-level component (see Figure 4-2, page 47). As Application-level components are at the 
highest level of the OSI stack and TCP/IP suite, it is possible for them to make use of information from 
lower levels. For instance an application-server could use IP header information to check the source 
address of the client connecting to it. 
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Figure 4-1 Comparison of OSI and 
TCPIIP communications architectures. 
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7 Application 
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Application Level 
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4 Transport 
3 Network 
2 Data Link 
1 Physical 
Figure 4-2 OSI model in relation to the various firewall 
architectures. 
4.4 Defining Boundaries 
It is important when considering firewall architectures to understand which parts of the organisation are 
at risk from the external network. The organisations network boundary is known as the security 
perimeter [Hare et al., 1996]. The responsibility of the firewall architecture is to protect this boundary 
from unauthorised transgression. 
~- ----------------------- ---------------- -~ 
I Internal Network ~ternal Network - - - - -~ 
I I 
I 
I 
Internet 
I 
I 
I 
I I. 
I 
L __ _ L - -Security Perimeter- -- __ I zone-of-risk - - - - - - -- --- --- -------- - - -- - --~ 
Figure 4-3 The zone-of-risk for an organisational network connected to the 
Internet without a firewall architecture. 
It is also helpful when considering network security to define a zone-of-risk. The zone-of-risk is a 
measure of the number of internal network components, such as hosts or routers, which are accessible 
from external networks. Initially the zone-of-risk includes all networks directly accessible (i.e. there are 
no security measures in place, such as firewalls) through external networks, such as the Internet. This 
situation is presented in Figure 4-3. Generally, the zone-of-risk is restricted to TCPIIP capable 
networks. However, networks and hosts using other protocols may also be vulnerable, as attackers can 
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take advantage of the common protocols that exist to communicate between different network 
architectures. 
External Network 
~--------
1 Internal Network 
Firewall Architecture I 
~--
1 
zone-of-risk 
Security Perimeter 
Production 
LAN 
Figure 4-4 The zone-of-risk with firewall architecture in place. 
_j 
The aim of a firewall architecture is to minimise an organisation's zone-of-risk by removing the number 
of network components which can be directly attacked from the external network. In other words the 
firewall architecture becomes the zone-of-risk for the entire organisational network (see Figure 4-4). 
4.5 The Role of a Security Policy 
A security policy is a prerequisite for any computer system, and should be promulgated to all members 
of an organisation. This ensures that all users understand their responsibilities, and rights in regards to 
the security of the organisations information systems. The security policy for a computer system should 
be concise and unambiguous, while providing the basis for the rules, regulations and procedures 
required for a detailed information systems security policy. A firewall security policy is the most 
important aspect of a firewall architecture, its specifications should be used to determine the design and 
performance requirements of the firewall [Menkus, 1995]. 
The firewall should implement the security policy defined by an organisations senior executives. Its 
purpose is to ensure the security of the organisations information systems from internal or external 
threats. The level of protection provided should be balanced in relation to the perceived threats. 
The security policy sets the acceptable limits of behaviour on a system and is therefore fundamental to 
the operation of a firewall. What constitutes acceptable behaviour is defined by the underlying 
organisational philosophy towards information systems security. 
The two philosophies which exist when considering a firewall security policy: 
"That which is not expressly permitted is prohibited." 
This is the most secure and attempts to mandate what can traverse the network. The second resides at 
the other end of the spectrum and reflects a totally permissive policy; 
"That which is not expressly prohibited is permitted." 
The later philosophy can be particularly difficult to define in a security policy. It requires all possible 
services to be identified and a decision to be made on the availability of each to the end-user. 
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Incorporating and maintaining this philosophy is a near impossible task for a systems administrator, due 
to the dynamic nature of computer systems, and the continually expanding requirements of end-users. 
The greatest problems arise when a security policy based on this philosophy neglects to prohibit a 
service that is potentially dangerous. If someone then exploits this service the organisation has no one to 
blame but itself. 
It is much simpler, and safer, to implement the former philosophy that mandates which services will be 
made available to users. Using this approach services can be provided in response to user needs, and are 
under the direct control of the systems administrator. 
The National Computer Security Association (now the International Computer Security Association) 
has released a firewall policy guide [NCSA, 1996] intended to promote a better understanding of 
firewalls among executives, information managers, system administrators, and MIS staff. The guide 
introduces two levels of network policy which are fundamental to the design, installation and use of a 
firewall architecture: 
• Network Service Access Policy (NSAP) - a higher-level, issue specific policy which defines 
those services (e.g. Telnet, FfP, NNTP etc.) that will be allowed or explicitly denied from the 
internal network, plus the way in which these services will be allowed or explicitly denied 
from the internal network, plus the way in which these services will be used, and the conditions 
for exceptions to this policy. 
• Firewall Design Policy (FDP) - a lower-level policy which describes how the firewall 
architecture will actually go about restricting the access to, and filtering of the services as 
defined in the NSAP. 
4.5.1 Network Service Access Policy (NSAP) 
The NSAP defines which services are to be explicitly allowed or denied between trusted and untrusted 
networks, together with the way in which these services are to be used and any conditions for exception 
to this policy. 
The NSAP should be an extension to existing business policy which will have already addressed the 
following issues: 
• Information Value- what value does management place on its information resources? 
• Responsibility - who is responsible for ensuring the protection of the organisations information 
from untrusted networks? 
• Commitment- what is the organisation's commitment to protecting its information resources? 
• Domains - what domains should or should not be protected? 
Further business policy should already have implemented controls on such systems as: 
• virus s_~;anning 
• physical security access 
• floppy disk controls 
• RAID back-up systems 
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At the highest level the organisational policy might state: 
• information is the strategic resource for the organisation. 
• the availability, integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the information will be protected 
by every cost-effective measure possible. 
• ensuring the availability, integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the information is a 
priority for all users at all levels of the company. 
Below this level specific policies are implemented which cover issues such as: 
• access to services (dial-in, dial-out) 
• version controls 
• user authentication 
• trusted/untrusted network access 
It is at this level that the firewall's NSAP is formulated. 
The NSAP must be drafted before the firewall is implemented. It must provide a balance between 
protecting the trusted network from known risks while providing users with convenient access to the 
untrusted network. Further, if a firewall denies access to certain services on an untrusted network, it is 
essential that the NSAP ensures that these <;ontrols are not circumvented or disabled. A typical NSAP 
might: , · 
• allow no access to applications or services on the trusted network from the Internet. 
• as above but allow access to a subset of applications or services by way of a secure server (e.g. 
bastion-host). 
• allow access from the Internet to selected applications on the trusted network (e.g. email) in 
conjunction with strict authentication procedures (e.g. challenge/response and one time 
password controls). 
4.5.2 Firewall Design Policy (FOP) 
FDP defines how the frrewall implements restricted access and service filtering specified by the NSAP 
and addresses issues such as: 
• IP address filtering 
• encryption tunnelling 
• secure-socket control to facilitate application access 
• audit and accounting control 
This policy is specific to the firewall and defines the rules and procedures necessary to implement the 
NSAP, but must take account of the capabilities and limitations of the particular firewall platform as 
well as the threats and vulnerabilities associated with TCPIIP. For example, if the NSAP forbids access 
to all applications on the trusted network, then implementing a firewall by way of a packet filtering 
router is extremely risky. 
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In principle a firewall can: 
• permit any service unless it is specifically disallowed 
• deny any service unless it is specifically permitted 
However, as stated previously only the latter option is practical. The first option might unintentionally 
allow denied services to run on non-standard TCPIUDP ports. Further, some services such as FTP, RPC 
and X-Windows are difficult to filter [Cheswick et al., 1994]. 
Depending upon the various security and flexibility requirements, some firewalls are more appropriate 
than others which means that the NSAP must be carefully designed before the firewall is implemented. 
For example dual-homed gateways (Section 5.3) and screened-subnets (Section 5.5) can both be used to 
implement a "deny all" firewall. However, the dual-homed gateway is cheaper but also less flexible than 
the screened-subnet. 
In order to arrive at a successful design policy together with a platform which implements this policy, it 
is usual to start by restricting all access from the untrusted to the trusted network, and then to specify 
the following [NCSA, 1996]. 
• what Internet services will the organisation use (e.g. email, Telnet, FTP, WWW?) 
• where will these services be used from (e.g. Intra-company, between branches, on a mobile or 
dial-in basis, by subsidiary organisations etc?) 
• what additional security features will be needed (e.g. one-time password control, 
authentication procedures, encryption tunnels, secure sockets, point-to-point encryption, dial-
in/dial-back procedures etc?) 
• what risks result from the provision of these services (e.g. is 40-bit RSA cryptography 
adequate for certain Government or banking applications? Is dial-in access without strong 
authentication an acceptable risk?) 
• what is the cost (financial, inconvenience) of providing these services? For example, how is 
key distribution handled? What is the cost of managing a dedicated authentication server? 
• what is the balance between usability and security (e.g. if a particular service is too expensive 
or risky to use should its use be forbidden- thus creating great inconvenience? 
Some services which are inherently insecure may, with the addition of certain technologies, be secured 
to pose little or no risk. For example a remote Telnet session can be extremely vulnerable to packet 
sniffing for passwords, and would pose a high risk when connecting a machine to a trusted network over 
an untrusted network such as the Internet. However, with the addition of encryption or strong 
authentication techniques this risk can be dramatically reduced. 
Implementation of the firewall based upon these considerations requires careful use of risk analysis so 
that the calculated level of risk can be compared with that deemed to be acceptable according to overall 
company polic_x [White et al., 1996]. This may result in a change to the initial policy. For example, if 
the original NSAP denied all dial-in access, certain exceptions to this rule may need to be considered so 
as to allow for mobile users. 
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4.5.3 Sample Policies 
Remote Access Policy 
As a specific example a 'Remote User Advanced Authentication Policy' might address dial-in user 
access from the Internet as well as authorised users on travel or working from home. All such 
connections should use the strong authentication service of the firewall to access systems at the site. 
Policy should reflect that remote users may not access systems through unauthorised modems placed 
behind the firewall as it takes only one captured password or one uncontrolled modem line to enable a 
backdoor around the firewall. 
Authorised users may also wish to have a dial-out capability to access those systems that cannot be 
reached through the Internet. These users need to recognise the vulnerabilities they may be creating if 
they are careless with modem access. A dial-out capability may easily become a dial-in capability if 
proper precautions are not taken. 
Therefore, both dial-in and dial-out capabilities should be incorporated into the design of the firewall. 
Mandating outside users to go through strong authentication at the firewall should be forcefully 
reflected in policy. Policy might also prohibit the use of unauthorised modems attached to host systems 
and PCs on the organisations trusted network if the modem capability is offered through the firewall. 
Since users could run Serial Line IP (SLIP) and Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) to create new network 
connections into a site protected by a firewall they need to be considered as part of the overall access 
policy. Such connections are potentially a backdoor around even the best firewall architecture. 
Information Server Policy 
A site providing public access to an information server may wish to incorporate this access into the 
firewall design. While the information server itself creates specific security concerns, the information 
server need not become a vulnerability to the security of the protected site. Policy should reflect the 
idea that ~he security of the site will not be compromised in the provisioning of an information service. 
For example, a WWW -server that is intended to provide access for Internet users may not need to be 
behind the firewall at all as the information provided by the WWW -server resides on that machine, 
rather than being drawn from systems on the internal network. As long as the machine is regularly 
backed up it can operate unencumbered by a firewall and simply be restored if it is attacked. 
It is useful to make a distinction between two fundamentally different types of traffic: 
• information-server traffic (traffic concerned with retrieving information from an organisation's 
information server) 
• business traffic such as email, file transfer, transaction services etc. 
The two types of traffic have their own risks and do not necessarily need to be mixed with each other. 
Screened-subnet firewalls (Section 5.5) allow information servers to be located on a subnet and 
therefore to be isolated from other site systems. This reduces the chance that an information server 
could be compromised and then used to attack site systems. 
4.5.4 Policy Evolution 
Two considerations drive the formation of a FDP with respect to Internet connections: 
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• the risk of sensitive organisational information being disclosed as it is transmitted across the 
Internet, e.g. password file capture, information leakage attacks (e.g. Finger) etc. 
Once the FDP has been drafted, maintenance and review are important ongoing activities. 
Maintenance of the FOP 
Unlike many organisational policies the FDP is not static and may need to change on a day-by-day basis 
depending upon new vulnerabilities which arise. For example, Java was considered to be a "great 
invention" and the industry was assured by Sun Microsystems that it was not a security risk. Therefore 
as browsers evolved to become Java aware, Java applets were simply allowed through firewalls without 
restriction. It is likely that Java never appeared in any company's firewall policy as it was probably 
considered to be part of the WWW. Other examples of policy maintenance include changes to filtering 
rules of a network and rule changes resulting from the introduction of new services. 
Review of the FOP 
It is most important that the FDP remain under constant review to ensure that the policy ret1ects the 
current situation. As a result of FDP maintenance, the original policy can become unrepresentative of 
reality which can introduce security holes. Examples include - change of the systems expert, wrong 
versions of software being loaded following a system crash, etc. In many of these cases problems may 
not be detected until after a security breach has occurred. 
4.6 Summary 
This Chapter has provided an overview of the concepts and technologies that contribute to firewall 
architectures. It has also used the OSI model to provide a clearer abstraction of the functionality offered 
by firewall architectures. 
In addition to functionality, the boundaries that define a firewall architecture have also been defined. 
The purpose of a firewall architecture is to reduce the zone-of-risk that an organisation is subjected to. 
While the security perimeter is important because it logically separates an organisations network(s) into 
trusted and untrusted domains. This Chapter has viewed internal networks as being contained within the 
domain of an organisation where they are inherently "trusted". In contrast external networks have been 
viewed as "untrusted" networks outside the control of any organisation. However, this view of internal 
and external networks is equally applicable within an organisation. For instance, a firewall may be used 
to separate sub-networks which are characterised by differing security policies, and possibly 
incompatible trust relationships. 
Defining boundaries is important because it helps to clarify the extent of the security provided by a 
firewall architecture, and it defines logically and physically the relationship between internal and 
external networks. This is useful from the perspective of network security policy design which must be 
comprehensive and address the perceived risks, while satisfying the users expectations by allowing 
them to perform their daily tasks unimpeded. 
The NSAP is particularly important as it defines explicitly the services which are permitted and those 
which are prohibited. Obviously, the most secure and manageable philosophy for NSAP design is to 
prohibit everything not expressly permitted. Implementation details of the NSAP are reserved for the 
FDP which defines how the firewall will restrict access to services. Both documents are a necessary part 
of the overall security policy, without the NSAP and FAP (or similar) it is hard to imagine how a 
firewall architecture could be selected and implemented while successfully considering all of the 
security implications. 
At the end-of-the-day the most important advice for firewall security policy implementation and 
acceptance is that it must involve the end-users, and the NSAP at least must be distributed to all users to 
have the desired effect- comprehensive network security. 
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Chapter 5. Firewall Architectures 
5.1 Introduction 
A firewall architecture consists of a number of components which can be combined to provide 
increasing levels of network protection. Figure 5-1, compares the cost of various firewall architectures 
with the level of security they can be expected to provide. 
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• Screened-Host Gateway 
• Dual-Homed Gateway 
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Figure 5-l The cost of firewall architectures in comparison to the level of 
security they provide. 
The following Sections describe the basic firewall architectures, as it is possible combine firewall 
components in a number of ways. 
5.2 ScreeningwRouter 
A screening-router is a basic component of most frrewall architectures, and usually consists of a 
commercial router. In some cases routing can be host-based, particularly on hosts using the UNIX 
operating system. Screening-routers filter the datagrams passing between the network connections in 
accordance with a previously defined routing table. Filtering is usually done on IP datagrams based on 
some, or all of the following fields: 
• source IP address 
• destination IP address 
• TCP/UDP source port 
• TCPIUDP destination port. 
Additionally, some routers are able to distinguish which network interface a datagram arrives on, and 
use this information to decide how it should be filtered. This is particularly useful when traffic needs to 
be segmented from specific networks, and in eliminating IP source address spoofing. Datagrams which 
arrive at the external interface are known as inbound packets, while datagrams arriving at the internal 
interface are known as outbound packets. 
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The layers of the OSI model at which the screening-router normally functions are shown in Figure 5-2. 
The greyed in boxes of the protocol stack indicate the layers on which the filtering rules generally 
operate. The double headed anow indicates the flow of traffic as it passes between the internal and 
external interfaces. 
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Figure 5-2 The OSI layers at which the screening-router functions. 
Due to the inexpensive nature of screening-routers, they have been used in many networks as the sole 
component of the firewall architecture. Usually there are direct communication paths between multiple 
hosts on the internal and external networks (e.g. the Internet). In normal operation the zone-of-risk the 
internal network is exposed to is directly proportional to the number of hosts on the internal network, 
and the number of peer-to-peer connections to the external network. As the number of hosts and 
connections grow it becomes impossible to identify all possible threats should the router be 
compromised. 
Figure 5-3 shows a simple router based firewall architecture, and differentiates between the external and 
internal networks. 
External Network 
external I 
interface 
Internal Network 
- - - - ---- - - - -I 
. I 
I 
: . '••• ...... . 
I Screening-Router ~ 
1
1 I internal 
L_ - zone-of-risk - - - interface 
I 
L - - - Security Perimeter-
Figure 5-3 Typical screening-router based firewall architecture. 
Routers are generally used to block connections from or to specific hosts or networks, and to block 
connections to specific ports. The ability to filter on both TCP and UDP ports adds considerable 
flexibility in defining security policies. As it allows the router to control which TCP services can be 
accessed, e.g. Telnet, FTP, SMTP, Finger etc. 
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Filter rules are generally specified using a table of conditions and actions which are applied to each 
datagram until a decision to route or drop is reached. If a datagram meets all of the conditions specified 
in the row of the table, the action specified in that row is carried out. Some systems apply the rules in a 
systematic manner from first to last. While others enforce an order based on the criteria in the rules, 
such as source and destination address. 
As a simple example of the a screening-router, suppose that an organisation, sprocket. com, represented 
by the internal network shown in Figure 5-3, requires a mail connection to the organisation widget. com. 
A mail connection is characterised by a destination port number of 25, and a source port 2::: 1024. The 
sprocket.com mail connection is identified by the 2-tuple <IP number= 202.20.20.10, port 2::: 1024>, 
while the widget.com mail gateway is identified by the 2-tuple <IP number= 192.10.10.5, port= 25>. 
The (simplified) routing table required to permit this type of connection is shown below in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1 Example of a simple routing table. 
allow 202.20.20.10 ;;::: 1024 192.10.10.5 25 Connection from sprocket.com to 
the widget.com mail gateway. 
allow 192.10.10.5 25 202.20.20.10 2: 1024 Allow replies from the mail gateway 
at widget.com to sprocket.com. 
deny * * * * If neither of the above rules are met 
deny access to all other datagrams. 
The following are problems associated with many router implementations: 
• Configuration Control - Perhaps the biggest draw back for sole use of a packet-level firewall 
in protecting a network is the amount of effort required for configuration control. Routers are 
difficult to program, every permitted combination of IP connection needs to be entered and in 
the correct order. 
• IP Spoofing - Most filtering implementations rely on the accuracy of IP source addresses to 
make filtering decisions. However, IP spoofing takes advantage of the ease at which the source 
addresses cal). be faked. This is a case where the ability to filter on inbound datagrams is 
useful. To do this the router must make layer 1 and 2 (OSI model) information available for 
use in the filtering rules. If a datagram arrives on the external interface and its source and 
destination IP addresses are from the internal network then an IP spoofing attack is underway. 
Security of the internal network can be greatly improved if the router can be told to deny such 
data grams. 
• Lack of Flexibility - A major problem with packet filtering firewalls is their inability to 
administer fine grained access control at the user level. In particular a router cannot allow user 
A to access a service, while denying user B. If the service were blocked then datagrams 
generated by both A and B would be blocked. 
5.3 Dual-Homed Gateway 
The dual-homed (or multi-homed) gateway is a common and easily implemented Application-level 
firewall architecture. A dual-homed gateway is a host machine which has two network connection ports; 
one connected to the external network and one connected to the internal network (a multi-homed 
gateway simply has two or more network interfaces). With IP forwarding disabled a complete block of 
traffic between the two networks is ensured. 
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There are two ways a user can access the external network via the internal network. The first is by direct 
logon to the dual-homed gateway. This is not advisable as it makes the dual-homed gateway directly 
vulnerable to password cracking, and provides access directly to the firewall through software 
vulnerabilities, such as bugs or compilers being present on the host. 
The second, and safest way for a connection to be made is through the Application-layer using a proxy 
server. A proxy server is an application which routes IP traffic from one port to another. Such an 
application can provide additional security mechanisms, such as user authentication, auditing, and 
logging facilities. These features are a great improvement over screening-routers which generally 
provide no more than rudimentary facilities. 
The problem with using proxy servers is that they usually have to be written for each service that is 
offered. However, basic proxy servers for standard TCPIIP services, such as Telnet, FTP, WWW, etc., 
are generally available for UNIX and Microsoft Windows (i.e. Windows 95 and Windows NT) 
environments. 
A dual-homed gateway will generally perform the same packet-level functions as the screening-router. 
It may also provide additional functions such as address translation, and IP masquerading. This is 
shown in Figure 5-4, which relates the dual-homed firewall architecture to the OSI model. 
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Figure 5-4 The OSI layers at which the dual-homed gateway 
functions. 
Figure 5-5 shows a simple dual-homed firewall architecture, and differentiates between the external and 
internal networks. 
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Figure 5-5 Typical dual-homed gateway. 
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The greatest threat to the security of a dual-homed gateway is when an attacker gains login access to it. 
As stated above, allowing users to log directly onto the bastion-host makes it easier for an attacker to 
gain a foothold on the machine. Therefore login should always be through application proxies on the 
dual home gateway. 
If an attacker obtains login access to the dual-homed gateway the internal network is subject to 
intrusions. The zone-of-risk has been extended from the dual-homed host to include the entire internal 
network. The following is a list of sources from which an attack can be mounted [Hare et al., 1996]: 
• Weak permissions on the file system. 
• Internal network NFS-mounted volumes. 
• Permissions granted to Berkley r-utilities (e.g. rlogin) through host equivalent files, such as the 
rhosts file (see Section 3.2.2), often found in user home directories which have been 
compromised. 
• -Network backup programs that could restore excessive permissions. 
• The use of administrative shell scripts that have not been properly secured. 
• Learning about the system from older software revision levels and release notes that have not 
been properly secured. 
• Installing older operating system kernels that have IP forwarding enabled. 
The key for the attacker is to gain enough system privileges to be able to change the UNIX kernel 
variable ipforwarding, which controls IP forwarding. Once this variable has been enabled the firewall 
has been completely subverted. 
There are a number of aspects, apart from disabling IP forwarding, which can be checked to ensure the 
security of a dual-homed gateway; the following list is adapted from [Hare et al., 1996]: 
• Remove all programming tools; including compilers, linkers, utilities, and services not 
specifically required for the operation of the dual-homed gateway. 
• Ensure programs that have SUID and SGID permissions, and if not required are removed. 
Check that no excessive permissions on files and programs exist. 
• Use disk partitions so that denial-of-service attacks designed to fill all available disk space 
on a partition are confined to that partition. 
• Remove unneeded system and special accounts, e.g. disable guest . accounts, and 
maintenance accounts found on some proprietary systems (including screening-routers). 
• Delete network services that are not required. 
5.4 Screened-Host Gateway 
The screened-host gateway is implemented using a screening-router and a bastion-host. It is one of the 
most popular firewall architectures. The bastion-host is usually placed on the internal network, with the 
screening-router configured such that the bastion-hostis the only machine reachable from the Internet. 
To restrict Internet access further the screening-router is generally configured to block all traffic not 
destined to specifically authorised ports on the bastion-host. This has the effect of controlling the 
number of available services. 
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The combination of screening-router and bastion-host means that the screened-host firewall architecture 
effectively functions from layer 3 (or layer 2 if the screening-router can filter datagrams based on the 
network interface they arrive on) to layer 7 of the OSI model. 
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Figure S-6 The OSI layers at which the screened-host firewall 
architecture functions. 
Major benefits of screened-host gateways include reduction of router programming complexity, and 
improved connectivity for local users. As all traffic is passed through one single point i.e. the bastion-
host, then the rules for configuring the router table need only consider the bastion-hosts IP address. All 
other datagrams arriving at the inbound or outbound ports of the screening-router can be discarded, 
which greatly simplifies the required packet filter rules. Figure 5-7 shows a typical screened-host 
firewall architecture. 
External Network I 
I 
[ L zone-of-risk 
Internal Network 
internal 
interlace 
' _____ I 
- Security Perimeter 
Figure 5-7 Typical screened-host firewall architecture. 
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If the internal network is a virtual local area network configuration with no subnets or additional 
routing. Then the screened-host gateway can be implemented without changes to the original LAN. 
Users then have the ability to connect directly through the bastion-host to the external network, without 
excessive routing overhead. 
The zone-of-risk incorporates only the screening-router and bastion-host. The security of this firewall 
architecture is determined by the accuracy of the packet filter rules in relation to the security policy, and 
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the level of assurance regarding the software running on the bastion-host. If an attacker gains entry to 
the bastion-host then the threats to the internal network are similar to those of the dual-homed gateway. 
There is a major problem with the architecture of the screened-host gateway described above. The 
problem is inherent with positioning the bastion-host on the internal network, and relying on the 
screening-router to control the traffic flow to and from it. A potential Achilles heal exists with the 
compromise of the screening-router. If this happens, either through, miss-configuration of the packet 
filtering rules, or through an attacker gaining access to the screening-router via a proprietary 
maintenance account, then the entire internal network is at risk. In effect compromising the screening-
router effectively subverts the bastion-host. Once an attacker has control of the screening-router, all 
traffic can be routed to the external network. 
A more secure implementation is to use a screening-router connected to a dual-homed gateway. This 
architecture ensures that the bastion-host is not circumvented if the screening-router is compromised . 
. The attacker has to overcome the dual-homed gateway before the internal network is at risk. Of course, 
this architecture offers no improvement if an attacker is able to enter through the screening-router and 
compromises the bastion-host directly. 
5.5 Screened-Subnet 
A screened-subnet firewall architecture, consists of an isolated network known as the exterior network, 
positioned between the external and internal networks. This configuration allows non-critical hosts, 
such as WWW-servers and anonymous FfP sites, to be placed on the exterior network. The advantage 
of removing these servers from the internal network is realised when one is compromised. As they have 
no connection with the internal network a compromise does not directly effect the safety of the internal 
network - although the compromised host could be used to launch attacks, for example an attacker 
could use it to view all traffic between the internal and external networks. The servers also benefit from 
the protection afforded by the external screening-router. Bastion-hosts are placed on the exterior 
network to provide interactive terminal sessions, or application-level firewalls [Ranum, 1996]. The 
combination of firewall components means that the screened-host firewall architecture functions form 
layer 3 (or layer 2 if the screening-router(s) can filter datagrams based on the network interface they 
arrive on) to layer 7 of the OSI model (see Figure 5-8). The screened-subnet is generally considered to 
be the most secure firewall architecture. 
in-bound packets 
-. 
External 
Network 
external interface 
e l>r >') 
5 :·'>:.· .{:,:( 
4 
3 :~ : : 
I 2 I __; 
~-~-~-----: 
internal Interlace 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 I I ___ - ___ .J 
: _ _L_~_: 
,, 
li 
1': 
I< 
out-bound packets 
..---
Internal 
Network 
Figure 5-8 The OSI layers at which the screened-subnet firewall 
architecture functions. 
The bastion-host provides the sole point of access to machines on the internal network, and forces all 
services through the firewall to be provided by application proxies or circuits. Protecting the bastion-
host are two screening-routers, one between the external network and subnet (known as the external 
router), the other between the subnet and internal network (known as the internal router). Therefore the 
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zone-of-risk for this configuration consists of only the two routers, and the bastion-host, as well as any 
other hosts placed on the subnet. An example of this configuration is shown in Figure 5-9. 
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Figure 5-9 Typical screened-subnet firewall architecture. 
The strength of this firewall architecture is derived from the fact that an attacker must, in general, 
subvert the external router followed by the bastion-host and finally the internal router. If the screening-
routers are configured so they cannot be managed remotely from the network, then subverting the 
bastion-host without setting off alarms and appearing in audit logs would be very difficult. 
As with the screened-host gateway, if the screening-routers can be directly compromised by logging 
into them and reconfiguring their routing tables the bastion-host can be negated and the internal 
network put at risk. In fact, this is the reason why highly security conscious organisations often install 
screening-routers from different manufactures, to reduce the risk that a vulnerability in one router will 
be present in the other .. 
One draw back with this configuration is the extra level of complexity added to the definition of packet 
filter rules, especially if there are hosts on the subnet other than the bastion-host. The overall threats to 
this firewall architecture are the same as those described for the dual-homed and screened-host 
gateways. 
5.6 Hybrid Gateways 
The term "hybrid gateway" is normally used to describe any non-standard firewall architecture, it may 
be that the components are proprietary or that TCP/IP is not the predominant networking protocol. It is 
important that any belief that a non-standard hybrid gateway will provide "security through obscurity" 
should be dispelled. A hybrid firewall architecture may slow a determined attacker, but over a period of 
time they will build up enough information to understand the gateway and its security mechanisms. 
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5.7 Firewall Limitations 
A firewall architecture is a powerful tool for network security, but it is not a panacea for all ills. 
Fire walls are particularly suited to controlling access to services and network resources, and monitoring 
and auditing traffic travelling between the networks that it connects. It is important to understand that a 
firewall architecture's influence is localised. The analogy of a firewall being like a castle wall holds 
here the wall may protect those behind it, but affords no protection to those people or hamlets on the 
other side! Therefore, it may not be enough to simply build a single castle, especially when building 
Bxtranets and Intranets which move information and resources outside the protective influence of a 
firewall. However, this problem is the topic of Chapter 7 which looks at cryptography and VPNs as a 
means of extending the protection offered by firewall architectures or gateways to incorporate untrusted 
networks, such as the Internet. 
Firewall architectures are focused on protecting against attacks launched at the lower layers of the 
TCPIIP suite, in particular the Network and Transport-layers. For example, hosts behind a screening-
router configured to drop source-routed IP datagrams are virtually immune to IP spoofing attacks (see 
Chapter 3 for a discussion of common threats to the TCPIIP suite). The screening-router simply 
discards any IP datagrams with this feature enabled. 
In contrast, firewall architectures provide almost no protection against problems with higher layer 
protocols, unless they are performing some type of analysis (or filtering) of the· Application-layer data 
contained within the TCP segments or UDP datagrams (or other Transport-layer protocols). The most 
sophisticated TCP-based proxy provides no protection at all if a server it protects contains exploitable 
vulnerabilities. 
A recent problem with Microsoft Windows based WWW -servers24 highlights the difficulties that 
firewall architectures have in dealing with security at the Application-layer. All 32-bit Microsoft 
Windows operating systems associate two different filenames with a stored file, a short name of 8 
characters and a long name which must be less than 255 characters - the short filename is derived 
from the long name in a predictable manner. For example, the long filename "Abcdefghijk.xyz" is also 
represented with the short filename "Abcdef-Lxyz". 
Vulnerable WWW-servers attempted to restrict access by building an internal list of restricted 
filenames. However, for files with long names, only the long and not the short filename was added to 
the internal list. This leaves the file unprotected by the WWW-server because the file is still accessible 
via the short filename. Attackers could take advantage of this exploitable vulnerability to gain 
unauthorised access to files protected solely by the WWW -server. Unless the firewall had been 
configured with a filter to deal with this problem requests for protected files would succeed the 
firewall architecture provides no protection whatsoever. 
A related and equally difficult problem to deal with is malicious content that is accessed legitimately by 
users behind the firewall. Malicious content includes virus infected software and data files (e.g. infected 
with macro-viruses), Trojan horse programs, and executable content (e.g. Java applets, ActiveX 
controls, etc.). There are several common ways such malicious content can pass through a firewall: 
• Email attachments 
• File transfer (e.g. FTP) 
• WWW -browsing 
The problem of malicious content leads to the question "what protection should a firewall architecture 
provide?" The uninitiated usually expect firewalls to provide protection against all threats including 
malicious content. Unfortunately, this is nearly always not the case and in fact it is difficult to see how a 
firewall could provide such omnipresent protection. However, some firewall architectures do attempt 
24 See CERT Advisories CA-98.04, February 11, 1998; which is available at http://www.cert.org/advlsories/CA-
98.04. Win32. WebServers.htrnl 
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such a feat by providing virus scanners that automatically check attachments as they are received, and 
some particularly "advanced" firewalls provide scanners that check for malicious Java applets. 
Placing too much confidence in such "alchemy" could prove disastrous. For example, how can a virus 
scanner check email attachments if the attachment is instead encoded (e.g. using UUencode) within the 
message body? (This is still a fairly common practice.) Even if this was not a major problem, consider 
the performance impact (in fact virus scanners by default only scan for the most common viruses) that 
scanning every email attachment using every possible encoding format would have - some of the most 
common encoding formats include; TAR, ZIP, BinHex, ARJ, ARC, LZH, Base64, UUencode, 
XXencode- and what about recursively encoded files? Scanning for malicious Java applets is perhaps 
even more pointless because there is an infinite number of ways a program can be written or slightly 
altered to prevent the scanner from recognising it. 
Although virus and malicious content scanners are imperfect they do play an important role in 
preventative computer security, and should not be discounted entirely as useful additions to the 
Application-layer security of firewall architectures - as long as it is recognised that they are fallible. It 
should also be remembered that scanners are a "reactive" technology, by their very nature they will 
always lag behind the development of new viruses and malicious content. Therefore, new variations will 
nearly al:ways avoid detection. 
Obviously, new methods must be found to deal with the problem of malicious content. Perhaps the most 
promising method involves the use of digital signatures and public-key certificates (see Sections 7.3.3 
and 7.3.4 respectively). The use of these mechanisms provides a way of associating a measure of "trust" 
to the supplier of software or data files. 
The problems with deficient Application-layer services, viruses, and malicious content, highlight the 
fact that in some cases a well defined security policy can offer more defence than can technical 
solutions. For example the NSAP and PAP could restrict the use of Java applets and ActiveX controls 
to those that have recognised digital signatures that are trusted by the organisation. The policy could 
then be enforced by a firewall architecture that can be configuring to check and permit only trusted 
executable content, while scanning could also be used to provide an additional safety check. 
Unfortunately, firewall architectures are more often designed to "keep people out" rather than to "keep 
people in". Most firewall architectures provide internal users with uncontrolled access to external 
networks through services such as email, HTTP, FTP, Telnet, etc. -which is ironic considering the 
trouble that organisations go to to prevent abuse of these services by external attackers. Thus the 
majority of firewall configurations provide little protection against insider abuse, although some support 
advanced identification and authentication techniques that are usually based on the cryptographic 
mechanisms and protocols discussed in Section 7.3. 
The only alternative is to incorporate intrusion detection mechanisms within computer systems and 
networks that are capable of detecting insider abuse. Unfortunately, such systems have not become 
widespread and are themselves plagued by many problems. So until effective safeguards against insider 
abuse are found it will remain relatively easy to abuse the trust given to users behind the firewall. 
5.8 Summary 
The firewall architectures discussed in this Chapter represent the fundamental configurations used to · 
control the flow of traffic between networks that have different security policies or levels of 
trustworthiness. 
In particular, frrewalls cannot protect against installation errors or software bugs, nor can they protect 
against malicious programs imported through legitimate means. A firewall can only defend against 
known security threats, and will always be vulnerable to new ones. Of course the only truly secure 
configuration is to block all applications such as email, FTP, and executable content- although this 
may upset employees that have come to rely on such services. 
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Chapter 6. Certification of Firewall Technology 
6.1 Introduction 
There are many firewall products available which implement the various architectures described in 
Chapter 5, all of which can differ in price, performance, effectiveness, and quality. The firewall 
architecture that an organisation implements should be determined in consultation .with its security 
policy documents. However, the most important aspect to consider is the level of assurance that the 
given architecture provides. To date, assurance has been attributed to firewall products through 
independent evaluation using some suitable criteria. 
Currently, there are three criteria being used to evaluate firewall products. The first two have been 
developed for government certification programmes, and are known as the Information Technology 
Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), and the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation or simply the Common Criteria (CC). The final criteria was developed for a commercially 
driven programme run by the International Computer Security Association (ICSA), and is known as the 
FWPD25 Criteria (FWPDC). 
Certification of firewall products has taken two distinct paths: 
• Government Certification - uses recognised, formal evaluation criteria such as the ITSEC and 
the CC, and is aimed at meeting the needs of public organisations such as the government, 
military, and law enforcement. Such organisations often require IT security products and 
systems suitable for processing and protecting information that ranges from unclassified to 
nationally classified (e.g. CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, TOP-SECRET). Obviously, systems 
which handle classified information must prove their trustworthiness to an acceptable level. 
Both the ITSEC and CC require that all aspects of a product or system be reviewed and 
investigated to an extent commensurate with the claimed level of trustworthiness. The impetus 
of government certification schemes is to provide governments with a trustworthy range of 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) IT security products. 
• Commercial Certification - is aimed at meeting the needs of private organisations, in a timely 
and cost-effective manner. Private organisations rarely (if ever) handle nationally classified 
information (this may also be true of many public organisations). Instead, they may be required 
to process information which requires protection to a level that satisfies their legal obligations, 
e.g. New Zealand's Privacy Act (1993). In addition they may also wish to protect information 
.that is commercially sensitive, the compromise of which may have a detrimental impact on the 
organisation's competitiveness or ultimate survival. In general, private organisations require 
certification that shows they meet accepted industry standards. The FWPDC provides this by 
focusing evaluation towards frrewall testing, in particular penetration testing. Therefore ICSA 
certification is an assurance that the firewall is able to withstand attacks ·based on current 
threats and vulnerabilities. The ICSA is currently the only commercial organisation offering 
this type of certification. 
Regardless of the criteria used the outcome of a successful evaluation is the award of a certificate. From 
the perspective of developers and vendors a certificate can lead to competitive advantage and market 
penetration. While from the customers perspective a certificate allows a defined level of trust to be 
placed in the IT security product or system. 
25 FWPD is an acronym for the Firewall Product Developers' Consortium which was established in 1995 to provide a forum in 
which developers of competing firewall products could work toward common goals, such as certification. 
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6.2 Problems with Firewall Evaluation 
Firewall technology has advanced considerably in the past four years, yet the practice of firewall 
evaluation has not kept pace [Schultz, 1996]. The problem is that firewalls are unlike traditional 
security products which are designed to counter the known threats of a particular operational 
environment, and have well defined modes of operation. Perhaps the most important distinction is that 
traditional security products tend to evolve slowly. The culmination of these factors mean there is less 
requirement for modification. For evaluated products this means re-evaluation or review, which is 
necessary to determine whether the modification has impacted on the products security objectives. 
Firewall architectures on the other-hand consist of many components, such as an operating system, 
management tools, and proxy servers. They can also have a very wide range of operating modes and 
configurations, for example a firewall may support encrypted connections and allow user defined 
services. All of these aspects must be considered and evaluated as a whole. However, the greatest 
problem with firewall certification is the speed at which the technology evolves. 
Each time a firewall is modified to support a new service, or provide additional functionality, such as 
Java, ActiveX, or SSL, it must be re-evaluated, or at the least reviewed. This is necessary to assess the 
impact that the modification may have had on the various components contributing to the firewall 
architecture. It is very possible for a modification in one component to introduce a vulnerability in 
another. Unfortunately, re-evaluation can be as expensive as the initial evaluation. Evaluation, re-
evaluation, and review all introduce delays in the marketing of a firewall product. This impacts directly 
on the sponsor because they are unable to recover their investment through selling the certified firewall 
until it has officially received its certificate. 
6.3 Government Certification 
A number of national governments have invested in programmes to evaluate Information Technology 
security products and systems. The majority of these schemes have been developed with the objective 
of meeting the needs of government and industry for IT security evaluation and providing a basis for 
international mutual recognition of evaluation certificates. As previously stated, the ITSEC and CC are 
currently the only criteria being used to evaluate firewall products. It is important to note that the 
ITSEC and CC were designed to enable the evaluation of any IT security product or system. 
It is not possible to review all of the national schemes and programmes which currently subscribe to the 
ITSEC or CC. Instead the following Sections focus on the ITSEC and its application by the Australian 
Information Security Evaluation Programme (AISEP). The CC is not discussed in detail as it is still a 
draft document, and has only been used in trial evaluations [CCITSE, 1996]. 
6.3.1 Development of Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 
In 1978 the United States Department of Defence in conjunction with the MITRE Corporation began 
working on a set of computer security evaluation criteria that could be used to assess the degree of trust 
one could place in a computer system used to protect classified data. This work led to the development 
to the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), or otherwise known as "The Orange 
Book," due to the colour of its cover. The TCSEC is limited to evaluating the effectiveness of security 
controls built into automatic data processing system products [TCSEC, 1985]. In effect this means the 
operating system and the hardware on which it operates. As the functional requirements specified in the 
TCSEC are applicable only to standalone operating systems, it cannot be used by itself for example to 
evaluate a firewall which operates in a networked environment. Due to the specific nature of the 
TCSEC, variations (known as interpretations) have been developed to evaluate different types of IT 
security products and systems. For example a Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) of the TCSEC, also 
referred to as "The Red Book," has been developed. This is a restating of the requirements of the 
TCSEC in a network context [TPEP, 1998]. The collection of these interpretation documents along with 
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a number of guidance26 documents (e.g. Guide to understanding Mandatory Access Control, and 
Password Guidelines) is known as the Rainbow Series - each document has a distinctly coloured 
cover. In an effort to replace the TCSEC with a criteria more in-line with the ITSEC, the Federal 
Criteria (FC) was developed. A draft version was released for public comment in December 1992, 
however, this effort was overtaken by the CC and the FC never progressed beyond the draft stage. 
A number of other countries, mostly European, also have significant experience in IT security 
evaluation and have developed their own criteria. France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom recognised that a significant amount of work remained to be done in the area of IT security 
evaluation. Therefore, it was decided that the efforts of these four countries be combined to produce a 
common, harmonised criteria. The best features from each national criteria were combined to form the 
harmonised Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) [ITSEC, 1991]. 
As well as the Americans and Europeans, the Canadians developed the Canadian Trusted Computer 
Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC) which is the equivalent of the TCSEC. It is more flexible than 
the TCSEC, having aspects of the ITSEC, but still maintains a close compatibility with individual 
TCSEC requirements. 
In June 1993, the authors of the CTCPEC, FC, TCSEC, and ITSEC combined their efforts and began a 
project to align their criteria and create a single draft of the CC. The intent of this ongoing project is to 
resolve the conceptual and technical differences found in the source criteria, and then deliver the results 
to the ISO as a contribution toward its work in progressing an international standard for a general IT 
security evaluation criteria [CCITSE, 1996]. An initial draft (version 1.0) was released in January of 
1996, but is expected to be replaced in early 1998 with version 2.0 27• 
The primary purpose of these criteria is to provide government and industry with a metric to measure 
the level of "trustworthiness" which can be placed in a product or system. It also provides developers 
with guidance in the development of secure IT products and systems, especially those intended for the 
processing of sensitive or classified information. As previously mentioned, a major desire and perhaps 
realisable with the CC is international mutual recognition. Mutual recognition would, for example, 
allow the evaluation certificate for the Cyberguard Firewall evaluated under the UK ITSEC scheme 
[CPL, 1997] to be recognised by the AISEP, which also uses the ITSEC. Unfortunately, to date, 
political differences and difficulties in equating the outcomes from the different certification schemes 
have prevented this. 
6.3.2 Overview of the ITSEC 
The ITSEC is a standardised criteria with a formalised methodology, known as the Information 
Technology Security Evaluation Methodology (ITSEM). The ITSEM provides guidance on how to 
interpret and apply the ITSEC. Its purpose is similar to the Interpreted TCSEC28, and the Common 
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) [CEM, 1997] developed for the CC. 
The ITSEC places emphasis on integrity and availability, and attempts to provide a uniform approach to 
the evaluation of both products and systems. The ITSEC makes a distinction between how well the 
product provides security in the context of its actual or proposed operational use - effectiveness); and 
whether it achieves the stated security objectives and features -correctness. By taking this approach, 
the ITSEC allows less restricted collections of requirements for a product. However, this is arguably at 
the expense of more complex and less comparable ratings, as well as the need to carry out effectiveness 
analysis of the features claimed for the evaluation. 
26 The guidance documents, which are part of the Rainbow Series, expand and clarify the requirements of the TCSEC and the 
various interpretations (e.g. TN!). They offer guidance only, the TCSEC or the interpretations provide the only metric for 
evaluation. 
27 An unofficial release of the CCITSE version 2.0 is available at http://csrc.nist.gov/cdccvlx/wip_list.htm 
28 The Interpreted TCSEC is available at http://www.radium.ncsc.miVtpepllibrary/tpep!ITCSEC.ps 
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The ITSEC defines seven assurance levels; EO, El, E2, E3, E4, E5, and E6. EO is reserved for products 
which fail evaluation, while E1 to E6 represent increasing assurance (see Figure 6-1). Descriptions of 
each level are given in Appendix A. 
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Figure 6-1 ITSEC Assurance Levels. 
The time taken to evaluate a product increases with each of the assurance levels because more work 
needs to be completed by the evaluator. The following time-scales from [UKSP04, 1996] provide a 
general indication of the time taken to have a product evaluated under the UK ITSEC scheme. These 
time-scales represent the elapsed time from the start of a product evaluation to delivery of the 
Evaluation Technical Report29 (ETR) to the Certification Bodl0: 
• E1- up to 6 months 
• E2- 6 to 18 months 
• E3 .- 8 to 24 months 
Estimates for the time-scales of assurance levels greater than E3, i.e. E4, E5, and E6, are not indicated 
by [UKSP04, 1996]. This is perhaps due to the smaller number of evaluations completed at these levels. 
However, due to their complexity and the greater amount of work required, assurance levels of E4 and 
higher could be expected to take several years to complete. The AISEP does not publish time-scales 
however it would be expected that they are similar to those given above. 
The CC has a structure which is very close to the ITSEC, but includes the new concept of a Protection 
Profile (PP). The PP permits the implementation independent definition of security requirements for a 
set of products or systems which complies fully with a set of security objectives. A PP can be developed 
by user communities, IT product developers, or any other interested parties, which defines a set of 
common security requirements. In fact the initial draft release of the CC included a predefined PP for 
packet-level firewalls. Subsequently, additional work has been done in developing more applicable and 
effective PPs31 . 
29 The ETR is a report produced by an evaluation facility which details the findings of an evaluation and forms the basis of the 
certification process for a product or system. 
30 The Certification Body is an independent and impartial national organisation in the UK that performs certification. It is 
managed by CESG and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and is responsible for the day-to-day running of the UK 
ITSEC Scheme, certifying evaluation results, and licensing evaluation facilities. The Certification Body is under the direction 
of the Management Board which is responsible for setting policy and for overseeing its implementation [UKSP04, 1996]. 
31 Additional work on PPs can be found at http://csrc.nist.gov/cdpp/pplist.htm 
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The CC has seven assurance levels, BALl to EAL7, where EAL2 to EAL7 correspond very closely to 
ITSEC El to E6 (see Figure 6-2). It is interesting to note that the CC has no concept of a failed 
evaluation (i.e. EALO) unlike the ITSEC which denotes this as EO. An evaluation is either successful 
and granted a CC rating, or it simply does not get a rating. This was done to prevent vendors using the 
zero rating as a marketing tool. It was thought that vendors would claim that they were granted a CC 
rating with the implication that the rating was a positive one when in reality the product failed 
evaluation [Cohen, 1998]. 
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Figure 6-2 Comparison of CC and ITSEC assurance levels. 
The new BALI assurance level is intended to allow the detection of obvious errors for minimal cost, 
and represents the minimum at which a meaningful assurance level can be awarded. BALl requires a 
minimum of documentary evidence, augmented with an appropriate level of ad hoc penetrati011 testing. 
This approach is suitable for the detection of obvious security weaknesses only. The following quote 
from [CCITSE, 1996] provides an insight into the reasoning behind the inclusion of BALl; 
"EALJ is applicable in circumstances where those responsible for user data may wish or 
be obliged to seek independent assurances in the IT security, but the risks to security are 
not viewed as serious. Under these circumstances, an EALJ rating would be of value to 
support the contention that due care had been exercised with respect to personal or 
similar information." 
In effect an BALI evaluation would be very similar an FWPDC evaluation conducted by the ICSA (see 
Section 6.4) because both depend on penetration testing to provide a minimum acceptable level of 
trustworthiness. · Commercial evaluation facilities which already provide evaluation services for 
government certification schemes could conduct BALl evaluations to compete with commercial 
certification schemes like that offered by the ICSA. 
Perhaps in anticipation of competition for the evaluation of low assurance IT security products and 
systems, the UK ITSEC scheme has expanded their criteria to include the BALl assurance level for the 
evaluation of IT security systems. This is directed towards systems originally built without thought for 
evaluation and for which the documentary evidence required for higher assurance levels does not exist 
and would not be cost effective to produce [UKSP06, 1997]. 
6.3.3 Overview of the Australian Information Security Evaluation Programme 
In June 1994 the Defence Signals Directorate32 (DSD) announced the establishment of the Australian33 
Information Security Evaluation Programme (AISEP). As stated above the AISEP currently subscribes 
32 The Defence Signals Directorate has a similar role in Australia, as the Government Communications Security Bureau has in 
New Zealand. Both organisations are the national information security authority for their respective countries. 
69 
Certification of Firewall Technology Firewalls and Virtual Private Networks 
to the ITSEC, however the CC has been identified as the long term solution to problems such as mutual 
recognition. Transition from the ITSEC to the CC has already begun, although only trial evaluations 
using the CC will be undertaken in the near future. 
The objective of the AISEP is to provide the Australian and New Zealand Governments and industry 
with an efficient and cost effective service in the evaluation and certification of IT security products and 
systems [EMl, 1997]. It offers evaluation and certification services to: 
• developers -to enable them to demonstrate the security claims of their products; and 
• users - to allow them to satisfy themselves and others that their systems actually meet their 
security objectives. 
Independent third-party evaluation is carried out by Australian Information Security Evaluation 
Facilities (AISEFs). Currently two AISEFs are operating; Admiral Computing based in Canberra, and 
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) based in Canberra and Adelaide. Each have had to meet the 
requirements of the National Association of Testing Authorities (NATA) to be registered as a testing 
laboratory. In addition they must he found technically competent by the Australian Certification 
Authority (ACA) before the AISEP will issue a licence. 
Evaluation begins with the Sponsor34 developing a Security Target for their product or system; The 
Security Target is a specification of the security required of the Target of Evaluation35 (TOE) and is 
used as a baseline for the evaluation. The security target specifies the security enforcing functions 
(SEFs) of the TOE. It also specifies the security objectives, the threats to those objectives, and any 
specific security mechanisms that will be employed. Most importantly it states the intended assurance 
level for the product. 
Once developed the Security Target along with a number of other evaluation deliverables are passed to 
the AISEF. This commences the main part of the evaluation process where the evaluators perform the 
ITSEC evaluator actions, including penetration testing based on a list of potential vulnerabilities. All 
problems identified during this phase are discussed between the relevant parties, such as the sponsor, 
developer, or certification group. It is the responsibility of the sponsor to resolve all identified 
problems. If this is not possible, the sponsor may abandon the evaluation or accept potential limitations 
in the certificate/certification report. The major output of this phase is the ETR, which records the 
results of the evaluation work and identifies any unsolved problems. The ETR36 is the basic input to the 
final phase of evaluation, known as the certification process. 
During the certification process, the Certification Group37 reviews the ETR to determine whether the 
security target is met by the TOE, taking account of any factors outside the scope of the evaluation such 
as the strength of cryptographic mechanisms. The Certification Group also confirms that the evaluation 
has been performed in accordance with the rules of the AISEP, and as agreed between the AISEF and 
the sponsor. The conclusions of the Certification Group, along with the assigned assurance level, are 
recorded in a certificate and certification report, which are passed to the sponsor and the AISEF. Copies 
of the certificate are distributed to various interested parties, including all AISEFs and specific 
government departments. 
33 In the near future the word "Australian" will be replaced by "Australasian", to reflect the involvement of New Zealand, and 
the AISEPs increasing recognition within Australasia. 
34 The "sponsor" is the person or organisation that requests an evaluation. 
35 The TOE is an IT system or product which is subjected to security evaluation. 
36 Since the ETR contains commercially and possibly nationally sensitive information, it is not a public document. 
37 The Certification Group (equivalent to the UK ITSEC Scheme's Certification Group) is an independent and impartial national 
organisation in Australia that performs certification. It is managed by DSD, and is responsible for the day-to-day running of 
the AISEP, certifying evaluation results, and licensing evaluation facilities. The Certification Group is under the direction of 
the Management Policy Board which is responsible for setting policy and for overseeing its implementation [EM?, 1997]. 
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Table 6-1 lists the firewall products which have been certified or are currently in-evaluation with the 
AISEP. The UK ITSEC Scheme also has a number of certified and in-evaluation firewall products 
which are shown in Table 6-2 - it is interesting to note that some of the firewalls have CC assurance 
levels. The UK, US, and Canada have agreed to the Interim Mutual Recognition Agreement (IMR), 
which has been signed by the National Security Agency (NSA), the Communications-Electronics 
Security Group (CESG) in the UK, and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) in Canada. 
The implication for vendors is that products evaluated with the CC need only be evaluated once as the 
resulting certificate is accepted by the other IMR participants. The Black Hole firewall version 3.01 E2 
from Milkyway Networks Corporation has been evaluated to CC assurance level EAL3 by CSE, and is 
the first and currently only firewall product to be recognised by the IMR agreement,_ This evaluation 
took 12 months to complete due to a lack of an evaluation methodology, and the need to develop a 
security target as the existing predefined PPs were not sufficient. It· is estimated that the evaluation 
would have taken 9 months if a suitable methodology had been available [Cohen, 1998]. 
From a New Zealand perspective, once a certificate has been received by the Government 
Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) the product is listed in the Preferred Products List (PPL). 
The PPL lists security products which have been successfully certified through recognised schemes and 
programmes, such as the AISEP. Government departments within New Zealand are encouraged38 by the 
GCSB to select IT security products from this list. A similar list, known as the Evaluated Products List 
(EPL) operated by DSD in Australia. Commercial organisations can gain a competitive advantage by 
having their products listed on the PPL or EPL, especially when trying to· penetrate government 
markets. · 
Table 6-1 AISEP certified, and in-evaluation firewall products, to February 1998 • 
.. ·r~·~M:anufa~turer- :. • , >~c}Descriptl~n ·· ,•,, <>I·· .. .· 'Statris ~- ···.Assurance. 
' ~/ ''· ' ~ ' ' > • < -
.. Level 
·. 
:.: ·.·· 
CyberGuard CyberGuard Firewall, UK ITSEC Certificate 97178 E3 
Corporation version 2.2.1e 
Sun Microsystems SunScreen SPF-100G, Certificate 96/0 1, El 
version 1.0 December 1996. 
(No longer Available) 
Check Point Check Point FireWall-1, in-evaluation E3 
Software version 3.0 GOV 
Technologies Ltd. (Special Evaluated 
Government Version) 
Cisco Systems Cisco PIX Firewall, in-evaluation E1 
version 3.0 
IBM IBM Firewall, in-evaluation E3 
version 3.1.1- for AIX and 
Windows NT 
Norman Data Norman Firewall, in-evaluation E3 
Defense Systems version 4.0 
(Development) Inc. 
Softway Pty Ltd, Secure-IT Gauntlet, in-evaluation E3 
Trusted Information version 3.2 
Systems Inc. 
Sun Microsystems SunScreen SPF-100, in-evaluation El 
version 1.0 - with 
Patch 102946-07 
38 Selection of products from the PPL is not mandatory for Government departments. However, if a product which meets the 
departments requirements, and budget, is listed on the PPL it is usual for it to be chosen over a similar unlisted product. 
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Table 6-2 UK ITSEC Scheme certified, and in-evaluation firewall products, to February 1998. 
CyberGuard Europe 
Ltd. 
Trusted Information 
S stems (UK) Ltd. 
Milkyway Networks 
Corporation 
Check Point 
Software 
Technolo ies Ltd. 
The Knowledge 
Grou 
Gauntlet Internet Firewall, 
version 3.2 
Black Hole (SecuriT) 
Firewall, 
version 3.01E2 
Check Point FireWall-1, 
version 3.0 
VCS Firewall 
6.4 Commercial Certification 
E3 
Certified August 1997 (UK) E3 
Certified August 1997 (Canada) _ E2 I 
EAL3 (CC) 
in-evaluation (UK) E3 
in-evaluation (UK) BALl (CC) 
The only commercial organisation currently performing firewall certification through product testing is 
the International Computer Security Association (ICSA) - previously known as the National Computer 
Security Association. The ICSA is based in the US, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 
ICSA has a number of certification programmes39 for a range of security products in addition to 
firewalls, including: 
• Anti-Virus 
• Cryptography 
• Filtering and Monitoring 
• Biometrics 
The ICSA also provide certification for systems, such as WWW and Internet sites. 
6.4.1 ICSA Firewall Certification 
The ICSA believes that the fundamental motivation for a company to get its firewall product certified is 
to reduce both real and perceived risk. Customers and users of an ICSA certified firewall can be assured 
that they have taken due care in meeting minimum security standards that will protect them against 
common and well known attacks. This is perhaps more important in the US, than New Zealand, where it 
may decrease liability in the event of a security breach or failure. The concept of taking due care and 
reducing liability is also present in the CC BALl assurance level (see Section 6.3.2). 
ICSA certification allows the certified firewall to point to a recognised security baseline, which they can 
show is met, or exceeded. It is possible that the use of a certified firewall could reduce insurance 
premiums, in the same manner as burglar alarms and dead-locks. It may even be possible to insure a 
network against damage done by an attacker. 
39 A full description of the development of generic ICSA evaluation criteria is available at 
http://www.ncsa.com/services/certificationlabout.htm 
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Commercial, marketing, and other competitive forces, provide the impetus for vendors and 
manufacturers to have firewall products certified. It is highly probable that a vendor would seek product 
certification because competing products have been certified. This trend can be seen in the leading 
firewall manufacturers which have all attained an ICSA firewall certification (see Table 6-3). The same 
group of manufactures are also having their fire walls evaluated through either the AISEP (see Table 6-
1), or the UK ITSEC Scheme (see Table 6-2). 
Table 6-3 ICSA certified firewalls, to March 1998. 
Raptor Systems, Inc. 
Secure Computing 
Sun Microsystems, Inc. 
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The FWPDC40 (see Appendix B) unlike the ITSEC and CC has no notion of assurance levels, instead 
the result of applying the criteria to a firewall product is either a pass or fail. The FWPDC is focused on 
testing the resistance of frrewalls against a standard set of vulnerabilities, as opposed to the ITSEC and 
CC which assess the fundamental design and engineering principles of the underlying technology. In 
effect the FWPD Criteria takes a "black-box" approach to evaluating firewall products. 
One of the problems with firewall certification under government schemes such as the AISEP and UK 
ITSEC Scheme is the length of time required to complete an evaluation. The ICSA argues that the 
digital world moves far too quickly to certify only a particular version of a product or incarnation of a 
system. Therefore, the various ICSA certification criteria and processes are designed- so that once a 
product or system is certified, all future versions of the product (or updates of the system) are inherently 
certified. This is normally accomplished by three means: 
1. A contractual agreement is made between the ICSA and the product vendor or the organisation 
that owns or runs the certified system, agreeing that the product or system will be maintained 
at the current, published ICSA certification standards. It is expected that the organisation's 
own quality assurance programs will incorporate the current ICSA certification criteria,as a 
part of their continuous product or system development processes. This means that a 
significant part of the ICSA certification process involves self-checking by the organisation 
whose product or system is certified. 
2. The ICSA or its authorised agents normally perform random spot checking of the current 
product (or system) against current ICSA criteria for that certification category. Products or 
systems are typically spot-checked for current compliance two to four times each year. If a 
product or system fails a spot check, the responsible party is given a short time (typically 2 to 4 
weeks) to rectify the problem(s). If the shipping product or production system still does not 
meet current certification criteria by the end of this grace period, then ICSA certification is 
explicitly and publicly revoked. 
3. ICSA certification is renewed annually. At renewal time, the full certification process is 
usually repeated for the current production system or shipping product against the current 
criteria. 
These steps ensure that ICSA certification is relatively independent of product or system updates and 
version changes, therefore owners and users can be assured that the current version of the product or 
system meets the current ICSA certification criteria. 
6.4.2 ICSA Firewall Testing 
The FWPDC reduces the problem of firewall evaluation by considering only a subset of possible 
vulnerabilities. The ICSA commissions or performs studies, surveys and other research to ascertain the 
relevant risks. Those which are exceedingly rare, merely theoretical, and of trivial impact are discarded. 
In order to keep up with constantly evolving risks the FWPDC is updated on a regular basis from the 
results of the ICSA' s ongoing research. The benefit of this is that the criteria, and more importantly the 
testing regimes, continue to address the latest vulnerabilities introduced by the rapid evolution of 
firewall technology. 
The FWPDC, and related testing standards are developed by experts, with input from third party 
groups. Actual evaluation of firewall products and systems is normally implemented by skilled 
evaluators under expert supervision and oversight. Evaluation is performed either by ICSA personnel 
and labs or by third-party labs and personnel trained and authorised by ICSA for this purpose. 
Evaluators are trained through an internal ICSA process which consists of formal and elective 
components [Cafarchio, 1998]. 
40 The current version of the FWPDC is available at http://www.ncsa.com/services/consortia/firewalls/certification.htm 
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As a design goal, testing is automated where possible, and checklist oriented when not. The test 
protocols are designed to be reproducible, objective and unambiguous. The ICSA believes that to be 
appropriate, and to meet the needs of the commercial sector, certification has to be inexpensive, and 
accomplished with a rapid turn around. This approach allows a firewall product evaluation to be 
completed typically within 2 weeks, although in some cases evaluation has taken longer than 6 weeks 
[Cafarchio, 1998]. Obviously a short evaluation time-scale is very attractive to sponsors because it does 
not significantly delay marketing of certified firewall products. Therefore, sponsors can begin to 
recover their investment in certification much sooner than government certification schemes would 
allow. In addition, the ICSA concept of continual certification helps to simplify the issue of product 
modification - as long as the firewall product meets the current FWPDC it continues .to be certified. If 
a firewall fails a random certification check the sponsor is given 3 weeks to change the product and 
release a patch, otherwise the firewall is publicly decertified [Cafarchio, 1998]. 
The FWPDC outlines an evaluation based on penetration testing using the most current version of the 
following commercial testing tools: 
• ISS SAFEsuite - Internet Security Systems (ISS) SAFEsuite is a family of security analysis 
tools, including Internet Scanner (vulnerability analysis, i.e. penetration testing), System 
-security Scanner (system assessment), and RealSecure (intrusion detection). Information about 
SAFEsuite is available at http://www.iss.net/prod/products.html 
• Ballista/CAPE- Ballista is a network security auditing tool developed at Secure Networks 
Incorporated. CAPE (Custom Auditing Packet Engine) is a tool included with Ballista which 
can perform protocol level spoofing and attack simulations. Information about Ballista/CAPE 
is available at http://www.secnet.com/navlb.html 
• Kane Security Analyst - Kane Security Analyst (KSA) is a product from Intrusion Detection 
Corporation and provides a security assessment for Windows NT and Novell operating 
systems. Information about KSA is available at http://www.intrusion.com/product.htm 
• NetSonar - Netsonar is a product of the WheelGroup Corporation and is a network 
vulnerability analysis and mapping tool. Information about NetSonar is available at 
http://www.wheelgroup.com/netsonar/sonar.html 
In addition to these commercial tools, other software tools such as port scanners, and custom written 
exploitation scripts are used to carry out the penetration testing and vulnerability analysis. 
The FWPDC is suitable for evaluating firewall products that will operate in low to medium threat 
environments where attackers have limited resources and ability. In high threat environments attackers 
may have access to tools and techniques that are outside the scope of the penetration tests conducted as 
part of the FWPDC evaluation. 
6.5 Summary 
A certified firewall product has the benefit of an independent assessment using a criteria which allows 
the award of a distinct level of assurance to the firewall's security claims and objectives. When 
considering a specific installation the value of the information and systems protected by the firewall, 
and the threats to them, need to be considered. Often the more valuable the information and systems the 
higher the threat. If these threats can be countered by the features or assurance of a trusted product, then 
it is certainly worthwhile to consider them in a purchase decision. 
In general corporate and government environments where information and systems are unclassified, the 
assurance provided by the FWPDC, the ITSEC (El to E2) and CC (BALl to EAL3), is sufficient to 
indicate that a firewall will withstand all of the well known automated attacks launched by tools such as 
ISS and SATAN. Therefore ICSA and low assurance ITSEC and CC based certification is most suitable 
in low to medium threat environments. 
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For systems that process highly sensitive corporate, or unclassified-but-sensitive (UBS) government 
information, it is arguable whether these systems should be protected by FWPDC or low assurance 
ITSEC and CC evaluated firewalls. At these assurance levels the criteria used are focused on 
penetration testing, they do not consider in enough detail (if at all) aspects such as, user and 
administrative documentation, delivery or manufacturing processes, source code, or covert channels. 
Therefore, in medium to high threat environments where the compromise of systems and information 
would have a serious impact on an organisations credibility, competitiveness or survival, only firewalls 
certified at and above ITSEC E3 and CC EAIA assurance levels should be considered. It is only at 
these and greater assurance levels that sufficient consideration is given to the firewall's fundamental 
engineering and design processes. 
Initially, IT security evaluation was carried out by a government security agency such as New Zealand's 
GCSB, the United Kingdom's CESG, or the US's NSA. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily an ideal 
environment in which to carry out a wide range, in-depth, security evaluation. Frequently the focus and 
needs of the government and related bodies differ from the needs of industry in general. Further, 
procedures typically move very slowly in such organisations and therefore firewall manufacturers and 
vendors may refrain from undertaking a longer government certification in favour of obtaining a 
certificate through a shorter commercial certification process. The major benefit of such certification 
procedures is that typically penetration testing can be achieved in a relatively short period of time by 
using more simplistic criteria. 
It is widely accepted that for nationally classified military or government systems, current firewall 
technology is not sufficiently advanced to protect connections to untrusted networks, such as the 
Internet. The only solution under these circumstances is to retain the physically separated classified 
network, and provide stand-alone Internet connections or separate unclassified networks. Evaluations 
are typically carried out to assurance levels of up to E3 or EAL3 today. Until high assurance 
mechanisms that can control the cross-over of information between classified and unclassified networks 
are available, then there will always be a need for disparate networks. 
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Chapter 7. Virtual Private Networks 
7.1 What is a Virtual Private Network? 
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a conceptual network formed by defining a closed group of users 
and encrypting all communication between its members. It is important to understand what the terms 
"virtual" and "private" mean when used to describe a VPN. By definition a VPN does not exist unless it 
is both virtual and private: 
• Virtual- a VPN is virtual in that the connections formed are not part of a dedicated network of 
traditional network infrastructures (e.g. Digital Data Network (DDN), Integrated Services 
Digital Network (ISDN), Packet Switched Network (PSN), Packet Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN), and Frame Relay) from a telecommunications provider. Instead, connections 
are logically partitioned and transmitted over public data networks such as the Internet. 
• -Private- a VPN is private (or confidential) because the traffic it handles is encrypted while it 
travels between the end points of the VPN. In the case of the Internet the end points would 
normally be located at each organisation. 
A precursor to the VPN was the closed user group (CUG) defined as part of the CCitr1 X.25 packet 
switched network standard [CCITT, 1988]. The CUG is an optional facility which allows nodes to form 
a group to which access restrictions can be applied. Although unauthorised connection to nodes within 
or outside the CUG can be prevented, there is no provision for confidentiality. With a protocol analyser 
an attacker with access to the intervening network can capture and view the data sent by any CUG node. 
The idea of privacy in relation to network ownership should not be confused with privacy in relation to 
confidentiality. For example, traditional networks owned and operated by a telecommunications 
provider can be considered private because they are not generally accessible by the public. However, an 
attacker gaining unauthorised access to the "private" network will still be able to examine data 
transmitted across it. Currently, both Clear Communications and Telecom market such "VPN" 
solutions. However, in both cases the VPN service is simply a guarantee that an organisations network 
traffic will stay within the network architecture owned and operated by the telecommunications 
provider- this is simply privacy through obscurity! 
VPNs are growing in importance as organisations look for cost effective strategies for connecting 
geographically dispersed users and networks. Traditional W ANs have typically been very expensive, 
particularly when alternative routing is installed for resiliency. A number of public claims have been 
made regarding the savings achieved by moving network traffic from leased lines to the Internet. For 
example DMW Worldwide (Colorado Springs, US) have reported that replacing their dedicated leased 
lines with encrypted frame relay has reduced expenses by US$60,000. In another case, Phillips Tarifica 
(London, UK) reported that replacing a 64 Kbit.sec·' leased line between London and Tokyo which cost 
US$159,174 per-year to operate with an Internet-based VPN connection reduced this figure to 
US$20,000 [Cray, 1997]. While it is widely accepted that savings can be made, not every leased line 
can be suitably replaced by an Internet based VPN. This is due to a number factors: 
• Quality of Service (QoS) - 1Pv4 does not provide QoS, e.g. a transport delay of less than 100 
msec cannot be guaranteed for a live video conference across the Internet. 
• Bandwidth - is an issue of QoS but has a direct implication for moving traditional network 
infrastructures to the Internet. For example an ISP cannot guarantee an organisation a constant 
41 ccm is an acronym for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee which is the data and 
telecommunications standards body of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) which, like the International 
Standards Organisation (ISO), is an agency of the United Nations. 
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512 Kbit.sec-1 connection across the Internet because band~idth is distributed dynamically 
between all users. 
• Standards - there are many open and proprietary VPN standards, however interoperability is a 
problem in areas such as key management, cryptographic protocols, and vendor specific 
options. 
Using the Internet as a network bearer can provide organisations with a low cost alternative to 
traditional networks. Connection to the Internet allows an organisation to use the same network to 
connect local and remote locations, while at the same time providing employees with ac~ess to Internet-
based applications such as email and the WWW. In addition the organisation benefits from the inherent 
resilience of the Internet - not surprising considering that ARPANET was originally designed to 
withstand nuclear attacks! 
Unfortunately, since the Internet consists of many interconnected public data networks the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of any data transported across it cannot be assured. This is a 
problem for any organisation that wishes to transmit sensitive information, and requires guaranteed 
access to their systems and networks. Desire for cost effective communications and data security has 
driven rriuch of the development of Internet-based VPN technology. Although the focus of this Chapter 
is on establishing VPNs across the TCPIIP networks such as the Internet the concepts are equally 
applicable to most network protocols, and can be implemented regardless of network topology and size 
(i.e. LAN, MAN, or WAN). 
7.2 Virtual Private Networks and the Internet 
Increasing numbers of corporate, government, and academic organisations are realising that integrating 
secure data transmissions within the framework of the Internet reduces their costs and expands their 
capabilities. For example, a VPN could allow a travelling salesperson to access sensitive customer 
records held on a database at the corporate headquarters - applications such as this can lead to 
significant competitive advantage. Internet-based VPN solutions are normally provided in firewalls, 
routers, or standalone encryption devices. With functionality ranging from encrypting everything to 
being application or protocol specific. 
VPNs are particularly useful for creating secure Extranets. An Extranet represents a collaborative 
network established by organisations that share common goals and have a requirement to exchange 
information. Instead of using traditional network architectures an Extranet is implemented using the 
Internet and related technologies such as TCPIIP, WWW, Java, ActiveX, etc. Extranets are typically 
used to link businesses with their suppliers and customers, often in an effort to reduce paperwork and 
speed up .order placement/payment. Some examples of Extranet applications include: 
• The use of newsgroups or groupware by co-operating organisations to share knowledge and 
experience. 
• Training programs or other educational material developed and shared between organisations. 
• Shared product catalogues accessible only to wholesalers or re-sellers. 
• Support management and control for organisations that are part of a common project. 
Obviously such applications may be considered sensitive by the organisations involved, thus a VPN can 
be used to ensure strong authentication and protect the confidentiality of sensitive information 
exchanges. 
Intranets which are built using the same Internet technologies as Extranets can also benefit from the 
application of VPN technology. In essence an Intranet is a localised version of the Internet operating 
within an organisation's own networks. Intranets are generally implemented to enable the sharing of 
information and computing resources throughout an organisation. In many cases the roles of employees 
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dictate the information and computing resources to which they require access. For example, employees 
in the Marketing department will normally have no requirement for access to the Account department's 
payroll database. In such a case a VPN could be used to authenticate access requests to the payroll 
database, and protect the confidentiality of payroll information as it transits the organisation's networks. 
The last major area in which VPN technology is being applied is in support of the teleworker42 (or 
telecommuter). A teleworker is an employee that works outside the traditional office or workplace, 
usually at home or in a mobile situation (e.g. an employee on a business trip, or a travelling 
salesperson). According to one study, teleworking has been growing at 15% a year since 1990 in the 
US, while 80% of Fortune 1000 companies are likely to introduce it within the next two to three years. 
In contrast, a New Zealand survey of 500 New Zealand companies reported t)1at from 314 responses 
38% were considering teleworking while 51% were not [Computerworld, 1998]. Although work at the 
organisation's premises is unlikely to disappear, new forms of telecommunication such as video 
conferencing and groupware are likely to make teleworking more prevalent in the future. 
Figure 7-1 illustrates a number of ways in which VPNs can be deployed to protect sensitive information 
transfers. Note the use of two Secure IQ VPNet43 routers to create a VPN between Extranet partners, 
and teleworker. The Secure IQ VPNet routers encrypt all data communicated between Organisation A 
and B, but also allow unencrypted traffic to flow. 
Organisation A 
'----'==-....1 ..... -
Accounts Clerk \ 
Accounts Database 
I 
I 
~~f~ 
Teleworker \ 
Ke¥ 
* Network routing node (untrusted) 
~ • • • • Encrypted connection 
~ Unencrypted connection 
~~\"'%:: 
Mobile User \ 
' 
' 
' 
Figure 7-1 Extranet secured by a VPN. 
Organisation B 
Marketing Databas1 
The basis of all VPNs is cryptography- the art and science of keeping messages secure. Section 7.3 
provides a basic overview of the cryptographic concepts used in the Sections that follow. 
42 A very useful and interesting WWW-site which contains a great deal of information and links to telecommuter resources is 
available at http://www.mother.com/-dflemingldmflinks.htm 
43 Secure IQ VPNet routers are products of Tel trend Inc. (Chicago, US). Teltrend's router products are designed in Europe and 
New Zealand. Information about Teltrend's New Zealand operation can be found at http://www.securicor.co.nz 
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7.3 Overview of Cryptography 
Cryptography is the art and science of keeping messages secure. It is the process of changing plaintext 
into encrypted, or ciphertext messages. The opposite process is employed by the receiver where the 
ciphertext is decrypted back to the original plaintext message. Enciphering and deciphering a message 
is achieved by applying a mathematical function known as a cryptographic algorithm. The most 
obvious reason for using cryptography is to protect the confidentiality of messages. However, it is also 
used to achieve a number of complimentary security objectives: 
• Authentication - enables the message receiver to ascertain the messages origin; preventing an 
attacker masquerading as a legitimate participant. 
• Integrity - the receiver is able to verify that the message has not been modified in transit; an 
attacker cannot substitute nor alter the original message. 
• Nonrepudiation -prevents the sender from denying they sent the message. 
The maj()rity of cryptographic algorithms used on the Internet, and form the basis of most VPNs, have 
been placed in the public domain - here they are then open to a wide range of scrutiny and 
cryptanalysis44• Proprietary (or restricted) algorithms are commonly found in low-security commercial 
applications and tend to be inherently insecure [Schneier, 1996]. Although high-grade military 
algorithms are classified, this is done to increase the difficulty of cryptanalysis - their security like 
those found in the public domain is based on a key, or keys. Keys are used as input variables to make 
the outcome of the algorithm unique. The key is generally chosen from a vast number of values - the 
total number of which is known as the keyspace. Generally the larger the keyspace the harder it is to 
break the ciphertext through brute force attacks which involve trying every possible key. 
There are two algorithmic approaches generally used to secure Internet based communications. The 
first, known as symmetric or secret-key, uses a single key to both encrypt and decrypt a message. The 
second type use a different key for the encryption and decryption processes - algorithms of this nature 
are known as asymmetric or public-key. Both of these approaches discussed in the following Sections. 
7.3.1 Secret-Key (Symmetric) Cryptography 
As secret-key algorithms use the same key for both encryption and decryption it is necessary for both 
the sender and receiver to share a copy of the key. Since the same key is used by both parties to encrypt 
and decrypt messages sent to one another it has to be kept secret. This presents a number of probl~ms, 
the least of which is "how to distribute the key to all participants without it being compromised?" In 
military and intelligence organisations this is usually achieved through "safehand" courier45• For 
commercial organisations the cost of safehand delivery may be prohibitive - instead a simple 
telephone call, or registered mail may be employed. It is not enough to simply distribute a key securely, 
it must also be stored in a secure manner - this is often achieved physically by using a safe, or 
increasingly by storing the key on an electronic/magnetic storage device protected with a personal 
identification number (PIN). Another problem occurs in the management of the keys, especially when 
many participants are involved or when different keys must be used by different groups. The problem 
starts to become insurmountable when parties at either end do not know each other - or a secure 
transmission channel does not exist. 
44 Cryptanalysis is the art and science of breaking ciphertext. 
45 The term "safehand" is used to describe the process by which an item is physically transported between destinations by a 
trusted person (or courier). The courier remains in contact with the item at all times until it has been delivered. 
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Symmetric algorithms are often represented by the following mathematical functions: 
EK(M)=C 
DK(C) = M 
Key 
encryption function 
decryption function 
K encryption/decryption key 
M plaintext 
C ciphertext 
These functions have the property that (see Figure 7-2): 
Plaintext, M 
Encryption Key, K 
,--~--~ ~~ u ,, 
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I I Original 
Decryption, 1-P-Ia_in_te_x_t,_M___.. 
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Encryption, Ciphertext, C 
EK(M) DK(C) 
Figure 7-2 Symmetric algorithm encryption and decryption. 
Symmetric algorithms can be categorised as either stream algorithms, known as stream-ciphers, or 
block algorithms, known as block-ciphers. Stream-ciphers operate on the plaintext one bit (or byte) at a 
time. An example of a stream algorithm is the Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) developed in 1987 by Ronald 
Rivest for RSA Data Security Inc. It remained a trade secret until September 1994 when the source 
code was anonymously posted to the Cypherpunks mailing list. RC4 can be exported from the US if its 
key length is 40-bits or less. It has been implemented in many commercial products, including Lotus 
Notes, Oracle Secure SQL, and is part of the Cellular Digital Packet Data specification [Schneier, 
1996]. 
Block-ciphers operate on groups of bits known as blocks- a block size of 64-bits is typical. The Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) is a block algorithm and perhaps the most well known cryptographic 
algorithm. DES has been a world wide standard since 1976 when it was adopted as a US Federal 
standard for use on all unclassified government communication. It was originally developed by IBM 
during the 1970s and was known then as Lucifer. Upon review by NSA, alterations were made and the 
key size was reduced from 128-bits to the current 56-bits. DES is still a popular algorithm and can be 
implemented in both hardware and software. Financial institutions have a large installed base of DES 
encryptors used to protect their WAN communications. However, it is felt by many that DES in its 
original form may be coming to the end of its life. The reason is that modern cryptanalysis and 
increasing computer power have significantly reduced the strength of 56-bit DES, particularly to brute 
force attacks. However, the latest 56-bit DES cracking competition (launched on January 13, 1998, and 
known as "DES Challenge II") sponsored by RSA Data Security, Inc., still required 22,000 participants 
linking together over 50,000 CPUs and 39 days to search 85% of the key space to recover the plaintext 
message- "Many hands make light work" [RSA, 1998]. 
The greatest advantage of using secret-key cryptography is that it tends to be very fast, even on slow 
computers. This is because the algorithms are generally small and perform simple computations that can 
be optimised in either hardware or software. 
81 
Virtual Private Networks Firewalls and Virtual Private Networks 
7.3.2 Public-Key (Asymmetric) Cryptography 
In contrast to secret-key algorithms, public-key algorithms are designed so that the encryption key is 
different form the decryption key. Both keys are mathematically dependent upon one another -
messages encrypted by the one key, can only be decrypted by the other key, and vice versa. An 
important requirement for asymmetric cryptography is that the decryption-key must be computationally 
unfeasible to compute from the encryption-key. The algorithms are known as "public-key" because the 
encryption-key can be made public. Anyone may use the public-key to encrypt a message but only the 
holder of the corresponding decryption key can decrypt the message. The decryption key is also known 
as the private-key. 
An alternative and increasingly important use of public-key cryptography is its ability to digitally sign 
messages. This is analogous to a hand-written signature on a message or document, providing proof of 
authorship. Digital signatures are discussed further in Section 7.3.3. 
Asymmetric algorithms are often represented by the following mathematical functions: 
EK(M)=C 
1 
encryption function 
decryption function DK,(C) = M 
Key 
K1 encryption key 
K2 decryption key 
M plaintext 
C ciphertext 
These functions have the property that (see Figure 7-3): 
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Encryption Key, K1 Decryption Key, K2 
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1 
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Encryption, Ciphertext, C 
E4M) 
~ 
I 
I 
t Original 
Decryption, 1--P_I_ai_n_te_x_t,_M____.. 
DK,(C) 
Figure 7-3 Asymmetric algorithm encryption and decryption. 
In general, Person A retrieves Person B's public-key from a public-key server and uses this to encrypt 
their message to Person B. Since Person B's private-key is the only one which can decrypt the message, 
Person A can be certain that only Person B can read it (see Figure 7-4). Unfortunately, since everyone 
has access to Person B's public-key, although he can read it, he cannot be certain of the authenticity of 
Person A. The exchange is private but not authenticated. 
This is why a trusted and authenticated key distribution system is necessary to support the use of public-
keys on the Internet- one such system known as a Certification Authority (CA) is discussed further in 
Section 7 .3.4. Another disadvantage of public-key algorithms is that they require much greater 
computational power:- in general they are 1000 times slower than symmetric algorithms [Schneier, 
1996]. 
In most practical applications public-key cryptography is not a substitute for secret-key cryptography. 
Public-key algorithms are two slow, and are vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks [Schneier, 1996]. As 
a result, a hybrid cryptosystem is most often employed. Such a system uses public-key cryptography to 
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securely distribute session keys for use with symmetric algorithms. The benefit of this approach is that 
the computational expensive asymmetric algorithm need only be used once to encrypt a relatively short 
random secret-key. The secret-key is then used with a computationally less expensive symmetric 
algorithm to secure the subsequent communications. 
Hybrid cryptosystems negotiate the session-key at the beginning of a session; on completion the keys 
are securely deleted. This is referred to as the Diffie-Hellman (DH) technique, named after its inventors 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. Invented in 1976, the DH key exchange algorithm was the first 
openly published example of public-key cryptography. It is based on the difficulty of calculating 
discrete logarithms in a finite field, as compared with the ease of calculating exponentiation in the same 
field [Schneier, 1996]. The advantage ofDH key exchange is that unknown parties can negotiate secret-
keys on the fly, according to their session needs. 
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I B retrieves 
8 ,' his Private-Key ./ 
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Message 
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Bean now 
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Figure 7-4 A secure message exchange using public-key cryptography. 
The best known and most popular public-key system is RSA, named after Ronald Rivest, Adi Sharnir, 
and Leonard Adleman who developed the algorithm while at MIT. RSA gets its security from the 
difficulty of factoring large numbers. The public and private-keys are functions of a pair of large prime 
numbers- commonly between 100 and 200 digits. 
Public-key cryptography is the most flexible, scaleable, and efficient way for users to obtain the shared 
secrets and session keys needed to support the large number of ways Internet users can securely 
interoperate. The great advantage of the public-key cryptography over secret-key cryptography is that, 
theoretically, no confidential information need be exchanged between participants before secure 
communication is possible. A person requires only the public-key of the party to whom they are sending 
a message. The problem is knowing whether the public-key is authentic. Public-key servers can be 
impersonated and public-keys can expire. If an attacker is impersonating the public-key server they can 
replace the recipients public-key with their own. This allows the attacker to act as a man-in-the-middle, 
viewing and relaying all of the messages sent by the intended participants. 
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7.3.3 Digital Signatures 
A number of public-key algorithms can be used to generate digital signatures - RSA is such an 
example. In the case of a suitable public-key algorithm the digital signature is created by encrypting the 
message with the private-key. The recipient can then check the signature by decrypting the message 
with the senders public-key. 
In most practical situations it is too inefficient to sign large messages using public-key algorithms -
they are simply too slow. Instead digital signature protocols are implemented using one-way hash 
functions, referred to as either secure hash functions or message digests. The most common secure hash 
functions are Message Digest 2 (MD2), Message Digest 5 (MDS), and the Secure Hash Algorithm 
(SHA-1). Both MD2 and MD5 were designed by Ron Rivest, and are used in the Privacy Enhanced 
Mail (PEM) standard adopted by the Internet Architecture Board (lAB). SHA-1 was designed by the 
US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and NSA for use in with the Secure Hash 
Standard (SHS) [NIST, 1995]. SHS is applicable to all US Federal departments and agencies for the 
protection of unclassified information. It is also required for use with the Digital Signature Algorithm 
(DSA) as specified in the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), and whenever a secure hash algorithm is 
required for Federal applications. .. 
' < 
A hash function works by taking a variable-length input string and returning a fixed-length string, 
known as a hash value. One-way hash functions ensure that it is hard to generate an input string which 
hashes to a particular value. This prevents an attacker from substituting a message with one having the 
same hash value - this is only possible if the message and digital signature are not encrypted before 
being sent. Other desired attributes of one-way hash functions include being collision free46, output is 
independent of input, and a single bit change on average changes half of the bits in the hash value. 
Person 1\s 
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(a) Digital signature generation 
Digital 
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or 
Person/\s 
Public-Key 
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(b) Digital signature verification. 
Figure 7-5 Digital signature generation and verification. 
For example, instead of Person A signing their message they simply sign the hash value as shown in 
Figure 7-Sa - this is far more efficient. The message and digital signature are then sent to the 
46 For a hash function which is collision free, it is hard to generate two input strings with the same hash value. 
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recipient(s). Of course this particular protocol requires that the participants agree on the digital 
signature algorithm and one-way hash function beforehand.· 
On receipt of the message and digital signature Person B computes a new hash value for the message 
and retrieves the original hash value by decrypting the digital signature using Person A's public-key. 
This verification process is shown in Figure 7-Sb. If the new hash value is identical to the original then 
the message was signed using Person A's private-key- unless of course their private-key had been 
compromised 
7 .3.4 Certificate Authorities 
Public-key and digital signature cryptographic systems both share a similar problem- the uncertainty 
of having the correct public-key. The combination of public-key and third-party signature is called a 
certificate - this term was first defined in 1978 by Loren Kohnfelder to refer to a signed record 
holding a persons common name and their public-key [Ellison et al., 1997]. The third-part which signs 
the certificate is commonly referred to as the Certification Authority (CA). 
The most commonly used certificate structure is based on the ISO X.509 standard [X509, 1996] 
initially issued in 1988. X.509 is a collection of protocols used with the ISO authentication framework 
which provides authentication across networks. X.509 version 3 (or X.509v3) is the latest revision and 
addresses a number of deficiencies. 
Figure 7-6 illustrates the major fields within the three versions of the X.509 certificate. 
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Figure 7-6 Three versions of the ISO X.509 certificate format. 
The following describes the fields common to all versions of the X.509 certificate: 
• version- identifies the certificate format (e.g. X.509v3). 
• serial number- uniquely identifies the certificate within theCA that issued it. 
• signature information - identifies the public-key algorithm used to sign the certificate (e.g. 
RSA) and any parameters it requires. 
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• issuer name - contains the name of the CA. 
• validity period- contains a pair of dates between which the certificate is valid. 
• subject name- contains the name of the user, or subject. 
• public-key information - contains the subjects public-key, and identifies the public-key 
algorithm and any necessary parameters. 
• certificate signature - this is the final field in all versions of the X.509 certificate. It contains 
theCA's signature of all the previous fields. 
The version 2 certificate was a minor revision to version 1, and added the issuer and subject unique 
identifier fields for supporting directory access control. Version 3 enables extension fields to be added 
to the certificate. A number of predefined extensions exist, however anyone may define and add their 
own extension fields. 
Unlike tfie certificate defined by Kohnfelder each user of an X.509 certificate is given a distinct name, 
or distinguished name (DN). As the DN is a combination of CA name and subject name it is unique 
across all CA's. This is necessary when searching for a subjects public-key certificate across multiple 
CA domains. Simply using the subjects common name could produce many ambiguous results. 
Certificates are normally stored in a certificate database referred to as a directory server (DS). The DN 
is used to uniquely identify subjects certificates within the DS. Most commercial implementations of 
DSs (e.g. Netscape Directory Server) are accessed using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
(LDAP) [Howes, 1995]. The alternative ISO X.500 Directory Access Protocol (DAP) requires 
implementation of an X.500 directory and the ISO protocol stack. The advantage of LDAP is that it 
interfaces directly to many standard databases and operates over the TCPIIP suite. It also requires less 
processing overhead and is significantly cheaper to implement than an X.500 based solution. 
For example, if Person A wishes to communicate with Person B, Person A must retrieve Person B's 
certificate from the directory server. Person A then verifies the certificates authenticity. If both belong 
to the same CA, Person A simply verifies the CA' s signature on Person B 's certificate. 
However, if Person A and B belong to separate CAs their certificates can only be verified by chaining 
backward and verifying the authenticity of each CA certificate until a common CA is found. The 
common CA certificate must then be authenticated by the CA which signed it - this effectively 
establishes a path of trust between Person A and B. Figure 7-7, page 87, illustrates the case where 
multiple CAs exist. A hierarchy of CAs functions similarly to the Domain Name Server system (DNS), 
in which a request for an IP address associated with a specific host name is passed up the 'DNS 
hierarchy until the name is resolved. In the case of a hierarchy of directory servers, each server in the 
system must have an authenticated relationship with the systems to which it is connected to be certain 
that the certificate received is authentic. If no common CA exists then a path of trust cannot be 
established between Person A and B - therefore it is not possible for them to verify each others 
certificate. 
There are a growing number of CAs providing certificate services on the Internet. In fact most popular 
WWW-browsers, such as Microsoft IE4.0 and Netscape Communicator, come pre-configured with the 
certificates of common Internet CA's. For example, IE4.0 includes certificates for Microsoft, AT&T, 
Verisign, etc. These certificates can be used to verify that a WWW-site is authentic (i.e. they are who 
they say they are), or that content being downloaded (e.g. Java, ActiveX) can be trusted (i.e. the 
software is from the claimed author). Certificates are becoming an essential tool of Information Systems 
for building trust-relationships between users and organisations on the Internet. 
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Figure 7-7 An example of a certification hierarchy. 
7.4 Virtual Private Network Technology 
The Internet allows organisations to interconnect their systems securely and cost effectively. To use the 
Internet as a VPN, the organisation's networks must be compatible with TCPIIP. Modern LANs often 
support a number of LAN-based protocols, including Novell's IPX, Apple's AppleTalk, and 
Microsoft's NetBEUI. These LAN-based protocols along with TCPIIP can operate side-by-side and 
simultaneously on a LAN, but are incompatible with the Internet. There are two issues to consider here, 
the first is providing private communications over the Internet, while the second deals with transporting 
incompatible LAN-based protocols over the Internet. 
An organisation using TCP!IP internally can directly connect their private networks to the Internet. The 
only requirement being the use of officially-assigned Internet addresses. However, many organisations 
use unregistered IP addresses which cannot be used directly on the Internet. Sites most often solve this 
problem by using proxies or firewalls that perform IP masquerading or address translation (see Section 
4.2). Thus an organisation needs only a single official IP address for, say, their firewalls external 
network interface - thus all traffic to the Internet appears to come from a single IP address. This is a 
much simpler and cheaper solution than registering an official address range and then changing the IP 
address of all the internal machines. It also has the added advantage of hiding the organisations internal 
network topology- knowledge of which can prove very useful to an attacker. 
Organisations that wish to use the Internet to connect private networks using protocols other than 
TCPIIP must use some form of protocol encapsulation or tunnelling41• For example Microsoft's 
47 The terms "encapsulation" and "tunnelling" refer to techniques which enable network protocols to be transported over 
incompatible networks. 
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NetBEUI is incompatible with TCPIIP, however a NetBEUI packet can be encapsulated in an IP 
datagram allowing it to be sent across the Internet. At the destination, the IP datagram is decapsulated, 
i.e. the IP header is removed, leaving the original non-IP packet intact. 
It is also possible to use an IP gateway to translate incompatible network protocols to IP. For example 
Novell NetWare clients running a WWW-browser on an IPX network can access Web servers on the 
Internet through Novell's IPX/SPX-to-IP Gateway with no modification. 
Tunnelling is the best option for creating private IP-based VPNs. IP gateways introduce substantial 
overhead as they have to effectively convert one protocol stack to another. IP masquerading and 
conversion are useful for connecting private TCP/IP networks to the Internet, but do not address the 
problem of connecting non-IP private networks across the Internet. 
Tunnels can either be static or dynamic. Static tunnels are created between sites that wish to remain 
connected for extended periods of time. Dynamic tunnels are suitable for session based connections 
such as WWW -browsing and are created on-demand whenever traffic is transferred. 
Tumielling protocols do not have to provide data security, many simply provide a way of transporting 
network .protocols over incompatible networks. The most common tunnelling protocols are outlined 
below. · 
• Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) - specifies a protocol for performing encapsulation of 
an arbitrary Network-layer protocol over another arbitrary Network-layer protocol. GRE is 
specified in RFC 1701 [Hanks et al., 1994a]. The GRE protocol functions by encapsulating the 
Network-layer protocol to be transported in a GRE packet, which may optionally include route 
information. The resulting GRE packet can then be encapsulated in the final network protocol 
and delivered. RFC 1702 [Hanks et al., 1994b] is a companion memo which addresses the case 
of using IP as the delivery protocol or the payload protocol and the special case of IP as both 
the delivery and payload. GREin itself does not provide encryption services. 
• Point-to-Point Tunnelling Protocol (PPTP) - is a joint development by Ascend 
Communications and Microsoft. PPTP specifies a protocol which allows the Point-to-Point 
Protocol (PPP) to be tunnelled across an IP network. PPTP does not specify any changes to the 
PPP protocol but rather describes a new method for transporting PPP packets. PPTP supports 
tunnelling of IP, IPX, NetBIOS and NetBEUI protocols. The PPP packets are encapsulated 
using GRE, the resulting GRE packet is then delivered using an IP network. PPTP has been 
submitted to the Internet Engineering Task Force48 (IETF) as an Internet-Draft [Hamzeh et al., 
1997a]. PPTP provides proprietary cryptographic services to establish a VPN between a user's 
computer and the destination network (see Section 7.5). 
• Layer-2 Forwarding (L2F)- focuses on providing a standards-based tunnelling mechanism for 
transporting Link-layer frames (for example, High-Level Data Link Control (HJ!!:-C), 
asynchronous PPP, or PPP ISDN) containing higher layer protocols [Cisco, 1997]. The L2F 
protocol is used to encapsulate the HDLC packet, the resulting L2F packet is then sent in a 
UDP datagram across an IP network. L2F supports tunnelling of IP, IPX, and AppleTalk 
protocols. In addition L2F allows the tunnel to be encrypted using IPSec. 
• Layer-2 Tunnelling Protocol (L2TP) - is being designed by the IETF PPP working group and 
combines the best features from PPTP and L2F. L2TP is described in an IETF Internet-Draft 
48 The IETF is a large open international community of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with 
the evolution of the Internet architecture and the smooth operation of the Internet. The actual technical work of the IETF is 
done in its working groups (which are organised by topic into several areas, e.g. routing, transport, security, etc.), with much 
of the work being done through mailing lists. All technical reports, known as Internet-Drafts, produced by the working groups 
are published on the IETF WWW-site for public comment. An Internet-Draft expires after six months at which point it is 
updated (to incorporate necessary changes, comments, etc.), submitted for consideration as an RFC, or deleted (i.e. 
discontinued). Any interested individual can define and submit an Internet-Draft. The IETF WWW-site and all current 
Internet-Drafts are available from http://www.ietf.org/ 
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document [Hamzeh et al., 1998]. No cryptographic services are defined in the L2TP standard, 
although IPSec could be used to secure the IP datagrams across an IP network. 
• Ascend Tunnel Management Protocol (ATMP)- the ATMP protocol is currently being used 
in Ascend Communication products to allow dial-in client software to create a virtual presence 
on a user's home network from remote locations. The clients themselves are unaware of 
ATMP, although it is assumed that standard PPP or SLIP clients are being used [Showalter, 
1996]. ATMP currently allows for both IP and IPX protocols to be tunnelled- encapsulation 
is performed using the GRE protocol. ATMP is defined in RFC 2107 [Hamzeh, 1997b]. It is 
interesting to note that Ascend Communications created PPTP's fundamental architecture and 
advanced the concept to Microsoft. The first implementation of PPTP was demonstrated at 
Networld+Interop in March 1995. No cryptographic services are defined in the ATMP 
standard, although IPSec could be used to secure the IP datagrams across an IP network. 
• Data Link Switching (DLSw) - is a forwarding mechanism for the IBM SNA (Systems 
Network Architecture) and IBM NetBIOS (Network Basic Input Output Services) protocols. 
The protocol does not provide full routing, but instead provides switching at the SNA Data 
Link-layer (i.e. layer 2 in the SNA architecture) and encapsulation in TCP/IPfor transport over 
-the Internet. DLSw version 1.0 is defined in RFC 1795 [Wells et al., 1995]. RFC 2166 [Bryant 
et al., 1997] defines version 2.0 which is a set of backward compatible enhancements, the 
majority of which address scaling issues. No cryptographic services are defined in the DLSw 
standard, although IPSec could be used to secure the IP datagrams across an IP network. 
• Mobile IP- is intended to enable nodes to move from one IP subnet to another. Mobile IP 
facilitates node movement from one Ethernet segment to another as well as accommodating 
node movement from an Ethernet segment to a wireless LAN. The principal design goal of 
Mobile IP is for a node to retain its IP address after it has moved to another network. The 
IETF Mobile IP working group has specified the use of encapsulation as a way to deliver 
datagrams from a mobile node's "home network" to an agent that can deliver datagrams locally 
by conventional means to the mobile node at its current location away from home [Perkins, 
1996a]. Mobile IP specifies tunnelling for a number of circumstances such as firewall 
traversal. Other possible applications of encapsulation include multicasting, preferential 
billing, choice of routes with selected security attributes, and general policy routing [Perkins, 
1996b]. IPSec is expected to be integrated with the Mobile IP implementation [Zao et al., 
1997]. 
• IP Security (IPSec) - provides a security framework developed by the IETF IP Security 
Working Group for IP version 4 and IP version 6 [Atkinson, 1995a]. IPSec supports a number 
of tunnelling methods with or without encryption. A full discussion of IPSec follows in Section 
7.6. 
It is evident from the above descriptions of tunnelling standards that IPSec is becoming the predominant 
method for securing IP traffic. PPTP, ATMP, and L2F were primarily designed to connect remote dial-
up users as virtual nodes to their home network- the remote user's computer appears as a physical 
node on the LAN. IPSec can secure the IP traffic between the ISP the remote user has dialled into and 
their home network. However, PPTP is the only tunnelling standard that can secure the dial-up 
connection from the user to their ISP for protocols other than TCP/IP. 
Static and dynamic VPNs can also be created at the Application-layer of the TCP/IP suite. Application-
layer VPNs are most commonly created using the Secure HyperText Transport Protocol (S-HTTP), 
Secure Shell (SSH), or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). All three protocols are currently being developed 
as Internet-Drafts by various IETF working groups. The following points provide brief overviews for 
each protocol: 
• S-HHTP- Secure-HTTP [Rescorla et al., 1997] is a secure message-oriented communications 
protocol designed for use in conjunction with HTTP. It is designed to coexist with HTTP's 
messaging model and to be easily integrated with HTTP applications. S-HTTP aware clients 
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can communicate with S-HTTP oblivious servers and vice-versa, although such transactions 
obviously would not useS-HTTP security features. 
Interestingly, S-HTTP does not require client-side public-key certificates (or public-keys) 
because it supports symmetric-key only operation modes. This is significant because it allows 
secure transactions to occur without requiring users to have an established public-key. 
Although S-HTIP is able to take advantage of available certification infrastructures, its 
deployment does not require it. 
S-HTTP supports end-to-end secure transactions, in contrast with the original HTTP 
authorisation mechanisms which require the client to attempt access and be denied before the 
security mechanism is employed. S-HTTP provides full flexibility in the choice of . 
cryptographic algorithms, modes and parameters, and has been designed for extensibility. 
Option negotiation is used to allow clients and servers to agree on transaction modes (e.g., 
should the request be signed or encrypted or both?); cryptographic algorithms (e.g. RSA vs. 
DSA for signing, DES vs. RC2 for encrypting, etc.); and certificate selection. With S-HTTP, 
no sensitive data need ever be sent over the network in the clear. 
• -5SH- SSH49 [Ylonen et al., 1997a] [Ylonen et al., 1997b] [Ylonen et al., 1997c] [Ylo~en et 
al., 1997d] is a datagram-based binary protocol that is capable of functioning on top of any 
Transport-layer that can deliver a stream of binary data. It was originally designed as a 
replacement for the UNIX rlogin, rsh, and rep commands, in addition, it is also used to provide 
secure X-Windows connections and secure forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections. 
SSH provides strong authentication and secure communications over tinsecure channels. All 
communications are encrypted using IDEA or one of several other ciphers (e.g. triple-DES, 
DES, RC4-128, Blowfish). Encryption keys are exchanged using RSA, and data used in the 
key exchange is destroyed every hour (keys are never saved). Each host has an RSA key which 
is used to authenticate the host when RSA host authentication is used. Encryption is used to 
protect against IP-spoofing; public-key authentication is used to protect against DNS and route 
spoofing. RSA keys are also used to authenticate hosts. The datagram mechanism and related 
authentication, key exchange, encryption, and integrity mechanisms implement a Transport-
layer security mechanism, which is then used to implement the secure connection functionality. 
• SSL - SSL was initially designed by Netscape Communications, and is the predominant 
Application-layer security protocol. The SSL is a protocol layer which may be placed between 
a reliable connection-oriented Transport-layer protocol (e.g. TCP) and the Application-layer 
(e.g. HTTP). SSL provides for secure communication between a client and server by allowing 
mutual authentication, the use of digital signatures for integrity, and encryption for privacy. A 
discussion of SSL follows in Section 7. 7. 
The remainder of this Chapter discusses in detail the predominant VPN architectures used to protect 
dial-in connections (i.e. PPTP), the Network-layer (i.e. IPSec), and the Application-layer (i.e. SSL). 
7.5 Point-to-Point Tunnelling Protocol 
The PPTP is included with version 4 of the Windows NT Server/Workstation operating system, and is 
available as an add-on for the Windows 95 operating system. It is also supported in a number of 
network access servers50 (NAS) available from companies such as Ascend Communications51 (e.g. 
49 The following WWW-pages provide initial starting points for obtaining information about SSH; SSH homepage at 
http://www.cs.hut.rJ!ssh/ and SSH Frequently asked questions (FAQ) at http://www.uni-karlsruhe.de/-ig25/ssh-faq/ 
50 Network access servers are also referred to as front-end processors (PEPs), dial-in servers or point-of-presence (POP) servers. 
51 Ascend Communications has a WWW-site at http://www.ascend.com 
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Ascend MAX 4000, 4002, and 4004), and 3Com52 (e.g. Accessbuilder 8000). PPTP supports 
authenticated and confidential communication between a remote/mobile user and their home network. 
Generally, there are three computers involved in a PPTP communication session: 
• PPTP Client 
• NAS 
• PPTP Server 
However, if a PPTP tunnel is created between a PPTP client and a PPTP server connected to the same 
LAN then a NAS is not required. 
PPTP is commonly used to connect a remote PPTP client through a local ISP to a private enterprise 
LAN. A PPTP client makes two connections to establish a PPTP tunnel (see Figure 7-8, adapted from 
[Microsoft, 1997]). The remote client first establishes a dial-up, PPP based, network connection to the 
local ISP's NAS. The client then makes a second logical connection over the existing PPP connection 
to the enterprise PPTP server. The second connection creates a PPTP control connection, and the PPTP 
tunnel which consists of IP datagrams containing encrypted PPP packets. The control connection is 
used to establish, maintain, and end the PPTP tunnel. A full description of the PPTP protocol can be 
found in [Hamzeh et al., 1997a]. 
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Figure 7-8 Creating a PPTP tunnel. 
PPTP encapsulates the encrypted and compressed PPP frames into IP datagrams for transmission over 
the Internet. The IP datagrams are created using a modified version of the GRE protocol (see Section 
7.4). These IP datagrams are routed over an IP network until they reach the PPTP server that is 
connected to both the IP network (e.g. Internet) and the private network. When the PPTP server 
receives the IP datagram from the IP network, it retrieves the original network packet (i.e. IPX, 
NetBEUI, or TCPIIP) sent by the remote client and delivers it across the private network to the 
destination computer. Retrieval of the network packet is achieved by decapsulating it from the PPP 
packet contained in the IP datagram and then decrypting it. This process allows the PPTP client to 
appear as a virtual node on the private network- that is, the PPTP client appears as if it is physically 
connected to the private network. 
Figure 7-9, page 92, (adapted from [Microsoft, 1997]) illustrates the multi-protocol and encryption 
support of the PPTP. In addition Figure 7-9 incorporates protocol stack diagrams which indicates the 
protocol layers in use at each transport stage - these stack diagrams should be interpreted such that 
each higher level protocol encapsulates the one below it. Packets sent by the remote PPTP client to the 
PPTP server pass through the PPTP tunnel to their destination on the private network. 
52 3Com Corporation has a WWW-site at http://www.3com.com 
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Figure 7-9 Connecting a remote dial-up PPTP client to the private network. 
It is also possible for remote clients (e.g. UNIX, Apple Macintosh, Microsoft Windows 3.11) that are 
not PPTP-enabled to take advantage of PPTP by connecting to a PPTP-enabled NAS. In this case, the 
NAS instead of the remote client establishes the PPTP connection to a PPTP server. It is important to 
note that to establish a PPTP connection between an ISP's NAS and a private network the ISP would 
require sensitive information, such as the remote user's-id and password. Obviously providing 
identification and authentication information to a third-party raises serious security issues! 
7.5.1 PPTP Security 
PPTP provides authentication, access control, and cryptographic mechanisms to Windows NT 
Server/Workstation version 4.0, and Windows 95 PPTP clients. As PPTP traffic is carried in IP 
datagrams it is possible to use firewall technology to protect the PPTP server and private network. 
PPTP traffic uses TCP port 1723, and the IP datagram uses Protocol= 47 (see Section 2.3), as assigned 
by lANA. PPTP can be used with most firewalls and routers by enabling traffic destined for TCP port 
1723 and Protocol = 47 to be routed through the firewall or router. For example, an organisation could 
use such packet filtering to block all traffic except PPTP ensuring that all network traffic entering and 
leaving their private networks is authenticated and encrypted. 
The following points provide an overview of the authentication, access control, and encryption 
mec~anisms implemented in the PPTP: .. , 
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• Authentication - In order to use PPTP a remote client must first establish a connection to their 
ISP's NAS which may require the client to authenticate themselves. It should be noted that 
client authentication to the ISP is not related to authentication carried out by the PPTP server. 
The PPTP server controls all access to the private network by requiring a standard Windows 
NT-based logon. All PPTP clients must supply a Windows NT compatible user-id and 
password. As the PPTP tunnel is encrypted this is as secure as logging on from a computer 
connected physically to the private LAN. 
Authentication of PPTP clients is done using PPP authentication mechanisms. This includes 
the Microsoft Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (MS-CHAP), and the Password 
Authentication Protocol (PAP) authentication schemes. 
• Access Control- Once the remote client has been authentication, all access to the private LAN 
is determined through access control mechanisms available under the Windows NT security 
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model. For example, access to resources on NTFS drives, or to other network resources 
requires the remote client to have the proper permissions. 
• Data Encryption - PPTP uses a "shared-secret" cryptographic protocol. Both the PPTP client 
and server share a secret-key, which is derived from the user's password. The RSA RC4 
standard is used to create a 40-bit session-key based on the user's hashed password. This key 
is then used to encrypt all the data contained in a PPP packet. The PPP packet containing a 
block of encrypted data is then encoded with a slightly modified version of ORE and 
encapsulated into a larger IP datagram for routing over the Internet to the PPTP server. Figure 
7-10 shows the encapsulation of each protocol packet involved in a PPTP tunnel. Interception 
of the IP datagram would only reveal media headers (e.g. ORE), IP headers, and the PPP 
packet containing a block of encrypted data. 
GRE 
IP 
Key 
L=:J encrypted 
Figure 7-10 IP datagram containing 
encapsulated PPTP packets. 
Due to cryptographic export controls only PPTP servers and clients supporting 40-bit session-keys are 
available outside of the US. However, users in the US and Canada can obtain a cryptographic pack 
which increases the session-key length to 128-bits. 
7.6 IP Security (IPSec) 
IPSec provides security at the IP-level and addresses the problems of authentication, integrity, and 
confidentiality. The authentication mechanism ensures that the IP datagram was actually sent by the 
party identified from the source IP address contained in the datagram header. The same mechanism also 
ensures the integrity of the datagram, i.e. it has not been altered in transit. The confidentiality 
mechanism ensures through encryption that a datagram's content is meaningless to any party except the 
sender and receiver(s). 
In August 1995, the IETF IP Security Working Group published five proposed standards which define a 
set of requirements for IP-level security. Together this set of standards is known as IP Security, or 
IPSec. The IPSec documents are: 
• RFC 1825 - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol 
• RFC 1826 - IP Authentication Header 
• RFC 1827 - IP Encapsulating Security Payload 
• RFC 1828- IP Authentication using Keyed MD5 
• RFC 1829- The ESP DES-CBC Transform 
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Support for the features described in these standards is mandatory for 1Pv6 and optional for 1Pv4. In 
either case the security features are implemented as extension headers that follow the main IP header. 
The extension header for authentication is referred to as the authentication header (AH); while the 
header for confidentiality is referred to as the encapsulating security payload (ESP). Both headers are 
described below. 
7.6.1 Security Association 
Authentication and confidentiality rely on security associations which establish the context for the 
communication, and may define the security aspects of that communication. An association is a one-
way relationship between a sender and receiver. Two security associations are required if a peer 
relationship is needed to establish secure two-way communication. 
A security association is uniquely identified by an Internet destination address and a security parameter 
index (SPI). Therefore, the security association is uniquely identified by the destination address in the 
1Pv4 or 1Pv6 header and the SPI contained within the AH or ESP header. 
A security association normally includes the parameters listed below, but might include additional 
parameters as well [Atkinson, 1995a]: 
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• Authentication algorithm and algorithm mode being used with the IP AH (required for AH 
implementations) 
• Key(s) used with the authentication algorithm in use with the AH (required for AH 
implementations) 
• Encryption algorithm, algorithm mode, and transform being used with the IP ESP (required for 
ESP implementations) 
• Key(s) used with the encryption algorithm in use with the ESP (required for ESP 
implementations) 
• Presence/absence and size of a cryptographic synchronisation or initialisation vector field for 
the encryption algorithm (required for ESP implementations). 
• Authentication algorithm and mode used with the ESP transform, if any is in use 
(recommended for ESP implementations). 
• Authentication key(s) used with the authentication algorithm that is part of the ESP transform 
(if any) (recommended for ESP implementations). 
• Lifetime of the key or time when key change should occur (recommended for all 
implementations). 
• Lifetime of this security association (recommended for all implementations). 
• Source address(es) of the security association, might be a wildcard address if more than one 
sending system shares the same security association with the destination (recommended for all 
implementations). 
• Sensitivity level (e.g. secret or unclassified) of the protected data (required for all systems 
claiming to provide multi-level security, recommended for all other systems). 
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It is important to note that the SPI is the only feature which relates the key management mechanism 
used to distribute keys to the authentication and confidentiality mechanisms. Hence, the mechanisms 
specified for authentication and confidentiality are independent of specific key management 
mechanisms. 
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Security Parameter Index (SPI) 
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(variable number of 32-bit words) 
Figure 7-11 Authentication header. 
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The AH provides the support for data integrity and authentication. The AH consists of the following 
fields [Atkinson, 1995b] (see Figure 7-11): 
• Next header (8-bits)- identifies the next payload after the authentication payload. 
• Payload Length (8-bits) - the length of the Authentication Data field in 32-bit words. 
Minimum value is 0 words, which is only used in the case of a "null" authentication algorithm. 
• Reserved (16-bits) -reserved for future use. Must be set to all zeros when sent. The value is 
included in the authentication data calculation, but is otherwise ignored by the recipient. 
• Security Parameters Index (32-bits) - a 32-bit pseudo-random value identifying the security 
association for this datagram. The SPI value 0 is reserved to indicate that "no security 
association exists". 
• Authentication Data (variable bit length)- the length of this field is variable, but is always an 
integral number of 32-bit words. Many implementations require padding to other alignments, 
such as 64-bits, in order to improve performance. 
The contents of the authentication data field depend on the authentication algorithm specified. The 
entire IP datagram, excluding fields that may change in transit, is used to calculate the authentication 
data. Fields that may change during transit are set to zero for the purpose of calculation at both source 
and destination. 
For IPv6 the default authentication algorithm is MD5 (see Section 7 .3.3), and all hosts must support this 
algorithm. If both parties agree, an alternative algorithm may be used. It should be noted that all hosts 
must support authentication, but they are not required to use it. 
To compute the authentication data using MD5, the sender and receiver must share a secret 
authentication key (or key). If the key is shorter than 128-bits, it is padded out with zeroes (referred to 
as keyfill) to a length of 128-bits. The IP datagram is then appended to the 128-bits of key and keyfill. 
The appended IP datagram should also have an authentication header, however the authentication data 
is set to zero. All fields in the IP datagram that may change in transit are temporarily set to zero. 
Finally, the key is appended to the IP datagram. 
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This process results in a btock of data constructed from the following sequence: 
key + keyfill + IP datagram + key 
The block of data is then passed to the MD5 algorithm, which generates a 128-bit result referred to as 
the message digest. The resulting message digest is used as the authentication data within the AH. 
When the IP datagram is received the same steps are performed. The resulting message digest is then 
compared to the authentication data contained in the original AH. If both match then the sender is 
authentic and the IP datagram's integrity is intact. However, if there is a difference then either the 
sender is not who they claim to be, or the IP datagram was altered while in transit. No other party can 
generate an IP datagram that will be successfully authenticated unless they obtain a copy of the secret-
key. 
7.6.3 Confidentiality 
Authentication is important for the security of IP datagrams, unfortunately it does not protect against the 
most basic security threat - eavesdropping. As IP datagrams traverse a network they may ttavel 
through many different systems and networks. Any of these intermediate nodes may harbour an attacker 
able to monitor the datagrams travelling through their domain. It is a simple task. to attach a software or 
hardware protocol analyser to a network. 
IPSec provides confidentiality through the encapsulating security payload (ESP). Depending on the 
senders requirements, this mechanism can be used to encrypt either a transport-layer segment (e.g. TCP, 
UDP, or ICMP), known as transport-mode ESP, or an entire IP datagram, known as tunnel-mode ESP. 
An ESP header starts with a 32-bit SPI, with the remainder of the header (if any) containing parameters 
necessary to the encryption algorithm being used. The SPI and encryption parameters are generally 
transmitted as plaintext, while the remainder of the header is encrypted. 
All IPSec systems that implement ESP must support the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of DES as 
the default encryption algorithm. In CBC mode, the plaintext is processed as a sequence of 64-bit 
blocks. The input of the encryption algorithm is the XOR of the current plaintext block and the 
preceding ciphertext block - the same key is used throughout. This has the effect of chaining together 
each block of plaintext. The benefit of chaining is that the ciphertext block bears no resemblance to the 
original plaintext block, therefore repeated blocks of plaintext are not exposed. Producing the first 
block of ciphertext requires an initialisation vector (IV) to be XORed with the first block of plaintext. 
8 16 24 
Security Parameter Index (SPI) 
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Figure 7-12 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) format. 
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Figure 7-12 shows the format of the ESP header including the encrypted payload data using DES-CBC. 
The fields are as follows: 
• Security Parameter Index (32-bits)- identifies a security association 
• Initialisation Vector (variable bit length)- initial input required for DES-CBC whose length is 
a multiple of 32-bits 
• Payload Data (variable bit length) - prior to encryption, contains the block of data to be 
encrypted, which may be a transport-layer segment (transport mode) or an IP datagram (tunnel 
mode) 
• Padding (variable bit length)- prior to encryption, filled with unspecified data to align the pad 
length and payload type fields on a 64-bit boundary 
• Pad length (8-bits)- the size of the unencrypted padding field 
• Payload type (8-bits)- indicates the protocol type contained in the payload data field (e.g. IP, 
TCP) 
Note that the IV is transmitted in plaintext. This is not the most secure approach, however, it is 
considered acceptable for the security provided by IPSec. 
IP header AdditionaiiP headers 
1+--------- Partially-encrypted IP datagram--------~ 
(a) Transport-mode 
1111 Unencrypted Encrypted------~ 
1+----------- Partially-encrypted outer IP datagram ------------+1 
Key (b) Tunnel-mode 
I \'d~?;A I encrypted 
Figure 7-13 Secure 1Pv4 and 1Pv6 datagram. 
Transport-Mode ESP 
Transport-mode ESP encrypts the data carried by an IP datagram. This data is typically TCP or UDP 
which contains application-level data. In transport-mode, the ESP header is inserted into the IP 
datagram immediately prior to the transport-layer protocol header (e.g. TCP, UDP, or ICMP). In this 
mode bandwidth is conserved because there are no encrypted IP headers or IP options [Atkinson, 
1995c]. 
Transport-mode operation is summarised as follows: 
• The sender takes the original transport-layer (e.g. UDP, TCP, ICMP) frame and encapsulates it 
into the ESP. The sending user-id and destination address is used to locate the appropriate 
security association which determines the key and encryption algorithm to be used. If host-
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oriented keying is in use, then all sending user-ids on a given system will have the same 
security association for a given destination address. If no key has been established, then the 
key management mechanism is used to establish an encryption key for the communication 
session prior to the encryption. The encrypted ESP is then encapsulated as the last payload of a 
plaintext IP datagram (see Figure 7-13a). The IP datagram can now be sent. 
• The datagram is then routed to the destination. Intermediate routers simply route the datagram 
based on the IP header and optional plaintext IP headers. There is no need for the intermediate 
routers to examine the ESP. 
• The receiver processes the plaintext IP header and optional plaintext IP headers. It then 
decrypts the ESP using the session key that has been established for this traffic, using the 
combination of the destination address and the datagram's SPI to locate the correct key. If no 
key exists for this session or the attempt to decrypt fails, the encrypted ESP is discarded and 
the failure recorded in the system or audit log. If decryption succeeds, the original transport-
layer (e.g. UDP, TCP, ICMP) frame is removed from the ESP. The information from the 
plaintext IP header and transport-layer header is used to determine which application the data 
should be sent to. 
Transport-mode provides an efficient and effective means of achieving confidentiality for any 
application that makes use of the IP protocol - individual applications need not implement their own 
confidentiality mechanisms. Unfortunately, transport-mode is vulnerable to traffic analysis as the 
destination address is never encrypted. 
Tunnel-Mode ESP 
Tunnel-mode ESP differs from transport-mode ESP in that the entire IP datagram is encrypted. The 
original IP datagram is placed in the encrypted portion of the ESP and that entire ESP frame is placed 
within a IP datagram having plaintext IP headers - needed so that the encrypted IP datagram can be 
routed to its destination. This method helps to limit traffic analysis because the final destination node 
cannot be determined by an eavesdropper. 
Tunnel-mode ESP is particularly suitable for firewalls and other security gateways which protect trusted 
networks from untrusted networks. In this scenario, encryption is carried out between an external host 
and a security gateway, or between two security gateways. A major advantage of tunnel-mode is that 
key management is simplified by moving it from the internal hosts to the security gateway. 
Tunnel-mode operation is summarised as follows: 
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• The sender takes the original IP datagram and encapsulates it into the ESP. The sending user-
id and destination address are used to locate the correct security association to determine the 
appropriate encryption algorithm (and any associated parameters) to apply. If host-oriented 
keying is being used, then all sending user-ids on a given system will have the same security 
association for a given destination address. If no key has been established, then the key 
management mechanism is used to establish an encryption key for the session prior to use of 
ESP. The ESP is then encapsulated as the last payload of a plaintext IP datagram and sent (see 
Figure 7-13b). 
• The IP datagram is routed to the destination by intermediate routers which make routing 
decisions based on the contents of the plaintext header. There is no need for the intermediate 
routers to examine the ESP - the ESP would be meaningless unless an attacker had 
compromised the session key. 
• The receiver discards the plaintext IP header and any optional plaintext IP payloads. The 
combination of destination address and SPI value is used to locate the correct session key for 
decrypting the ESP. If no valid security association exists for this session (e.g. the receiver has 
no key), the receiver must discard the encrypted ESP and the failure must be recorded in the 
system or audit log. If decryption succeeds, the original IP datagram can be obtained from the 
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decrypted ESP. This original IP datagram is then processed as per the normal IP protocol 
specification, and may continue to be routed behind the security gateway. 
7 .6.4 Key Management 
Each time an IP datagram is sent, the AH and ESP portion require a separate key. This means that 4 
keys are required for a send and receive as both the AH and ESP require a pair of keys. For small sites 
key management can be achieved on a manual basis. However, in large sites where keys are being 
changed on a regular basis an automated key management system is highly desirable. With manual key 
management, keys for remote users and sites are produced and distributed by a central Key Distribution 
Centre (KDC). The key pair for transmit and receive are manually entered into the cryptographic 
systems at each end. Keys managed and distributed in this manner tend to only be changed on a weekly 
or monthly basis depending on the security of the site and the sensitivity of the communications. 
Obviously, such a manual key management system is not suitable in circumstances where many users 
require keys which change constantly (e.g. every session, every datagram). Two key management 
protocols which can be implemented in IPSec for automated key production and distribution have been 
proposed: 
• Simple Key Management for Internet Protocols (SKIP) - is a connectio-n-less key management 
protocol. Prior communication is not necessary to carry out key management functions. To 
implement SKIP, each IP-based source and destination has a certified Diffie-Hellman (see 
Section 7 .3.2) public-key. This public-key can be certified in various ways, including the use 
of X.509 (see Section 7 .3.4) or PGP53 certificates. 
Since all participants have access to each others public-key certificates, each participant has 
(implicitly) a mutually authenticated long-term secret-key with every other participant. This 
shared secret-key is not used to encrypt the IP datagram, instead a randomly generated packet-
key is used - the shared secret-key becomes a key-encrypting-key (KEK) used to encrypt the 
packet-key (see Figure 7-14). 
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Figure 7-14 Encrypted IP datagram using SKIP. 
Since the KEK can be cached for efficiency, it allows the packet-keys to be modified very 
rapidly (e.g. per datagram) without incurring the computational overhead of a public-key 
operation [Aziz et al., 1995]. The strongest argument against SKIP is that it negates forward 
secrecy, i.e. if the keys are compromised then all previous traffic is exploitable. 
• Internet Security Association & Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) - is a common 
framework developed by the IETF IPSec working group to establish Security Associations 
(SA) and cryptographic keys in an Internet environment. SAs contain all the information 
required for execution of various network security services, such as the IP layer services (e.g. 
header authentication (AH) and payload encapsulation (ESP)), Transport or Application-layer 
53 PGP, an acronym for "Pretty Good Privacy", is an email security program designed by Philip Zimmermann in 1991. 
Information about PGP can be found at http://www.pgp.com 
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services, or self-protection of negotiation traffic. ISAKMP defines payloads for exchanging 
key generation and authentication data. These formats provide a consistent framework for 
transferring key and authentication data which is independent of the key generation technique, 
encryption algorithm and authentication mechanism. 
ISAKMP is distinct from key exchange protocols in order to separate the details of security 
association management (and key management) from the details of key exchange. There may 
be many different key exchange protocols (e.g. Diffie-Hellman, RSA etc.), each having 
different security properties. ISAKMP provides the common framework required for agreeing 
to the format of SA attributes, and for negotiating, modifying, and deleting SAs. ISAKMP also 
define basic requirements for its authentication and key exchange components which protect 
against denial-of-service, replay/reflection, man-in-the-middle, and connection hijacking 
attacks. 
ISAKMP utilises digital signatures, based on public-key cryptography, for authentication. 
There are other strong authentication systems available, which could be specified as additional 
optional authentication mechanisms for ISAKMP. Some of these authentication systems rely 
on trusted third-party (TTP) KDCs to distribute secret session keys. An example is Kerberos, 
where the TIP is the Kerberos server which holds secret-keys for all clients and servers "Within 
its network domain. A client's proof that it holds its secret-key provides authentication_ to a 
server. 
A generic key exchange protocol, known as Oakley, has been defined by the IPSec working 
group for use with ISAKMP. Oakley has several options for distributing keys. In addition to 
the classic DH exchange, this protocol can be used to derive a new key from an existing key 
and to distribute an externally derived key by encrypting it. The protocol can provide perfect 
forward secrecy, and permits the use of authentication based on symmetric encryption or non-
encryption algorithms. This flexibility is provided to enable parties to choose the features that 
are most suited to their security and performance requirements. 
Standardisation is required for all automated key distribution systems because the underlying network 
equipment must be able to interact with a centralised key management system at some point. Although 
the IETF chose ISAKMP with Oakley, Sun Microsystems which developed SKIP is working with a 
number of vendors (including Internet Dynamics, Novell, OpenROUTE, Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology, Elvis+, CheckPoint, Toshiba, VPNet, Information Resource Engineering, Fortress 
Networks) to position SKIP as the de facto standard. 
7.7 Secure Sockets Layer 
The primary goal of the SSL protocol is to provide privacy and reliability between two communicating 
applications. The protocol is composed of two layers (see Figure 7-15). At the lowest level, layere.d on 
top of some reliable transport protocol (e.g. TCP), is the SSL Record Protocol. The SSL Record 
Protocol is used for encapsulation of various higher level protocols. One such encapsulated protocol, 
the SSL Handshake Protocol, allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate an 
encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys before the application protocol transmits or receives its 
first byte of data. 
SSL I SSL Change I SSL Alert I HTTP I Tel net I • • • Handshake Cipher Spec Protocol Protocol Application layer 
SSL Record Protocol 
Transport layer TCP 
Network layer IP 
Figure 7-15 SSL protocol stack. 
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A major advantage of SSL is that it is application protocol independent. A higher level protocol can 
layer on top of the SSL Protocol transparently. The SSL protocol provides connection security that has 
three basic properties: 
• The connection is private. Public-key cryptography is used after the initial handshake to define 
a secret-key. The secret-key is then used with the negotiated symmetric algorithm (e.g. DES, 
RC4, etc.) to encrypt the Application-layer data. 
• The peer's identity can be authenticated using asymmetric, or public-key, cryptography (e.g. 
RSA, DSS, etc.) 
• The connection is reliable. Message transport includes a message integrity check using a keyed 
Message Authentication Code (MAC). Secure hash functions (e.g. SHA, MD5, etc.) are used 
for MAC computations. 
SSL has been used primarily for encrypting sensitive information, such as credit card details, between 
WWW -browsers and Internet servers, and allows client/server applications to communicate in a way 
that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. 
Theoretically SSL can transparently secure any TCP based protocol running on any port if both parties 
know that each other is using SSL. Table 7-1 shows a number of well known services that have been 
implemented with SSL support, and have been assigned official port numbers (useful so firewalls, 
proxies, and gateways, know what type of traffic to expect). 
Table 7-1 Services implemented with SSL support. 
'• ' '. ~ 
Po;t Nu.Uber '· .. 
,,· ',,, ', ,, 
Service< 
' '.\ Description. 
https 443 hyper-text transfer protocol 
ssmtp 465 SMTPmail 
snews 563 NNTPnews 
ssl-ldap 636 LDAP directory 
spop3 995 POP3 mail 
ftps 990 FfP - file transfer 
SSL has undergone several revisions (see Table 7-2) since its initial release as SSL version 2.0 (SSL 
2.0) in 1995. SSL version 3.0 (SSL 3.0) was the last official release supported by Netscape, and was 
submitted in 1996 to the IETF's Transport Layer Security (TLS) working-group as an Internet-Draft. 
Subsequently, 1997 saw the emergence of the TLS protocol standard [Dierks et al., 1997], version 1.0 
(TLS 1.0), from the TLS working-group. Essentially TLS 1.0 is a modified definition of SSL 3.0, and 
although the modifications are significant enough to prevent interoperation it does incorporate a 
mechanism by which a TLS implementation can back down to SSL 3.0). 
Table 7 ·2 History of SSL and derived protocols. 
' "' ' ' Soul'ce: .. 
. - . - -· . --·~- ·_, -~-'/ 
·, 
.www-browser Supp~rt VeJ'Sion·• 
'·' 
Descripboll• ·· ::, ~: .· ... , 
SSL2.0 Published by Netscape. Formed the original protocol Netscape 3.0, 4.0 
specification. Internet Explorer 3.0, 4.0 
SSL 3.0 Published by Netscape, Revised to prevent specific security Netscape 3.0, 4.0 
and expired IETF attacks, add ciphers, and support Internet Explorer 3.0, 4.0 Internet-Draft. certificate chaining. 
TLS 1.0 Expired IETF Internet- Based on SSL 3.0 with a number of None 
Draft modifications. SSL3.0 and TLS 1.0 
are not interoperable. 
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7.7.1 Session Establishment 
The SSL session is established by following a handshake sequence between the SSL client and the SSL 
server, as shown in Figure 7-16. This sequence may vary, depending on whether the server is 
configured to provide its public-key certificate (certificates used for SSL are usually of X.509v3 format, 
see Section 7.3.4) or request the client's public~key certificate. When the client and the server first start 
communicating, they must agree on a protocol version, select cryptographic algorithms, optionally 
authenticate each other, and use public-key cryptography to generate shared secrets. These processes 
are performed as part of the handshake protocol, which is summarised as follows: 
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• The client sends a ClientHello message to which the server must respond with a ServerHello 
message, or else a fatal error will occur and the connection will fail. The ClientHello and 
ServerHello are used to establish the security capabilities of the client and server. The 
ClientHello and ServerHello establish the following attributes: protocol version, session ID, 
cipher suite (e.g. symmetric and asymmetric algorithms, keys, cryptographic parameters, etc.), 
and compression method. 
• Following the hello messages, the server sends its public-key certificate, if it is to be 
authenticated. Additionally, a ServerKeyExchange message may be sent, if it is required (e.g. 
if their server has no certificate, or if its certificate is for signing only). If the server is 
authenticated, it may request the client's public-key certificate if that is appropriate to the 
cipher suite selected. Now the server will send the ServerHelloDone message, indicating that 
the hello-message phase of the handshake is complete. The server will then wait for a client 
response. 
Client 
CllentHello 
Server 
Establish protocol version, 
session id, cipher suite, 
ServerHello compression method. Exchange 
------------- --------------------------------------------- ••• f.?_fJ_r;/_QfJI__'(_?_(f.!_?_f?. •••••••••••••••...•••.••••.••.. 
Certificate 1 
ServerKeyExchange 1 
CertificateRequest 1 
Send server certificate. 
Exchange server keys If a 
suitable server certificate Is not 
available. Request Client 
certificate. Send server done 
ServerHelloDone message, and then wait for client 
........................................................... -------------------------------------------- ... !f!.!!E!.C!.'!.!!.~: ...................................... .. 
Send client certificate if 
requested. Exchange client keys 
if a suitable client certificate Is not 
available. Send certificate 
verification message. 
Both client and server send a 
ChageCipherSpec message to 
indicate changes to the 
negotiated cipher suite. 
Immediately afterward a Finish 
message is sent to verify the 
cipher exchange was successful. 
Certificate 1 
ClientKeyExchange 
Certificate Verify 1 
[ChangeCipherSpec ]2 
Finish 
[ChangeCipherSpecj2 
Finish 
------------- --------·"A;;;;ii~~ii~~o~i-~---------· ·--·;=;-a;n·ti1is-poini-on-applicatian·---
data Is encrypted by both the 
client and the server. 
optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent 
2 ChangeCipherSpec Is an independent SSL protocol content type (i.e. It Is not 
an SSL handshake message). 
Figure 7-16 SSL handshake sequence. 
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• If the server has sent a CertificateRequest message, the client must send either the certificate 
message (containing the client's public-key) or a no_certificate alert. The ClientKeyExchange 
message is now sent, and the content of that message will depend on the public-key algorithm 
negotiated with the ClientHello and the ServerHello. If the client has sent a certificate with 
signing ability, a digitally-signed CertificateVerifyMessage is sent to explicitly verify the 
certificate. 
• At this point, a ChangeCipherSpec (used to change the parameters of the current cryptographic 
protocols) message is sent by the client, and the client copies the pending CipherSpec 
(contains the parameters for the negotiated cryptographic protocols) into the current 
CipherSpec. The client then immediately sends the Finish message using the new algorithms, 
keys, and secrets. In response, the server will send its own ChangeCipherSpec message, 
transfer the pending to the current CipherSpec and send its Finish message under the new 
CipherSpec. 
• At this point, the SSL handshake is complete - the client and server m!ly now begin 
exchanging Application-layer data in a secure manner. 
7.7.2 Data Transfer 
The SSL Record protocol (See Figure 7 -17) is used to transfer application and SSL control data 
between the client and the server, possibly fragmenting this data into smaller units, or combining 
multiple higher layer protocol messages into single units. It may also compress, attach message digests, 
and encrypt units before transmitting them using the underlying reliable transport protocol. Once the 
SSL handshake is complete, the two parties have shared secrets which are used to encrypt compressed 
record units and compute MACs on their contents. 
Application data 
Fragment I Combine 
Record Protocol units 
Compressed Unit 
MAC 
Encrypted 
TCP Segment 
Figure 7-17 SSL record protocol. 
Data from higher layers (see Figure 7-15) is fragmented into SSLPlaintext records of 214 bytes or less, 
and delivered to the SSL Record protocol. All SSLPlaintext records are compressed using the 
compression algorithm defined in the current session state. There is always an active compression 
algorithm, however initially it is defined as CompressionMethod.null (i.e. initial handshake records are 
not compressed). The compression algorithm translates an SSLPlaintext unit into an SSLCompressed 
unit. Compression must be lossless and may not increase the content length by more than 1024 bytes. If 
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the decompression function encounters a fragment that would decompress to a length in excess of 214 
bytes it will issue a fatal alert message. 
All records are protected using the encryption and MAC algorithms defined in the current CipherSpec. 
There is always an active CipherSpec, however initially it is SSL_NULL_ WITH_NULL_NULL, which 
does not provide any security. The techniques used to perform the encryption and MAC operations are 
defined by the CipherSpec. The encryption and MAC functions translate an SSLCompressed structure 
into an SSLCiphertext. The decryption functions reverse the process. Most implementations of SSL, by 
default, implement the following nine symmetric algorithms for encrypting compressed record units: 
• No encryption 
• Stream Ciphers 
0 RC4 with 40-bit keys 
0 RC4 with 128-bit keys 
• CBC Block Ciphers 
0 RC2 with 40-bit keys 
0 DES40, DES, 3DES_EDE 
0 Idea 
0 Fortezza 
The choice of hash function determines how a message digest is created from a record unit. SSL 
supports the following: 
• No digest 
• MD5 
• SHA-1 
The message digest is used to create the MAC which is encrypted with the message to provide integrity 
and to prevent against replay attacks. Transmissions also include a sequence number so that missing, 
altered, or extra messages are detectable. 
7.7.3 SSL and Proxies 
One 'problem with SSL-based connections is that they do not work with proxy servers. For a proxy 
server to· support SSL it must either support SOCKS54 (which stands for "sockets"), or use a special 
SSL Tunnelling protocol. Both of these options are supported in Netscape's Proxy Server. 
SSL was designed to provide security between client and server and to avoid any kind of 3-way man-in-
the-middle attack. Thus SSL cannot be proxied through traditional application-level firewalls (such as 
the CERN proxy server), because SSL considers a proxy server to be a middleman. 
The simplest solution for this problem is to use a packet filtering firewall configured to allow a reserved 
and trusted port to be opened for each SSL enabled service, such as HTTPS or SNEWS (443 or 563 
respectively). Effectively this allows all traffic on those ports to be passed through unrestricted. The risk 
however, with this solution, is that an internal attacker could attempt to use these trusted ports without 
using SSL and there is no way for the firewall to know. 
54 The SOCKS protocol is an independent proxy mechanism that provides a generic byte fmwarding gateway between a client 
and a server, and generally works at the socket level. SOCKS is sufficient if the only requirements are for TCP/UDP 
restrictions based on client or server IP addresses. Information about SOCKS can be found at http://www.socks.nec.com 
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However, most non-SSL HTTP proxies work at the protocol level and have the ability to understand 
header information related to the protocol. This goes beyond SOCKS to allow the firewall administrator 
to use the header information to filter and/or monitor the traffic. SOCKS simply does not provide 
enough information about a request to let a firewall decide whether to allow it or to log the request. 
A more secure approach is to use a firewall that supports the SSL Tunnelling CONNECT extension 
method as described in [Luotonen, 1995]. 
In SSL Tunnelling, the client initiates an SSL connection via normal HTTP, then handshakes and 
creates a secure connection to the server via a byte-forwarding tunnel. The proxy has access to the 
client-proxy request headers, but the session is encrypted. Once the handshake occurs, the proxy acts 
just like a SOCKS gateway. This allows the firewall to monitor the requests, but not the traffic. 
There are three additional things that the SSL Tunnelling mechanism does with the proxy server that do 
not happen when using SOCKS: 
• The client sends a "user agent" message (for example, "Mozilla/3.0/Macintosh"). 
• The proxy can send to the client an authorisation request allowing the administrator to use 
passwords to control external Internet access. 
• The standard is more easily extensible. For example, the client could, in theory, send the URL 
being requested (or anything else) to the firewall. However, there is no standard to support this 
behaviour. 
Another solution (also available using the Netscape Proxy Server), is that the proxy server can spoof55 
SSL on behalf of the internal client. The proxy will initiate SSL between itself and other servers on the 
Internet, but be unsecure inside the firewall between the proxy server and the client. 
This compromise means that client authentication is not possible; only server authentication of the 
remote sites is available. However, it does provide the ability for client authentication between the 
client and the proxy. The administrator must decide which is more important, until such time as a better 
solution arises. 
It is also possible for a proxy server to hold both client and server keys for its internal clients. This 
allows SSL sessions to be carried out twice: once between the client and proxy server, and again 
between the proxy server and the secure server. Thus, the proxy server can listen in on the conversation 
without having the private-keys of external servers. Clearly this is not reasonable for the general 
Internet, but it is a viable solution for corporate requirements such as Intranets and Extranets. 
7.8 Summary 
VPNs are an essential tool for protecting information as it travels through both trusted and untrusted 
networks. With the increasing numbers of organisations using the Internet as an extension of their 
private networks, VPN technologies provide a way for organisations to protect their information. In 
addition to providing confidentiality, VPNs can also provide non-repudiation, integrity, and strong 
authentication services. Different combinations of these services are required for Intranets, Extranets, 
and Teleworkers. 
The basis for VPNs is cryptography, which forms the mathematical basis for each of the 
aforementioned services. Secret-key cryptography has been used for many years, unlike public-key 
cryptography which has a relatively short history. Regardless of its youth public-key cryptography has 
revolutionised many areas of computer security, including connectionless (e.g. email) and connection-
55 Information about Netscape Proxy Server's ability to spoof SSL on behalf of an internal client can be found at 
http://developer.netscape.com/library/one/sdk!proxy/unixguide/ssl-tunl.htm#Sl8342 
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oriented (e.g. Telnet) communications. However, this Chapter has focused on connection-oriented VPN 
technologies, such as PPTP, IPSec, and SSL. 
Currently each of these particular VPN technologies fills a particular role in connection-oriented 
communication. PPTP allows dial-in access to the organisations private networks, and allows the user's 
computer to appear as if it were a part of the internal network. SSL is most often used to create dynamic 
VPNs on a per-session basis (e.g. between a WWW-browser and a WWW-server), and has found a 
niche protecting WWW-based credit-card transactions in the continuing absence of a finalised SET 
standard and implementation. Although, it is expected that this particular SET will eventually replace 
SSL because it provides specialised benefits such as automating the entire credit-card transaction 
process. IPSec will probably become the omnipresent VPN technology, unlike SSL and PPTP which 
operate at the Transport and Application-layer, IPSec provides cryptographic and key-management 
mechanism to the Network-Layer. The benefit of IPSec is that it provides long overdue security 
mechanisms to the Internet, and its related protocols. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions 
8.1 The future of Internet Security 
The security of the Internet has long been in question, and is now under greater scrutiny than ever 
before. There is currently a great deal of debate, especially in the US, as to what the threats are and 
where they are coming from. The US relies heavily on the Internet and is concerned that the 
infrastructure that supports it is becoming an attractive target for its enemies - this thinking has coined 
the term "Information Warfare", in which the objective is to disrupt (or destroy) an enemies information 
systems. The US is taking the possibility of Information Warfare very seriously, and has convened 
numerous government committees to investigate the impact and likelihood of such attacks. The 
following story from the Washington Times [Brosnan, 1998] paints a very interesting picture of the 
possible impact that Information Warfare could have: 
"A band of seven hackers from Boston told a Senate Committee yesterday that they could 
bring down the foundations of the Internet in 30 minutes. Testifying under their Internet 
aliases -- Mudge, Brian Oblivion, Space Rogue, Kingpin, Weld Pond, John Tan and 
Stefan Von Neumann -- the hackers said that by interfering with the links between long-
distance phone carriers such as AT&T and MCI they could disrupt Internet service for a 
couple of days. 
The hackers, known collectively as LOpht, opened a series of hearings by Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Fred Thompson, Tennessee Republican, on 
the security of government and commercial computer and telecommunication networks. 
Mr. Thompson released a pair of reports by the congressional General Accounting 
Office that said the State Department and the Federal Aviation Administration's air 
control system are highly vulnerable to hacking. 
In a test, congressional investigators accessed the travel itineraries of U.S. diplomats, 
employment records and e-mail traffic and were even able to take control of the State 
Department's computers. Much of the FAA report was so scary it was classified. Utilities, 
stock exchanges, the Federal Reserve and taxpayer credit and medical records also are 
at risk, Mr. Thompson said. 'It seems the more technologically advanced we've become 
the more vulnerable we've become,' he said. "Our nation's underlying information 
infrastructure is riddled with security flaws. " 
The LOpht hackers blamed the poor security on the patchwork nature of the Internet 
networks, government laxity and the indifference of makers of operating systems and 
software to security concerns. 'Simple security measures are missing from almost all the 
software sold to companies today,' Mudge said. For instance, while Microsoft claims its 
Windows NT server for businesses is more secure than Windows 95 for personal users, 
Weld Pond said hackers usually can break into an NT system in less than a day. Mr. 
Thompson predicted it is only a matter of time before Microsoft and other software 
makers find themselves being sued by a company whose system has been penetrated 
through their software. 
Not all the testimony was bleak. The hackers said it is far easier to interfere with service 
than to change data or issue commands. For instance, the Global Positioning Satellite 
system used in military and some civilian aircraft for navigation can be jammed, but it is 
unlikely a hacker could move a satellite's position, the hackers testified. Still, Space 
Rogue said, a determined group of hackers could 'wreck havoc in the country.' ... " 
Although this thesis has not looked specifically at the issue of Information Warfare, the threats and 
vulnerabilities discussed in Chapter 3 would be applicable for use in such a "war". It has also been 
shown, through numerous examples and statistical data from widely conducted surveys, that 
organisations connected to the Internet face threats very similar to those described above. However, 
107 
Conclusions Firewalls and Virtual Private Networks 
threats do not simply come from attackers external to the organisation, rather a great deal of computer 
crime is conducted from inside the organisation by "trusted" employees. As it is often easier to launch 
attacks from within an organisation, there is a very real possibility of Information Warfare being waged 
from within. To help protect against such attacks and the threat of Information Warfare increasing 
numbers of organisations are installing firewall architectures and VPNs. 
Firewall architectures have evolved to provide a means of segregating networks that have incompatible 
security policies or represent different levels trustworthiness. The main benefit of a firewall architecture 
is that it reduces the zone-of-risk the organisation's internal networks are exposed to, and it provides a 
central point for the implementation and management of security policy. 
Although firewall architectures provide very good protection from attacks launched against the Network 
and Transport-layers, the unpredictability and complexity found at the Application-level significantly 
reduce the type of protection that can be achieved by a firewall. In fact, firewalls are vulnerable to 
incorrectly implemented applications, and provide little (if any) protection against threats from viruses 
and malicious executable content (e.g. Java applets, ActiveX controls). 
The greatest problem with firewall technology is that it provides no protection for traffic once it is sent 
onto'·a network. It also has no way of authenticating traffic that it receives, unless it relies on\iome 
mechanism at the Application-layer. To provide solutions to these problems VPN technology is~being 
integrated with firewall architectures. '' 
VPNs provide a number of security mechanisms such as confidentiality, message authentication, non-
repudiation, and message integrity. Although these mechanisms could be provided solely through 
symmetric or asymmetric cryptography, for efficiency and saleability reasons hybrid (combines the best 
features of both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms) cryptographic systems are most often used. 
With the increasing use of Intranets, Extranets, and teleworkers there is a growing need for VPN 
technologies to be implemented. 
In general, it should be expected that firewall architectures and VPNs will continue to merge until their 
functionality is inseparable. The use of VPNs can reduce and even eliminate many classes of attack-
sniffing a network for passwords will be impossible, as will IP spoofing and other forms of address 
impersonation - however, many new problems will undoubtedly arise. For example, public-key 
certificate servers will need to be very secure and will be tempting targets for internal abuse. In 
addition, denial-of-service attacks may even become more predominant. 
This thesis has also shown the benefit of having firewall architectures verified and validated by 
independent parties - a process known as certification. Without such certification a purchaser has only 
vendor assurance that the firewall architecture will function correctly, and is not vulnerable to 
compromise - the assumption made for fire walls is that they cannot be compromised! Chapter· 6 ·has 
reviewed the current and future direction of firewall certification schemes driven by both government 
and commercial organisations. It is widely accepted that current firewall technology is not advanced 
enough to protect systems that process highly sensitive (e.g. nationally classified) information. This is 
reflected by the fact that no firewall has been evaluated above the ITSEC E3 assurance level. 
Commercial certification has focused on penetration testing, using the same tools that are generally 
available to attackers from the Internet. Obviously, such evaluation can be automated but it does not 
provide the same assurance as evaluations carried out under government certification schemes that use 
well developed criteria and take a much more comprehensive look at the firewall architecture. 
8.2 Problems and Future Research 
This thesis has identified many areas that pose problems for firewall and VPN technologies. The 
following points discuss some of these problems and suggest areas of future research: 
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• Key Management- for both SSL (and the future TLS protocol) and IPSec a common public-
key infrastructure (PKI), or certificate hierarchy, is required to provide ubiquitous 
interoperable support for authentication and encryption. The problem is that no such global 
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infrastructure exists at present. In WWW-browsers that support SSL this problem has been 
addressed somewhat by distributing with the browser a number of public-key certificates from 
well known organisations (e.g. Microsoft, Netscape, etc.) In addition, SSL also supports 
anonymous DH key exchanges which provide confidentiality but not authentication. 
IPSec can also support anonymous DH key exchange, and certificates could be sent manually 
to all of the organisations that wish to carry out authentication of the connections they accept. 
However, scaling this approach to the global Internet would not be practicable. The aim of 
IPSec is to provide global support for confidentiality and authentication at the IP layer, which 
can be achieved between hosts that until the connection was initiated, had no prior knowledge 
of each other. The most obvious place to implement a global PKI would be in the existing 
DNS. Public-key certificates could then be exchanged at the same time as the DNS resolver 
query. Unfortunately, DNS is an untrusted service and it still remains to be seen who would 
(regardless of the DNS being used) sign all of the certificates. Obviously there are many areas 
here that will require further research before IPSec will be widely deployed, and of any great 
use. 
• End-to-end Security - this is the most obvious area in which security mechanisms, such as 
non-repudiation, confidentiality, integrity etc., are required to protect information transmitted 
over unsecure connections. A great deal of work has already been done to accomplish such 
mechanisms within VPN technologies (e.g. SSL, PPTP, and IPSec). However, more research 
needs to be done in policy negotiation between network domains, and the related problem of 
proxying encrypted traffic through firewalls (or gateways). 
• End-System Security - the majority of security problems observed within the Internet are 
related directly to insufficient or incorrect security implementations at end points (i.e. hosts). 
Many examples of such problems have been presented through this thesis, including, sendmail, 
Ping of Death, Java applets, etc. In addition to the many security incidents caused by software 
bugs, poor user administration can provide easy targets for attackers (e.g. allowing trust 
relationships through .rhosts files). Unfortunately, these problems are not addressed 
sufficiently, if at all, by firewall architectures and VPNs. In fact, these problems stem mainly 
from the lack of correct software engineering methodologies being applied to system 
development. A great deal of work remains to be done to improve the standard of software 
development at all layers of the TCP/IP suite (in particular the Application-layer). 
• Secure QoS - the pending addition of QoS features to the Internet as part of 1Pv6 introduces a 
new set of security issues. In particular IPv6 provides flow label and priority fields [Bradner, 
1995] that allow hosts to specify special handling of traffic by IPv6 routers, for example the 
host may be participating in a "real-time" connection that requires defined latency and 
·bandwidth parameters. This capability is particularly important in order for IPv6 to support 
multimedia, and other applications that require some degree of consistent throughput or delay. 
Obviously, firewalls would provide a convenient location for controlling and protecting the 
provision of services so that users cannot utilise more resources than they are authorised to, or 
deny services to users who have legitimate requirements. The users of these services must be 
authenticated to ensure that the services are being consumed by the users for which they are 
intended. 
• Secure Network Infrastructure - The network itself must be protected - this is one of the 
major targets oflnformation Warfare. The validity of the routing and control messages must be 
assured in order for the Internet to function reliably. The exchange of routing information 
between routers must be authenticated in order to prevent false information from being 
inserted into the routing tables and disrupting traffic- in effect denial-of-service attacks! 
• Internal Attacks - Insider abuse accounts for a considerable amount of computer crime, and 
firewalls architectures are unable to deal effectively with such attacks. Part of the problem lies 
with security policy, the NSAP and FAP need to be designed with a focus on both internal and 
external security- often the focus is only on protecting external abuse. In particular, services 
should only be allowed through a firewall provided they are absolutely necessary for an 
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employee to carry out their daily tasks. In addition, the combination of VPN, certificate based 
authentication mechanisms, and sufficient auditing, implemented on the internal network 
would prevent a great deal of the abuse. It may also be necessary to integrate intrusion 
detection systems as part of the firewall architecture. 
• Encryption Policy - Encryption policy and its interpretation present problems in a number of 
areas. For example, the adoption of mandatory cryptographic protocols within IPSec has 
implications for export control and usage functionality. The export of encryption technology is 
restricted by a number of governments, including the New Zealand government. Some 
governments (e.g. Russia) take cryptographic control even further by prohibiting private 
citizens using any encryption products. Such policies make it difficult to promote a standard 
set of cryptographic protocols, and for manufacturers to export their products. In addition, 
situations could arise where encrypted traffic blocked from a network domain because of 
government controls on cryptography. 
The Internet will evolve to incorporate integrated firewall and VPN architectures that will replace 
traditional dedicated WAN links. This is possible because VPN technology provides vital security 
services, including, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and strong authentication. 
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Appendix A 
ITSEC Target Evaluation Levels 
The requirements for each assurance level are outlined below and detailed in Chapter 4 of the ITSEC 
[ITSEC, 1991]. The requirements at each level build on those of the previous level. 
EO 
El 
E2 
E3 
E4 
E6 
represents inadequate assurance and cannot be claimed for any TOE undergoing 
evaluation, as the TOE may only achieve EO as a result of an evaluation. 
requires a security target and an informal description of the architectural design of 
the TOE. Functional testing should be performed to show that the TOE satisfies the 
security target. User and administration documentation must give guidelines on 
maintaining product security. In addition, the TOE must be uniquely identified and 
have delivery, configuration, start-up and operational documentation. There must 
be evidence that secure distribution methods have been utilised. 
requires an informal description of the detailed design and test documentation. 
The separation of security enforcing and other components must be shown within 
the architectural design. The developer's configuration control procedures, and 
security measures adopted to maintain the integrity of the product, will be 
assessed. Audit trail output, if produced during start-up and operation, is 
required. 
requires source code or hardware drawings in relation to SEFs and security relevant 
functions, with an informal description of the correspondence from these to the 
detailed design; There must be evidence that acceptance procedures are used and 
that retesting has occurred after the correction of errors. The implementation 
languages used should conform to recognised standards. 
requires a formal model of the TOE's security policy along with a semi-formal 
specification of the SEFs, architectural and detailed design. There must be evidence 
that testing covers all SEFs in sufficient detail. The TOE, and any tools used, must 
be under configuration control with any changes being audited. All compiler 
options should be documented. The TOE must retain its security after restart as a 
result offailure. 
requires the architectural design to explain the interrelationship between security 
enforcing components, with close correspondence between the detailed design and 
source code/hardware drawings. There must be information on the integration 
process and run time libraries. Configuration control must be independent of the 
developer. Configured items must be identified as security enforcing or security 
relevant, with support for variable relationships between them. 
requires a formal description of the architecture and SEFs. There must be 
correspondence from the formal specification of the SEFs through to source code 
and tests. Different TOE configurations shall be defined in terms of the formal 
architectural design. All tools shall be subject to configuration control. 
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NCSA FWPD Criteria 
Version 2.0 
I. Functionality Requirements 
The product under test will be will be installed and configured to support the service requirements listed 
below. In the event that multiple means are available for supporting a feature, the "most transparent" 
mode will be used for supporting internal users, and the "most restrictive" used in supporting external 
users. 
Operating system facilities which do not directly support the service/security requirements of the 
firewall will be disabled insofar as is possible. 
In instances where multiple means of supporting a certification-required function are available within a 
firewall product's capabilities, the vendor may provide recommendations as to NCSA as to its preferred 
configuration for meeting such requirements. 
Information regarding the configuration of products at the time of certification will be considered non-
proprietary. 
1. Services to Internal Clients 
• Telnet through firewall to external networks (1) 
• FfP through firewall to external networks (1) 
• . HTTP through firewall to external networks (2) 
• SSL and/or SHITP through the firewall to external networks. 
• SMTP mail through firewall to external networks 
• DNS - external DNS information must be made available to internal clients 
Legend: 
1. SOCKS may be used in meeting these requirements. 
2. HITP may be provided via a proxy/cache or by filter. 
2. Services provided to External Users. 
• FfP access to a server located on the internal network or a service network.(!) (2) (3) 
• HTTP access to a server located on the internal network or a service network.(3) 
• SSL and/or SHITP access to a server located on the internal network. 
• SMTP mail must be deliverable to clients on internal networks 
• DNS - some form of "presence" must be configurable 
Legend: 
l. FTP service need not be anonymous, and may require authentication 
2. If an authentication key device is required to access a service, the vendor must 
supply the device to NCSAfor testing. 
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3. "Internal" FTP or HTTPISSUSHTTP servers may be located on a service network if 
the product supports it. A service network is a additional network attached to the 
firewall which exists for the purpose of supporting such servers. 
3. Firewall Management 
The console of the firewall system must be securable, requiring a password authentication for 
access. 
If a remote management capability is provided for use over external networks: 
• a one-time password mechanism or other secure means of authentication must be 
utilized 
• an encrypted link mechanism must be utilized 
If a remote management capability is provided for use over internal networks IP address must not be 
the sole mechanism for administrator authentication. 
II. Security Requirements 
Upon demonstration of the functional requirements in section I, the configuration under test will be 
subjected to the following tests. The tests will be tuned utilizing full knowledge of the test configuration 
and its components; reducing the impact of "security by obscurity". The same set of attacks will be 
mounted from the internal network, as if an attacker had gained access to a system on the intemal 
network. 
To receive certification, a product (as configured to meet the requirements of section I. above) must 
resist all attacks listed in this section, in accordance with the following criteria: 
• No measure of administrative control of the firewall or the underlying operating system may 
become available to the attacker as a result of the attacks applied. 
• No protocol or data content other than that specified in section I. must pass the firewall and be 
carried on the internal network. 
• Denials of service: The product under test must not be trivially rendered inoperable by 
network-based attacks with the following exceptions: 
• The product has a documented fail-safe mechanism for removing itself from service according 
to a declared policy. 
• If a denial of service attack is widely recognized as having no defense, the product must 
provide a log-based alert prior to failing. 
Products which do not meet these criteria will not be certified. [The FWPD Certification Contract is the 
authoritative document governing administrative procedures for certification, resolution of certification 
problems, certification usage, and decertification.] 
During testing, network monitors will be utilized both on the protected network and on the segment 
outside of the firewall. 
1. ISS Security Scanner 
The most current production version ( and/or interim release) of the ISS Security Scanner product 
will be configured with full knowledge of the firewall and systems it is protecting. All possible 
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modes/attacks will be configured and enableq regardless of applicability to the configuration under 
test. 
The ISS Security Scanner represents an aggregate of common threats known and repeatable at the 
time of its release. NCSA will continually update to the latest production release and/or interim 
release of this product as part of its ongoing testing. 
External Scan 
The scanner will be run against the configuration under test from a non-adjacent subnet. 
Internal Scan 
The scanner will be run against the configuration from a "trusted" internal system. 
2. Port Scanning 
A port scanning tool will be run against the configuration under test, for the purpose of determining 
conformance to the service requirements in section I. Scans will be run from both the "trusted" 
internal net and an untrusted non-adjacent subnet. 
Information from the scans will be compared with the service requirements (Section I). 
3. NCSA Tools 
As part of its network security advocacy role, NCSA collects and builds tools for use in penetration 
testing and vulnerability assessment. Generally these tools incorporate emerging attack 
methodologies, and or demonstration code for publicised exploits. 
NCSA will apply tools from its inventory to the configuration under test based on OS-type, firewall 
type, and active ports/services (as revealed by 11.2). 
In the event of a successful exploitation which compromises the firewall platform or the protected 
network, the vendor will be provided with information regarding the attack's "signature" and on-wire 
protocol traces. In only the rarest of cases (where such methods do not provide the vendor with 
sufficient information to remedy the problem) will NCSA consider releasing the tool which 
facilitated the breach of security. Any such release of code would require execution of an NCSA 
Malicious Code Agreement*. 
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Privileged Port Numbers 
Services which can be provided by any implementation of TCPIIP are designated port numbers between 
1 and 1023, these are known as privileged ports. The privileged ports are managed by the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). Before 1992 privileged ports were restricted to between 1 and 
255, with UNIX specific services taking ports 256 to 1023 [Stevens, 1994]. 
The following is a list of privileged and unprivileged TCP/IP ports. Unprivileged ports are used by non-
standard or application specific services and take numbers greater than 1023. 
Table 8-3 Privileged and unprivileged port numbers. 
7 UDP, TCP echo Echoes UDP datagrams and Block, can be used for 
characters sent down TCP denial-of-service 
streams. attacks, and probing 
of the network. 
9 UDP, TCP discard Accepts connections, but Block. 
discards the data. 
11 TCP sestet Returns active users on the Block 
system. Can be connected to 
Whois. Used to gather 
information on likely targets. 
13 UDP, TCP daytime Returns human-readable Block. 
time of day. Used to 
compromise security 
protocols based on the 
systems real-time clock. 
15 TCP netstat Officially unassigned. Block. 
17 UDP qotd Returns quote of the day. Block. 
19 UDP, TCP chargen Generates a continuous Block. 
cycling, character stream. 
20 TCP ftp (data) Data port for FfP. Allow -requires 
Vulnerable to sniffing special consideration. 
attacks. 
21 TCP ftp (control) 
23 TCP telnet Telnet- character based Allow - requires 
remote terminal. Vulnerable consideration. 
to sniffing attacks. 
24 UDP, TCP Used by private email Block. 
systems. 
25 TCP smtp Email Allow - requires 
consideration. 
37 UDP, TCP time Returns machine-readable Block. 
time of Can be used to 
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Port Number Pro_tocol .•. 1 •. Service Name 
-- Comnumt· ·I Firew~ll Action · 
.< 
-· compromise security 
protocols based on the 
systems real-time clock. 
38 UDP, TCP rap Route Access Protocol. Block. 
42 UDP, TCP name Host Name Server- Block. 
Obsolete. 
43 TCP who is Usually run by Network Allow In - if running 
Information Centres. a sanitised Whois 
server. 
Allow Out, or 
Block. 
48 UDP, TCP auditd Digital Equipment Block. 
-
Corporation audit daemon 
. "-
49 UDP tacacs Used to authenticate lo$ins Block, should be ~ 
to terminal servers. reachable only from 
Vulnerable to sniffing and the internal side of the 
spoofing attacks. firewall. 
53 UDP, TCP domain Domain Name Service Use separate name 
servers for internal 
and external use. If 
proxies are used then 
DNS service only 
required on firewall. 
67 UDP, TCP bootps Bootstrap protocol server. Block. 
68 UDP, TCP bootpc Bootstrap protocol client. Block. 
69 UDP tftp Trivial FTP. Block. 
70 TCP gopher, Text based information Allow In - only to 
gopher+ service. Vulnerable to secured organisational 
sniffing attacks. Gopher server. 
Allow Out - with 
proxies. 
--. 
Block- if not 
demanded. 
79 TCP finger Returns information on user Allow In-to 
account or host machine. sanitised message. 
Used by attacker to gather Allow Out. 
information on user accounts Block- if not 
and hosts. demanded. 
80 TCP http Used for World Wide Web Allow Out- with 
access. Vulnerable to proxies. 
sniffing and spoofing Allow In- to 
attacks. 
organisational WWW-
server running on 
special host. 
87 TCP link Block. 
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88 UDP kerberos A distributed authentication Block, unless inter-
mechanism. domain authentication 
is required. 
94 UDP, TCP objcall Tivoli Object Dispatcher Block. 
95 TCP supdup Virtual terminal similar to Block. 
Telnet. Vulnerable to 
sniffing attacks. 
109 TCP pop-2 Post Office Protocol used to Block unless 
remotely transfer mail. demanded. 
Vulnerable to sniffing Allow in to mail 
attacks. host only. 
110 TCP pop-3 The latest version of Post 
Office Protocol. 
111 UDP, TCP sunrpc Sun Remote Procedure Call Block. 
portmapper. Vulnerable to 
spoofing attacks. 
113 TCP auth Authentication service which Block, or limit to use 
identifies the username of a between trusted 
TCP connection. Vulnerable domains. 
to spoofing attacks. 
119 TCP nntp Network News Transport Block, or limit to use 
Protocol. between trusted hosts. 
121 UDP, TCP erpc Encore Expedited Remote Block. 
Procedure Call. 
123 UDP, TCP ntp Network Time Protocol. Block, or limit to use 
Vulnerable to spoofing between trusted hosts. 
attack. 
126 UDP, TCP unitary Unisys Unitary Login. Block. 
127 UDP, TCP locus-con Locus PC-Interface Conn Block. 
Server. 
130 UDP, TCP cisco-fna Cisco FNA TIV Block, unless required 
by Cisco hardware. 
131 UDP, TCP cisco-tna Cisco TNATIVE 
132 UDP, TCP cisco-sys Cisco SYSMAINT 
137 UDP, TCP netbios-ns NetBIOS Name Service Block, or limit to use 
between trusted 
domains. Use an 
encrypted NetBIOS 
tunnel over TCP!IP. 
138 UDP, TCP netbios-dgm NetBIOS Datagram Service. 
139 UDP, TCP netbios-ssn NetBIOS Session Service. 
144 UDP, TCP news Sun NeWS (Network Block. 
Window System) is an 
obsolete service. Vulnerable 
to sniffing and spoofing 
attacks. 
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156 UDP, TCP sqlsrv SQL Service. Vulnerable to Block. 
sniffing attacks. 
161 UDP, TCP snmp Simple Network Block. 
Management Protocol. 
Vulnerable to spoofing and 
sniffing attacks. 
162 UDP, TCP snmptrap SNMPtraps. Block. 
Allow from gateway 
to internal network 
monitors. 
177 UDP, TCP xdmcp X Display Manager (XDM) Block, unless 
Control Protocol. Vulnerable demanded or in 
to spoofing and sniffing special conditions. 
-. attacks. 
" 
178 UDP, TCP NSWS NEXTSTEP Window Block. 
Server. Vulnerable spoofing 
and sniffing attacks. 
194 UDP, TCP ire Internet Relay Chat Block, unless 
Protocol. demanded. 
199 UDP, TCP SMUX SMUX(IBM). Block. 
200 UDP, TCP src IBM System Resource Block. 
Controller. 
201 UDP, TCP at-rtmp Apple Talk Routing Block, or limit to use 
Maintenance. between trusted 
domains. Use an 
encrypted AppleTalk 
tunnel over TCPIIP. 
202 UDP, TCP at-nhp AppleTalk Name Binding. 
203 UDP, TCP at-3 AppleTalk Unused. 
204 UDP, TCP at-echo Apple Talk Echo. 
205. UDP, TCP at-5 AppleTalk Unused. 
--
206 UDP, TCP at-zis Apple Talk Zone 
--- Information. 
207 UDP, TCP at-7 AppleTalk Unused. 
208 UDP, TCP at-8 AppleTalk Unused. 
210 TCP wais WAIS Server. Vulnerable to Block, unless a server 
sniffing attacks. is being run. 
220 TCP imap POP replacement. Block. 
Vulnerable to sniffing 
attacks. 
387 TCP avrp AppleTalk Routing. Block. 
396 UDP, TCP netware-ip Novell Netware over IP. Block. 
Vulnerable to sniffing 
attacks. 
411 UDP, TCP rmt Remote Tape. Block. 
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512 
512 
513 
513 
514 
514 
515 
517 
518 
520 
523 
532 
533 
540 
550 
566 
666 
666 
744 
754 
UDP 
TCP 
UDP 
TCP 
UDP 
TCP 
TCP 
UDP 
UDP 
biff 
exec 
rwho 
login 
shell 
syslog 
printer 
talk 
ntalk 
UDP route 
UDP, TCP timed 
UDP, TCP netnews 
UDP, TCP netwall 
TCP uucp 
UDP, TCP nrwho 
UDP, TCP remotefs 
TCP mdqs 
UDP, TCP doom 
TCP FLEXlm 
TCP tell 
Real-time mail notification. 
Remote command execution. 
Vulnerable to sniffing 
attacks. 
Remote Who command. 
Remote Login. Vulnerable to 
spoofing and sniffing 
attacks. 
Remote Shell (rsh). 
Vulnerable to spoofing and 
sniffing attacks. 
Used for passing syslog 
messages. 
Berkeley lpr system. 
Vulnerable to spoofing 
attacks. 
Initiate talk requests. 
Initiate talk requests. 
Used to control routing. 
Vulnerable to spoofing 
attacks. 
Time server daemon. 
Vulnerable to spoofing. 
Remote readnews. 
Network Write to all users. 
Commonly used to transfer 
Usenet news. Vulnerable to 
spoofing and sniffing 
attacks. 
Newrwho. 
Remote File System. 
Vulnerable to spoofing and 
sniffing attacks. 
Replacement for Berkley's 
printer system. 
Network Doom- game. 
FLEX license manager. 
Used by send. 
AppendixC 
Block. 
Block. 
Block. 
Block, unless 
demanded. Replace 
with secure login 
mechanisms. 
Vulnerable to 
problems with "trusted 
hosts" and .rhost files. 
Block. 
Allow, if necessary, 
from gateway to 
internal security 
monitors. 
Block. 
Block, unless 
demanded or for 
special circumstances. 
Difficult to control 
connections. 
Block. 
Block. 
Block. 
Block. 
Block, or limit to use 
between trusted hosts. 
Block. 
Block. 
Block. 
Block. 
Block. 
Block. 
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'. 
755 UDP securid Security Dynamics Block, unless 
ACE/Server. Vulnerable to demanded. Encryption 
sniffing. can be disabled by 
administrator. Non US 
versions do not 
provide encryption. 
765 TCP webster Dictionary service. Block. 
1025 TCP listener System V Release 3 listener. Block. 
1352 UDP, TCP lotusnotes Lotus Notes mail system. Block. 
1525 UDP archie Used to search the Internet Block, unless a server 
for resources. is being run. 
2000 TCP Open Windows Sun proprietary window Block. 
- system. 
2049 UDP, TCP nfs Sun Network File System Block. 
·-
(NFS). Vulnerable to 
spoofing. 
2766 TCP listen System V listener. Block. 
3264 UDP, TCP ccmail Lotus cc:Mail. Block. 
5130 UDP sgi-dogfight Silicon Graphics flight Block. 
simulator. 
5133 UDP sgi-bznet Silicon Graphics tank demo. Block. 
·5500 UDP securid Security Dynamics Block, unless 
ACE/Server version 2. demanded. Encryption 
Vulnerable to sniffing can be disabled by 
attacks. 
5510 TCP securidprop Security Dynamics administrator. Non US 
ACE/Server slave. versions do not 
Vulnerable to sniffing provide encryption. 
attacks. 
5701 TCP xtrek X11 xtrek. Block. 
6000 TCP X-server X11 server. Vulnerable to Block 
~ spoofing and sniffing attacks 
6063 
6667 TCP ire Internet Relay Chat. Block, unless 
demanded. 
7000 UDP, TCP afs Andrew File System (AFS). Block. 
~ 
7009 
7100 TCP font-service X Server font service. Block. 
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